They're making inaccurate attacks on GrapheneOS to mislead people. We have sponsorships for our server infrastructure with those companies listed here: https://grapheneos.org/sponsors We also list the sponsors of…
> suspicious sponsors GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations. It doesn't accept strings attached sponsorships. We list companies sponsoring infrastructure for GrapheneOS on our website to encourage more companies to…
> What's wrong with the upcoming partnership with Motorola where they work with grapheneos to get it suppported, but it's not preloaded? It's definitely planned for GrapheneOS to be sold preinstalled on devices, but it…
It's not accurate, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48767176.
> giving the option to completely block attestation and DRM API would be a good start. Blocking access to attestation or DRM will prevent using the functionality of the app depending on it or the whole app unless it's…
> Linux based mobile OS foundation AOSP is a Linux-based mobile OS. It runs fine on top of standard Linux kernels without downstream changes. Getting rid of the need for closed source userspace drivers for components…
System administrators of a traditional Linux distribution assemble their own OS out of their package and configuration choices. There isn't a well defined standard base OS. That's part of what makes it the traditional…
> prioritised privacy Privacy depends on privacy patches/protections and on security patches/protections. They do the opposite of taking it seriously from the hardware through the software. None has anything close to…
> Usability-wise, they are no match for Android and iOS—or even versions of them from five years ago. They're also no match for the privacy or security of iOS or AOSP. They're bringing the lack of privacy/security model…
> It doesn't solve the current issue These operating systems aren't compatible with most of the apps and services people want to use. It's going to become much worse. The compatibility layers several provide have…
> and they are legally allowed to fingerprint grapheneos and block Play functionality. No, and you also don't understand how the Play Integrity API is implemented. Google has a bunch of monopolies tied to Android.…
GrapheneOS uses all of the standard Android security features including hardware-based security features. It also adds major security improvements including features heavily based on hardware security features which are…
> Your very rigid view of the world is so distorted to the point of being absurd. You know damn well that the vast, vast majority of spying on Android is done in userspace. Most local privilege escalation (LPE) attacks…
> copy your response To avoid writing the same thing a 2nd time without forcing people to use a link and lose their place where they were reading. > barely answers the question We fully answered the question by…
> without preinstalls GrapheneOS has an official partnership with Motorola Mobility which is improving their next generation devices to meet our requirements and helping us port GrapheneOS to those. GrapheneOS will be…
> every app installed is known to the proxy since each app has a unqiue key No such proxy exists in GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS does not intercept or proxy connections made by Google apps or other apps. GrapheneOS doesn't…
> Graphene proxies all the Google services connection. They take over the connections that would go to Google. They then, supposedly, only forward the ones you wish. GrapheneOS doesn't include Google Play services.…
> Read their terms. There are no such terms. In a comment further in this thread, you linked to inaccurate posts from an anonymous user on the Privacy Guides forum as your sources. > They still run everything through…
Our requirements are for industry standard privacy/security patches and protections. We haven't set a high bar but rather have very reasonable requirements. There's nothing puritanical about requiring what we do for a…
> Very little in GrapheneOS has gone back upstream post-Copperhead. Most of what we've landed upstream has been post-Copperhead. AOSP made it increasingly difficult to contribute without being an Android partner and…
The vast majority of smartphones don't allow installing another OS. Multiple Android OEMs have been restricting or fully phasing out supporting it. Among devices which do permit it, none have provided the hardware-based…
An end-of-life Xiaomi device with no privacy or security patches for the firmware, Linux kernel, drivers and HALs for years doesn't provide the bare minimum for protecting user privacy and security. It would…
Your claims about this don't make sense. Google does not provide compatibility with GrapheneOS for Google Play services. GrapheneOS doesn't license Google Mobile Services (GMS), doesn't include it in the OS and doesn't…
They're making inaccurate attacks on GrapheneOS to mislead people. We have sponsorships for our server infrastructure with those companies listed here: https://grapheneos.org/sponsors We also list the sponsors of…
> suspicious sponsors GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations. It doesn't accept strings attached sponsorships. We list companies sponsoring infrastructure for GrapheneOS on our website to encourage more companies to…
> What's wrong with the upcoming partnership with Motorola where they work with grapheneos to get it suppported, but it's not preloaded? It's definitely planned for GrapheneOS to be sold preinstalled on devices, but it…
It's not accurate, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48767176.
