The only thing I could argue is a speed component. Something would need to work at a reasonable operating speed for humans to judge it as conscious. If an answer took ten years to get back I doubt anyone would call it conscious.
It's possible that some form of life exists that operates on a significantly different time scale than we do, let's say it takes 10,000 years just to communicate a greeting, or a microsecond to do the same. We likely wouldn't recognize it as conscious (or even life), and it possibly wouldn't recognize us either.
>To see why, I’d like to point to one empirical thing about the brain that currently separates it from any existing computer program. Namely, we know how to copy a computer program. We know how to rerun it with different initial conditions but everything else the same. We know how to transfer it from one substrate to another. With the brain, we don’t know how to do any of those things.
What about DRM? We can copy programs because we make them or we know specifications of the original computer it was meant to be run on or we can guess (because there aren't that many architectures, etc.)
What if a DRM scheme didn't need to run on modern architectures, was written in new programming languages from machine language and up, on entirely new paradigms? Do you think it would be easy to copy? What if it was unethical and illegal to do anything that could stop the program, or break the hardware? Would it even be surprising that we couldn't emulate it?
Even today's DRM schemes have not all been broken, and not all programs can be run on other substrates. The ones that have been reverse engineered is because they're written for architectures that are already known, and there's just specifics that need to be figured out. (Or so is the impression I get from reverse engineering discussions).
One thing Julian Jaynes discusses in his book Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (highly recommend, but a hard read) is that consciousness is comprised of a number of different qualities, one being excerptification - the ability to take a number of indiscriminate ideas/memories/images and string together a narrative.
For example, I can take the idea of a narwhal horn and the idea of a horse and mix them together to create a unicorn. My conscious mind took the excerpt of a narwhal horn and strung it together with the excerpt of a horse body. And I didn't just stick the horn on some random part of the horse's body, there was a contextual understanding behind it - a narwhal horn belongs on the forehead, the head of a horse is the thing with eyes and a nose.
Can a computer do that? No way, not presently at least. There's waaayy too much going on in the process of excerptification for a computer to replicate just this one facet of our consciousness.
Computers are close to that. The neural net image backward inference is similar. They take bits of imagery and try to retrofit it in 'meaningful' ways, blending both source and target image. Also genetic programming can model swapping and blending traits.
Meh, not really, the computer doesn't understand the images it's mixing, it's just using some clever algorithms to piece together an image. It has no awareness of the images you're giving it. I couldn't give it an image of a narwhal and an image of a horse and expect it to give me a unicorn.
To be fair, you haven't defined awareness in any meaningful way. Concepts are just coded by specific patterns of neural firings - there is no reason a neural net can't theoretically also code concepts meaningfully (of course, understanding that process and getting it work perfectly is decades away, IMO).
I don't buy the "understanding is hard". Also you'd have to characterize precisely what is so special about a unicorn. There are animals with 2, 3 .. things on their forehead. That doesn't make them special. What about pegasus. Or other invented beings of 50/50 blends (minautor, egyptian gods). We just have one particular model or animal qualities ingrained and 'enjoy' toying with a maximizing function of having both our traits and other animal traits. I'd love to see a cockroachman god figure.
I'd bet a thousands dollars that the underlying principles Deep Dreams uses to infer fractal and continuous images are the same we have in our brains.
> Meh, not really, the computer doesn't understand the images it's mixing,
That's 100% wrong. It does create abstract representations and it can imagine back. For example, there is this neural net that can do "woman + glasses = woman wearing glasses" on images, without any tags. It can combine concepts and generate new images. There is also another one that can "dream" images of bedrooms. It can even interpolate 10 intermediary bedrooms between any two images, and they look very good.
> I couldn't give it an image of a narwhal and an image of a horse and expect it to give me a unicorn.
