I couldn't agree more. Lots of social institutions would have to be built up around it to make it work. That is why we are starting on a small scale with market research.
That is the point of the software!
This is why there is a nominating procedure. I don't think this is a great forum for hashing this all out without a white board, but I would be happy to do it with a whiteboard. I think I could persuade you that there…
For a long time I thought this too. But then Ken Arrow started working on QV and while he agrees that in spirit QV gets around the theorem, it does not to the letter. The reason is that there can be multiple equilibria…
Look above; I address this extensively in the paper.
Exponential voting would be too close to 1p1v in effect, as we argue in the paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531
As Marty Gillens argues in his book Affluence and Influence (http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9836.html), on almost every issue there is a sub group within those who feel a particular way on an issue that is highly…
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282
We are actively working on the identifiability issue; Ron Rivest (of RSA encryption) is writing a paper for a conference on the topic trying to solve this: http://bfi.uchicago.edu/events/quadratic-voting-and-public-g...
As we prove in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245), a small group can never beat out a large population with an overall preference in the opposite direction in equilibrium, regardless…
I cannot completely follow this scenario, but if you can write it up as an actual equilibrium analysis I would be fascinated to see this. I have worked very hard to come up with cases where QV does worse than…
Yes, in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models where people are not perfectly rational.
I completely agree. This is a crucial feature of QV with multiple alternatives. QV also has a nominating process to ensure the right things are on the ballot.
pas on vote buying, linear vote buying is bad according to the same theory that predicts QV is good. The only equilibrium under linear vote buying is that the single most intense (or wealthiest) individual has her way…
But it only grows with the square root of the number of wealthy individuals. See the paper with Posner; we go through many such calculations: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956
What Lalley and I (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531) prove is that QV is provably the only system of vote pricing that gives you efficiency always, so in some sense it is the best possible…
This is a great point. We address it in great depth in the paper with Posner, Voting Squared (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956). QV helps here, a lot we hope, because most current expenditure…
Fantastic question. QV does not really address this much; at a quantitative level you are right that it reduces the problem a bit, but you can't beat those asymptotic properties you highlight. The right solution is…
Agreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.
Two sets, in very controlled laboratory settings, have turned out well: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c... and http://rangevoting.org/GoereeZhangMar2013.pdf
I deal with this in another paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012
As paper describes, quadratic is the unique function with linear derivative and thus the only one that reveals true preferences.
The equity issues you all are raising are very important, but death with in detail here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956. The simplest solution is just to use an artificial currency that…
I couldn't agree more. Lots of social institutions would have to be built up around it to make it work. That is why we are starting on a small scale with market research.
That is the point of the software!
This is why there is a nominating procedure. I don't think this is a great forum for hashing this all out without a white board, but I would be happy to do it with a whiteboard. I think I could persuade you that there…
For a long time I thought this too. But then Ken Arrow started working on QV and while he agrees that in spirit QV gets around the theorem, it does not to the letter. The reason is that there can be multiple equilibria…
Look above; I address this extensively in the paper.
Exponential voting would be too close to 1p1v in effect, as we argue in the paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531
As Marty Gillens argues in his book Affluence and Influence (http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9836.html), on almost every issue there is a sub group within those who feel a particular way on an issue that is highly…
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282
We are actively working on the identifiability issue; Ron Rivest (of RSA encryption) is writing a paper for a conference on the topic trying to solve this: http://bfi.uchicago.edu/events/quadratic-voting-and-public-g...
As we prove in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245), a small group can never beat out a large population with an overall preference in the opposite direction in equilibrium, regardless…
I cannot completely follow this scenario, but if you can write it up as an actual equilibrium analysis I would be fascinated to see this. I have worked very hard to come up with cases where QV does worse than…
Yes, in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models where people are not perfectly rational.
I completely agree. This is a crucial feature of QV with multiple alternatives. QV also has a nominating process to ensure the right things are on the ballot.
pas on vote buying, linear vote buying is bad according to the same theory that predicts QV is good. The only equilibrium under linear vote buying is that the single most intense (or wealthiest) individual has her way…
But it only grows with the square root of the number of wealthy individuals. See the paper with Posner; we go through many such calculations: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956
What Lalley and I (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531) prove is that QV is provably the only system of vote pricing that gives you efficiency always, so in some sense it is the best possible…
This is a great point. We address it in great depth in the paper with Posner, Voting Squared (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956). QV helps here, a lot we hope, because most current expenditure…
Fantastic question. QV does not really address this much; at a quantitative level you are right that it reduces the problem a bit, but you can't beat those asymptotic properties you highlight. The right solution is…
Agreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.
Two sets, in very controlled laboratory settings, have turned out well: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c... and http://rangevoting.org/GoereeZhangMar2013.pdf
I deal with this in another paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012
As paper describes, quadratic is the unique function with linear derivative and thus the only one that reveals true preferences.
The equity issues you all are raising are very important, but death with in detail here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956. The simplest solution is just to use an artificial currency that…