> Now your cache/registers/SRAM are maintained. Power up with JTAG or a custom/debugging bootrom/mode that hopefully doesn’t overwrite much/any and dump away. If you care about security, you'd be disabling these. Every…
To get 192-bit security with RSA you'd need 7680-bit RSA key and with ECC you need 384-bit key as mentioned in the article. That assumes classical attacks only. For quantum attacks, the smaller key sizes used with ECC…
What the article describes is not particularly difficult to implement. But claiming that storing the firmware in a way that prevents the user from updating it via software somehow makes the device more "free" is absurd.
> That's why so few of them tend to advertise transmit capabilities. Any SDR that has transmit capability freely advertises it and there are many of them. The makers of one of them (bladeRF) also develops an open source…
This polling is not done by the CPU, this is a common misconception. In a typical modern system the only polling that happens with USB is done by the USB host controller and only when there is actual data the host…
This has nothing to do with "weakening of ECC". Dual_EC_DRBG is an RNG that happens to use Elliptic Curves but its problems have nothing to do with that, they have to do with the design of the RNG itself. And those…
Yes, for a wifi client (like in the article) you're right. manuel_w was talking about bridging on the AP and for that you do just enable bridging and it works fine.
The 802.11 header has 4 MAC addresses: Source Address (SA), Destination Address (DA), Transmitter Address (TA), Receiver Address (RA). The TA and RA are those of the Wifi station and SA and DA are the Ethernet…
> Until spoofing, amplification attacks on UDP are properly tackled This is already addressed by QUIC (the transport protocol used by HTTP/3). Those things are no more of a problem for HTTP/3 than they are for HTTP/2 or…
Firewall changes are only needed if your firewall rules were unreasonable to begin with. > connection tracking in routers may not work anymore What do you mean by this? Tracking of UDP flows has been supported by…
> if your users are untrusted and not under your direct administrative control (e.g. students in a dorm, hotel guests, et c) then default-allow-everything jeopardizes your upstream transit connection (e.g. if they start…
The mathematics of Shor's algorithm have been known for decades. The challenge is in building the hardware, not in the math. There are tens of billions of dollars worth of abandoned Bitcoins in addresses with exposed…
> it still has the decryption keys No, they (usually) work similar to PGP/GPG, i.e. each file is encrypted with a different AES key and the AES key is encrypted with a public RSA key. The original AES key for a…
The UID is 256-bit. With a proper random number generator you don't do anything additional to avoid collisions. Hardware random number generators are standard for crypto processors like the secure enclave and there are…
The ECC algorithms used today rely on the "Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem" and are very much vulnerable to (a version of) Shor's algorithm. Some would even say they are more vulnerable than RSA due to the…
> because I can compromise the thing without opening it (just press the button and reflash with non-signed images). I don't think so. With RDP enabled the only thing the bootloader lets you do is erase all flash. After…
Yes, but if you want your sessions that are captured today to remain confidential when quantum computers do become reality then you need to use post-quantum key exchange methods today.
Symantec already agreed to start using Certificate Transparency in the near future, as per Google's request. This is a good thing.
Firefox packages its own copy of the libraries it uses, including the stagefright library. They patched their copy in the new release.
This sounds like DHT, which has existed for a while now. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table
> Now your cache/registers/SRAM are maintained. Power up with JTAG or a custom/debugging bootrom/mode that hopefully doesn’t overwrite much/any and dump away. If you care about security, you'd be disabling these. Every…
To get 192-bit security with RSA you'd need 7680-bit RSA key and with ECC you need 384-bit key as mentioned in the article. That assumes classical attacks only. For quantum attacks, the smaller key sizes used with ECC…
What the article describes is not particularly difficult to implement. But claiming that storing the firmware in a way that prevents the user from updating it via software somehow makes the device more "free" is absurd.
> That's why so few of them tend to advertise transmit capabilities. Any SDR that has transmit capability freely advertises it and there are many of them. The makers of one of them (bladeRF) also develops an open source…
This polling is not done by the CPU, this is a common misconception. In a typical modern system the only polling that happens with USB is done by the USB host controller and only when there is actual data the host…
This has nothing to do with "weakening of ECC". Dual_EC_DRBG is an RNG that happens to use Elliptic Curves but its problems have nothing to do with that, they have to do with the design of the RNG itself. And those…
Yes, for a wifi client (like in the article) you're right. manuel_w was talking about bridging on the AP and for that you do just enable bridging and it works fine.
The 802.11 header has 4 MAC addresses: Source Address (SA), Destination Address (DA), Transmitter Address (TA), Receiver Address (RA). The TA and RA are those of the Wifi station and SA and DA are the Ethernet…
> Until spoofing, amplification attacks on UDP are properly tackled This is already addressed by QUIC (the transport protocol used by HTTP/3). Those things are no more of a problem for HTTP/3 than they are for HTTP/2 or…
Firewall changes are only needed if your firewall rules were unreasonable to begin with. > connection tracking in routers may not work anymore What do you mean by this? Tracking of UDP flows has been supported by…
> if your users are untrusted and not under your direct administrative control (e.g. students in a dorm, hotel guests, et c) then default-allow-everything jeopardizes your upstream transit connection (e.g. if they start…
The mathematics of Shor's algorithm have been known for decades. The challenge is in building the hardware, not in the math. There are tens of billions of dollars worth of abandoned Bitcoins in addresses with exposed…
> it still has the decryption keys No, they (usually) work similar to PGP/GPG, i.e. each file is encrypted with a different AES key and the AES key is encrypted with a public RSA key. The original AES key for a…
The UID is 256-bit. With a proper random number generator you don't do anything additional to avoid collisions. Hardware random number generators are standard for crypto processors like the secure enclave and there are…
The ECC algorithms used today rely on the "Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem" and are very much vulnerable to (a version of) Shor's algorithm. Some would even say they are more vulnerable than RSA due to the…
> because I can compromise the thing without opening it (just press the button and reflash with non-signed images). I don't think so. With RDP enabled the only thing the bootloader lets you do is erase all flash. After…
Yes, but if you want your sessions that are captured today to remain confidential when quantum computers do become reality then you need to use post-quantum key exchange methods today.
Symantec already agreed to start using Certificate Transparency in the near future, as per Google's request. This is a good thing.
Firefox packages its own copy of the libraries it uses, including the stagefright library. They patched their copy in the new release.
This sounds like DHT, which has existed for a while now. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table