You absolutely could with a generative adversarial network and the right training dataset. They can interpolate between images in a semantic way, and add and subtract components of the semantic representation. While it's not narwhals and horses, here's an example of using images of men with and without glasses along with a woman without glasses to generate a woman with glasses: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Newmu/dcgan_code/master/im...
More results here: https://github.com/Newmu/dcgan_code And note that this field is advancing so rapidly that these results have already been improved on despite being only six months old.
jbob2000 makes the error of being too vague (didn't define awareness). You're making the error of being too specific. Under no suitable definition of awareness do GANs exhibit awareness. They are a very specific and narrow statistical tool used to solve a specific problem they are trained for specifically.
If you're referring to backprop, no. It's an open research question to characterize what/how a neural net is learning during backprop (aside from trivial statements like "optimizing a nonconvex function" etc.)
No, I didn't even study NN, so backprop is a fuzzy notion. I take it as a convergence feedback loop, am I completely off ?
By backward I meant the images done by the Deep Dreams program. They retrofit (hence the back) 'dog' signals fractally. This is a pretty amazing primitive to me. Trying to recognize 'concepts' even through that much distortion.
J.C.R. Licklider, father of the Internet, thought analogy tests were a strong indication of intelligence. Hoeflin's difficult IQ tests also used analogies, but it actually now seems like a bad way to measure intelligence in a multicultural setting (for example "Jekyll : Hyde :: Eloi : ?" is a particularly pointless test of having "read" two particular mainstream books in English.)
Excerptification, as you describe it, sounds like a game of analogies. AI is not far from solving this kind of problem, as long as it is expressed symbolically.
Here's a paper discussing one AGI system, implemented in Haskell, that might be appropriate for work with analogy problems that require "imagination" as well as raw "perception":
Claes Strannegård; Rickard von Haugwitz; Johan Wessberg; Balkenius Christian (2013).
"A Cognitive Architecture Based on Dual Process Theory"
http://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/178583
My definition of conscious is being aware of what you are doing and influencing it.
Can a computer running a file server realize it is only storing pirated movies and stop it it without being explicitly programmed to do so? A conscious computer could.
Are you sure that's a good definition? You yourself can't reliably stop remembering something even if you want to; why expect a computer to be able to do it?
So to be aware, it is sufficient for the entity to attempt to influence its state? Is a sunflower aware? It tracks the sun. You're just pushing the difficulty into the word "independently" now.
> Can a computer running a file server realize it is only storing pirated movies and stop it it without being explicitly programmed to do so? A conscious computer could.
Can a person from 1975 know your hard drive was full of pirated content? Probably he knows no title from your library, so he could not assume one way or another. It's as if specific "programming" was missing from him, or people from 1975 aren't passing your consciousness test.
The question is - how explicitly? You, for example, can take a course in movie criticism and change how you see movies by applying patterns you are given there.
It's a question of are there meta-patterns and meta-meta patterns.
I've done things where a minimal set of rules in a filter led to very mildly emergent phenomena in control systems. I didn't tell it what the answers were; I told it how to find the answer ( this is much less impressive than it sounds - think of a filter into basically a running average ) .
I joked that this was AI, but I'm not sure I was really joking because it's a difficult question. In the end, it was just a (perhaps unnecessarily complex) feedback leg. But it worked when nothing else would - but once you find the thing you're looking for, you tend to stop looking.
The question isn't "can" but "should". Should we, assuming we could, create conscious (conscious meaning being self-aware and having the ability to learn) machines? There have been hundreds of books, movies, games - about this issue and all, come to the same conclusion... NO.
right. those books and movies and whatnot express human anxiety about artificial consciousness. whether that anxiety is well-founded is really beside the point.
I disagree. We absolutely should create conscious, artificially-intelligent beings, and then hopefully they'll decide we're obsolete and wipe us out. Good riddance.
