The threat model is malicious injection, not (some)information leakage. > my web site has been around for 20 years, serving static files mostly containing a blurb about my service, my blog, Your http website will be…
Counter-intuitively, it is often difficult to reach low latency with "narrow bandwidth" (you mean low sampling rate), because many SDR interfaces are designed to fill full packets with data, not send tiny packets (ex:…
Buffers, buffers everywhere... It depends on the sampling rate and technology (USB, ethernet, direct PCI), but in general 1msec is achievable, 10microsec is not achievable. That's why BladeRF-wiphy (…
HTTPS only is a "Fail Closed" system, ie it blocks access in case of failure. This is safe for the general population. HTTPS/HTTP mixed support is a "Fail Open" system, ie it allows (unencrypted) access in case of…
HTTPS-everywhere, along with constant monitoring and reporting of certificate chains by the browser, are designed to protect against QUANTUM attacks [1], which, ~10 years ago, was being scaled to support million of…
The threat model is malicious injection, not (some)information leakage. > my web site has been around for 20 years, serving static files mostly containing a blurb about my service, my blog, Your http website will be…
Counter-intuitively, it is often difficult to reach low latency with "narrow bandwidth" (you mean low sampling rate), because many SDR interfaces are designed to fill full packets with data, not send tiny packets (ex:…
Buffers, buffers everywhere... It depends on the sampling rate and technology (USB, ethernet, direct PCI), but in general 1msec is achievable, 10microsec is not achievable. That's why BladeRF-wiphy (…
HTTPS only is a "Fail Closed" system, ie it blocks access in case of failure. This is safe for the general population. HTTPS/HTTP mixed support is a "Fail Open" system, ie it allows (unencrypted) access in case of…
HTTPS-everywhere, along with constant monitoring and reporting of certificate chains by the browser, are designed to protect against QUANTUM attacks [1], which, ~10 years ago, was being scaled to support million of…