This is more of an attempt to give little background on RNG problems in a security context, and a description of how MirageOS' crypto stack deals with RNG, with an emphasis on entropy harvesting.
No, or at least not yet. :) You are probably thinking of these guys: http://www.mitls.org. They have a killer TLS, but it drags the entire CLR in. We are these guys: http://openmirage.org/blog/introducing-ocaml-tls.
Nope, not yet. ;_;
... back.
Because I'm looking at GBs of SYNs scrolling down the terminal.
Syn flood...
Update: DDoS, SYN flood. Stay tuned...
Why do you think this creates malleability? PKCS1.5 stripping takes away the leading 0x00 0x01 0xff ... 0x00 -- if this prefix is not present, it fails. The rest goes through the RSA tranform, and is parsed as PKCS1…
Hah, and I wondered how come we suddenly started getting MITM connections from several places. FWIW you can also do it with a single socat invocation, but I'll leave the exact command as an exercise for the reader.
Aaah, but you can try to do soooo much more! You can try to confuse the ASN.1 parser, or even the protocol level parser. You can try to defeat certificate validation logic. You can try to get handshake state-machine do…
Sounds like a nice exercise, I'll try it. But since by and large the lines we have are expression and not statements (the core handler is purely functional, using a monad to thread errors through), this amounts to type…
That is exactly the question we have. And yes, the primitives are in C largely due to timing concerns.
It concerns us too. Right now the entropy in Xen domains is weak, but we are working with the rest of the team to feed some actual environmental noise to keep Fortuna well-fed. You can also run the library on Unix, of…
Hey, (Disclaimer: one of the authors) We randomize the connection parameters on each connect to help us gauge the stack's behavior with various combinations (see https://github.com/mirleft/ocaml-tls/issues/159 ).…
This is more of an attempt to give little background on RNG problems in a security context, and a description of how MirageOS' crypto stack deals with RNG, with an emphasis on entropy harvesting.
No, or at least not yet. :) You are probably thinking of these guys: http://www.mitls.org. They have a killer TLS, but it drags the entire CLR in. We are these guys: http://openmirage.org/blog/introducing-ocaml-tls.
Nope, not yet. ;_;
... back.
Because I'm looking at GBs of SYNs scrolling down the terminal.
Syn flood...
Update: DDoS, SYN flood. Stay tuned...
Why do you think this creates malleability? PKCS1.5 stripping takes away the leading 0x00 0x01 0xff ... 0x00 -- if this prefix is not present, it fails. The rest goes through the RSA tranform, and is parsed as PKCS1…
Hah, and I wondered how come we suddenly started getting MITM connections from several places. FWIW you can also do it with a single socat invocation, but I'll leave the exact command as an exercise for the reader.
Aaah, but you can try to do soooo much more! You can try to confuse the ASN.1 parser, or even the protocol level parser. You can try to defeat certificate validation logic. You can try to get handshake state-machine do…
Sounds like a nice exercise, I'll try it. But since by and large the lines we have are expression and not statements (the core handler is purely functional, using a monad to thread errors through), this amounts to type…
That is exactly the question we have. And yes, the primitives are in C largely due to timing concerns.
It concerns us too. Right now the entropy in Xen domains is weak, but we are working with the rest of the team to feed some actual environmental noise to keep Fortuna well-fed. You can also run the library on Unix, of…
Hey, (Disclaimer: one of the authors) We randomize the connection parameters on each connect to help us gauge the stack's behavior with various combinations (see https://github.com/mirleft/ocaml-tls/issues/159 ).…