The Many Worlds hypothesis provides a partial answer to some issues of consciousness, via kind of solipsism: "I am the only mind which exists: in my fold of the Many Worlds complex". This reconciles the problem of why everyone's consciousness is pinned to oneself: what causes your consciousness to be confined to yourself and inaccessible to me and vice versa. Basically, there is no hidden context variable for that; in fact, the universe in which you're conscious is devoid of my consciousness. (Plain solipsism consists of denying that there is any other consciousness anywhere, which is very different, and has entirely different ethical/moral implications.) The hypothesis is essentially that the subjective phenomenon of consciousness is something of which a single instance arises in any universe. That's okay; we have multiple parallel universes, and therefore multiple instances of consciousness. A variation on the Anthropic Principle then explains why "you are you and not someone else". (If you were someone else, you might still be asking that question---as that someone else.)
> Look, clearly we’re machines governed by the laws of physics. We’re computers made of meat, as Marvin Minsky put it.
This really seem inescapable to me. The remaining arguments all seem like smokescreens. Being able to copy computer programs? Reproducing the running state of even a moderately complex distributed system is effectively impossible, so this argument bothers me not at all.
Even if there is some quantum gravitational aspect of human consciousness, the idea that you'd be able to distinguish between that and a reasonable computational approximation of it seems far-fetched at best.
That said, I feel that we are extremely far away from producing a computer-based consciousness. Even human consciousness needs a couple of years of full-speed processing to reach the point at which it could even vaguely be considered conscious by adult standards. Most likely 5-10 years after we give up on the notion of creating an AI we'll discover that we created one 15 years ago but just haven't yet been able to recognize it as an emergent property of a hugely complex system.
And even the Xen example is rough; the new copy of the system will be mostly functionally identical, but any reliance on the state of external things (like remote storage or IO or the state of unfair nondeterministic locks) will rapidly cause state to diverge.
Which only begs the question about how high-fidelity a copy has to be to be a "copy", even in the case of a hypothetical consciousness copy, and leads into the even more subtle question of the time evolution of a person and whether the me of now and the me of twenty seconds ago can be said to represent the same singular "consciousness" at all.
You linked to the migration of a single operating system kernel. That is very different from reproducing the running state of an entire distributed system. Migrating a single kernel is not easy, but straight-forward: you have access to all of the relevant pieces (in memory process state, and state on disks) in one place. With a distributed system, that is not so, since the the running state of a distributed system will include information in-flight, some of which is not virtualized.
It is possible to migrate the state of a distributed system by designing a protocol such that all of the components stop sending information around, so that you can be sure you did not miss anything. But I think that violates the spirit of the phrase "running state", since you essentially stopped the system. It's also not necessarily so that post-migration, the system will act the same.
I'm aware of such things, and in fact I work on a system that supports something very similar. (Paper to be published by my colleagues in the industry track of VLDB.) But that is a logical snapshot. Through a clever protocol, and assuming some characteristics of your transport, you can save a state across your system that is logically consistent. That is, if you restored to this logical state, the distributed application can resume from that point, and maintain integrity. You may, however, lose information from your system that was computed after you took your snapshot. The state is logically consistent, but unlikely to be representative of any actual point in time.
Strictly speaking you're correct -- a distributed snapshot doesn't capture the state of the system at a single instant. But there's a sense in which the nondeterminism introduced by the snapshot is no worse than the nondeterminism that is intrinsic to a distributed system.
To be more precise: any "possible outcome" of the snapshot was also possible at some point during the original execution. And likewise, any "impossible outcome" of the snapshot was also ruled out at some point in the original. So if viewed from the outside, the fact that you took and restored a snapshot is indistinguishable from the normal situation of having an asynchronous network. It can't cause the system to exhibit any behaviors that weren't otherwise allowable.
(Apologies if I'm just restating what you already know; other readers may not be aware of it. This might be the same property that you're calling "integrity".)
This is reminiscent of one of Scott Aaronson's comments from the original article. If quantum effects are significant in the brain, then it's impossible -- even in principle -- to "perfectly" copy it such that the original and the copy are guaranteed to behave identically. But if the original and the copy are statistically indistinguishable, it amounts to the same thing.
