He supplies his own. In situations where you control both endpoints, this is far more secure than trusting system CA certificates (which include all manner of foreign government and third-party certificates, including…
So the way you're using it: auto verificationErrors = reply->sslConfiguration().peerCertificate().verify(m_sslConfiguration.caCertificates()); implies that you want to see if "peerCertificate" validates under…
Also, you're using the "verify" function incorrectly. Take a look at the documentation for that function; it doesn't do what you think it does anyway. So even on non-Mac platforms, you weren't verifying the peer…
Looks like there are a couple of other functions in the Secure Transport backend that aren't implemented. Pretty irresponsible to put that kind of insecure-default code into a production library. The workaround is to…
He supplies his own. In situations where you control both endpoints, this is far more secure than trusting system CA certificates (which include all manner of foreign government and third-party certificates, including…
So the way you're using it: auto verificationErrors = reply->sslConfiguration().peerCertificate().verify(m_sslConfiguration.caCertificates()); implies that you want to see if "peerCertificate" validates under…
Also, you're using the "verify" function incorrectly. Take a look at the documentation for that function; it doesn't do what you think it does anyway. So even on non-Mac platforms, you weren't verifying the peer…
Looks like there are a couple of other functions in the Secure Transport backend that aren't implemented. Pretty irresponsible to put that kind of insecure-default code into a production library. The workaround is to…