/dev/random does not have to depend on any pseudo generator as long as it can block indefinitely while starved for entropy.
Yes. I've already admitted it is a very unlikely scenario, but last I heard we haven't proven P=NP yet...
> Applications trust /dev/urandom to be secure. That is decidedly not true. /dev/urandom is not guaranteed to be secure upon boot before enough entropy is gathered by the system, but it is guaranteed to not block…
I don't think I have that misunderstanding. My question is, do you have proof that: 1. the CSPRNG in Linux is secure, and 2. CSPRNGs in general exists ? Fixing #1 simply requires changing to another algorithm. Fixing #2…
This is probably way outside of my sphere of competence, but.... If your approach is adopted, people would simply treat /dev/random and /dev/urandom as the same thing (which I gather is your intended goal). That is fine…
/dev/random does not have to depend on any pseudo generator as long as it can block indefinitely while starved for entropy.
Yes. I've already admitted it is a very unlikely scenario, but last I heard we haven't proven P=NP yet...
> Applications trust /dev/urandom to be secure. That is decidedly not true. /dev/urandom is not guaranteed to be secure upon boot before enough entropy is gathered by the system, but it is guaranteed to not block…
I don't think I have that misunderstanding. My question is, do you have proof that: 1. the CSPRNG in Linux is secure, and 2. CSPRNGs in general exists ? Fixing #1 simply requires changing to another algorithm. Fixing #2…
This is probably way outside of my sphere of competence, but.... If your approach is adopted, people would simply treat /dev/random and /dev/urandom as the same thing (which I gather is your intended goal). That is fine…