That said, I feel that we are extremely far away from producing a computer-based consciousness
Views of distance to the production of "conscious" machines are likely all over the place because there aren't really any clear ideas about what consciousness is and why it's important.
* Is it one state of mind that represents another state of mind? We trivially can construct computers with states which reflect each other.
* Is it being able to act without external control, ie, apparently randomly? Computers can do that better than people right now.
And despite the fogginess and disagreement about what consciousness is, it's highly valued and thought necessary by many people looking into this stuff. If you think about that for a second, it's a reason to be even more skeptical about it.
I believe the broadest consensus defines consciousness as having a subjective experience.
What's unclear, and some deem impossible, is how we can externally detect consciousness. A machine could act and respond in a manner indistinguishable from humans but still be unconscious.
Not just a machine. I agree with definition of consciousness, but it's implication is that we can only ever be sure of our own present consciousness. The consciousness of other people and even our past selves can't be verified.
Ugh... replacing one vague and undefined word with three vague and undefined words (I'm including "having" because that's a hard one to nail down in context).
function i_am_conscious(x) { return x + Math.random(); }
This function has a subjective experience.
To avoid any discussion of consciousness becoming a discussion of the meaning of the word "consciousness" we have to accept that consciousness (like everything else in the real world) is not a boolean property, but rather a subjective "I know it when I see it" sort of thing. Or in Bayesian terms, it's a weighted evaluation of evidence against a vast array of mostly unknown priors.
That's why I think it will sneak up on us; there will be systems that some very small group of people (mostly crazy) think are conscious, then systems that a slightly larger group of people (maybe more crazy, maybe less) think are conscious, until one day You wake up and realize that You are one of the crazy people.
But directed attempts to satisfy some definition of "consciousness" in a system will just result in a counterexample to that definition.
>A machine could act and respond in a manner indistinguishable from humans but still be unconscious.
There are some types of behaviour that could make it clear a machine was conscious from a practical point of view. Say you had a robot teacher and threw something when it's back was turned and you tried to frame a fellow classmate but the robot saw through it and told you not to do that. It would be fairly clear it was conscious of what was going on from a practical point of view. You could of course say it's not real consciousness because it a robot but how do you know a human teacher is conscious beyond such behaviour?
A statement like "They've figured out what we're up to and are thinking how to stop us, though luckily they are not conscious." doesn't really make sense regardless of what the they is.
I believe the broadest consensus defines consciousness as having a subjective experience.
I could go one further and say "I believe the absolute broadest consensus defines consciousness as having a conscious experience." and only say slightly less vague than your statement.
Conscious, subjectivity, awareness in some of their meanings are just synonyms for some internal experience or other. There's a sense that this internal experience reflects things in a unique way, that it's not controlled by outside constrains, that it reflects a person's unique choices not controlled by any fixed pattern or program. But it's just primarily an intuition.
So then define "subjective experience" without "it's that thing we have" (which thing?) or using the word subjective. This feels to me like replacing one undefined term with another.
Also Dennett has an excellent rebuttal to the concept of p-zombies (unconscious entities indistinguishable from conscious ones) imo.
And David Chalmers has an excellent rebuttal to Dennett's rebuttal. Different people take different sides, and I'm with Chalmers on this one.
The evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies is in your living room, if you have a television. You can see people on it and they behave intelligently. Are they conscious? Of course not, they're just red, green, and blue dots. Maybe we could make this a bit more realistic?
