That doesn't solve the case for when you get a new device or reinstall the app. Any keys you had are lost.
As a consequence of this choice, they store all of your unencrypted contacts (or unencrypted Wire contacts) on their servers. I don't think that's "additional privacy," compared to what Signal stores (nothing, it…
If I remember correctly, as a consequence, they store all of your unencrypted contacts on their server, or at least all of your unencrypted Wire contacts on their server. Unlike Signal, which stores nothing about you…
I think this issue is more complicated than people realize. There are really only three options here: 1. Use the device's address book (phone numbers). 2. Use Facebook Connect (FB id). 3. Store the entire social graph…
> They assume that no side channel attacks will be mounted to determine the processes that occur in side the chip. They do? 2/3rds of this blog post are about side channel attacks. The majority of the technical aspects…
That doesn't solve the case for when you get a new device or reinstall the app. Any keys you had are lost.
As a consequence of this choice, they store all of your unencrypted contacts (or unencrypted Wire contacts) on their servers. I don't think that's "additional privacy," compared to what Signal stores (nothing, it…
If I remember correctly, as a consequence, they store all of your unencrypted contacts on their server, or at least all of your unencrypted Wire contacts on their server. Unlike Signal, which stores nothing about you…
I think this issue is more complicated than people realize. There are really only three options here: 1. Use the device's address book (phone numbers). 2. Use Facebook Connect (FB id). 3. Store the entire social graph…
> They assume that no side channel attacks will be mounted to determine the processes that occur in side the chip. They do? 2/3rds of this blog post are about side channel attacks. The majority of the technical aspects…