> giving the option to completely block attestation and DRM API would be a good start. Blocking access to attestation or DRM will prevent using the functionality of the app depending on it or the whole app unless it's…
> Linux based mobile OS foundation AOSP is a Linux-based mobile OS. It runs fine on top of standard Linux kernels without downstream changes. Getting rid of the need for closed source userspace drivers for components…
System administrators of a traditional Linux distribution assemble their own OS out of their package and configuration choices. There isn't a well defined standard base OS. That's part of what makes it the traditional…
> prioritised privacy Privacy depends on privacy patches/protections and on security patches/protections. They do the opposite of taking it seriously from the hardware through the software. None has anything close to…
> Usability-wise, they are no match for Android and iOS—or even versions of them from five years ago. They're also no match for the privacy or security of iOS or AOSP. They're bringing the lack of privacy/security model…
> It doesn't solve the current issue These operating systems aren't compatible with most of the apps and services people want to use. It's going to become much worse. The compatibility layers several provide have…
> and they are legally allowed to fingerprint grapheneos and block Play functionality. No, and you also don't understand how the Play Integrity API is implemented. Google has a bunch of monopolies tied to Android.…
GrapheneOS uses all of the standard Android security features including hardware-based security features. It also adds major security improvements including features heavily based on hardware security features which are…
> Your very rigid view of the world is so distorted to the point of being absurd. You know damn well that the vast, vast majority of spying on Android is done in userspace. Most local privilege escalation (LPE) attacks…
> copy your response To avoid writing the same thing a 2nd time without forcing people to use a link and lose their place where they were reading. > barely answers the question We fully answered the question by…
> without preinstalls GrapheneOS has an official partnership with Motorola Mobility which is improving their next generation devices to meet our requirements and helping us port GrapheneOS to those. GrapheneOS will be…
> every app installed is known to the proxy since each app has a unqiue key No such proxy exists in GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS does not intercept or proxy connections made by Google apps or other apps. GrapheneOS doesn't…
> Graphene proxies all the Google services connection. They take over the connections that would go to Google. They then, supposedly, only forward the ones you wish. GrapheneOS doesn't include Google Play services.…
> Read their terms. There are no such terms. In a comment further in this thread, you linked to inaccurate posts from an anonymous user on the Privacy Guides forum as your sources. > They still run everything through…
Our requirements are for industry standard privacy/security patches and protections. We haven't set a high bar but rather have very reasonable requirements. There's nothing puritanical about requiring what we do for a…
> Very little in GrapheneOS has gone back upstream post-Copperhead. Most of what we've landed upstream has been post-Copperhead. AOSP made it increasingly difficult to contribute without being an Android partner and…
The vast majority of smartphones don't allow installing another OS. Multiple Android OEMs have been restricting or fully phasing out supporting it. Among devices which do permit it, none have provided the hardware-based…
The vast majority of smartphones don't allow installing another OS. Multiple Android OEMs have been restricting or fully phasing out supporting it. Among devices which do permit it, none have provided the hardware-based…
An end-of-life Xiaomi device with no privacy or security patches for the firmware, Linux kernel, drivers and HALs for years doesn't provide the bare minimum for protecting user privacy and security. It would…
Your claims about this don't make sense. Google does not provide compatibility with GrapheneOS for Google Play services. GrapheneOS doesn't license Google Mobile Services (GMS), doesn't include it in the OS and doesn't…