Yes it does. They ship userdebug builds as production releases, pretend to support devices past their vendor EOL (which is impossible since Lineage can't provide security updates for firmware etc.), ship the F-Droid…
Locking the bootloader (to enable verified boot) isn't only a protection against physical attacks. It also ensures that any deep OS exploit that occurs is not persistent since the base OS is cryptographically verified…
> How does it handle Doze? Play Services requires its battery optimization to be set to unrestricted for FCM to work reliably. Other apps keeping a persistent background connection (e.g. Signal w/out Play Services)…
GrapheneOS doesn't automatically connect to Wi-Fi either unless you enable the option. It also has per-connection MAC randomization enabled by default so Wi-Fi is essentially anonymous when you use it anyway. > you…
There is no evidence to suggest this. GrapheneOS has multiple systemic privacy and security improvements over the stock OS (e.g. hardened_malloc, toggleable network permission, exec spawning), so it's a much harder…
> they insist in doing everything themselves because no other project is good enough They are making an alternative store with better security and privacy properties than both Google Play and F-Droid. Why is this…
Yes it does. They ship userdebug builds as production releases, pretend to support devices past their vendor EOL (which is impossible since Lineage can't provide security updates for firmware etc.), ship the F-Droid…
Locking the bootloader (to enable verified boot) isn't only a protection against physical attacks. It also ensures that any deep OS exploit that occurs is not persistent since the base OS is cryptographically verified…
> How does it handle Doze? Play Services requires its battery optimization to be set to unrestricted for FCM to work reliably. Other apps keeping a persistent background connection (e.g. Signal w/out Play Services)…
GrapheneOS doesn't automatically connect to Wi-Fi either unless you enable the option. It also has per-connection MAC randomization enabled by default so Wi-Fi is essentially anonymous when you use it anyway. > you…
There is no evidence to suggest this. GrapheneOS has multiple systemic privacy and security improvements over the stock OS (e.g. hardened_malloc, toggleable network permission, exec spawning), so it's a much harder…
> they insist in doing everything themselves because no other project is good enough They are making an alternative store with better security and privacy properties than both Google Play and F-Droid. Why is this…