You're now in a very realistic virtual reality. Your character is conscious, because you are. So is the character being played by your friend over there (assuming he's not a p-zombie). But what about the characters next to you? Maybe Doug Lenat and Geoffrey Hinton collaborated and developed an AI as intelligent as a person, and that's what controls them. They can't be conscious, because they're just pixels like the dots on your flat-screen TV, so not conscious in the virtual reality, and they're not conscious in the real world either, because they're just software, which is an epiphenomenon, like wetness or tidiness. The computer which runs the VR, and the AIs, might be conscious but that would be a very different consciousness from yours. Maybe it senses voltage levels at its memory addresses, but it certainly wouldn't see you or the submachine gun you're carrying in the VR.
Maybe we already are in a virtual reality. Nick Bostrom thinks we might be. If it's sufficiently realistic, there might be no way to tell, and no way to tell whether everyone is conscious, or nobody is conscious except you.
> The evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies is in your living room, if you have a television. You can see people on it and they behave intelligently. Are they conscious? Of course not, they're just red, green, and blue dots.
I don't see how that constitutes evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies. They're obviously distinguishable from conscious entities with a simple test: ask a TV person a question.
And your VR example simply assumes the conclusion:
> Maybe Doug Lenat and Geoffrey Hinton collaborated and developed an AI as intelligent as a person, and that's what controls them
How do you know the AI isn't conscious? You're simply asserting that it isn't. For all you know, "AI as intelligent as a person" literally isn't possible without consciousness, which makes your assertion inconceivable.
Which is why the whole p-zombie thought experiment doesn't convince anyone: if you already think consciousness is physical, then p-zombies aren't conceivable and the thought experiment isn't convincing, and if you already think consciousness is not physical, then p-zombies merely assert the same conclusion you already hold and you're "convinced".
The computer that runs the VR (including the AI controlling the behaviour of the NPCs) might well be conscious, but the NPCs themselves are just pixels. Before you argue that you are too, you know otherwise and you see the VR's pixels. Meanwhile, the computer which is generating the VR, and is outside it, doesn't have to see anything. It might sense some electrical signals originating from you and your friend's bodysuits, but that isn't going to feel anything like the experience you and your friend are having.
> The computer that runs the VR (including the AI controlling the behaviour of the NPCs) might well be conscious, but the NPCs themselves are just pixels.
Where and how the information processing actually occurs to produce this intelligence doesn't seem relevant. The NPCs are individually either as intelligent as a person, and equally distinct, or they are not. If they are, they may be conscious. You said they are so intelligent, and therefore, you have no idea whether they are or are not conscious.
> It might sense some electrical signals originating from you and your friend's bodysuits, but that isn't going to feel anything like the experience you and your friend are having.
I don't see how that's relevant to whether the game system or NPCs are conscious.
I think we're arguing past each other here. I accept that the computer controlling the VR might be conscious of something while it runs the AI software, but the brains of the NPCs clearly aren't conscious. In fact, they don't even need to have brains. The computer isn't immersed in the VR the way you and your friend are. It doesn't use senses the same way you do.
> I accept that the computer controlling the VR might be conscious of something while it runs the AI software
But the AI software/algorithm is exactly what would produce the consciousness, if it were possible to do. So if it runs this algorithm individually for each NPC, then each NPC is conscious. And it clearly must run the algorithm individually because each NPC finds itself in different circumstances, and so must respond differently to its environment, even if they all share the same "personality".
> It doesn't use senses the same way you do.
I still don't see why that's relevant. Sensory inputs are still just inputs. The AI algorithm also has such inputs since each NPC must respond to its environment.
I think we'll end up agreeing to disagree here, but the AI would only be producing the appearance of consciousness in the NPCs. There's absolutely no reason to believe it experiences any of the qualia experienced by the people immersed in the VR. It doesn't see anything or hear anything. Only the people do, via their headsets. It just behaves as if it does, like the people on your television screen.
> There's absolutely no reason to believe it experiences any of the qualia experienced by the people immersed in the VR.
Firstly, NPCs tautologically don't experience the same qualia, but that doesn't mean they don't experience qualia of their own. Like I said, they respond to their environment, which means they have senses of a sort.
> It just behaves as if it does [produce consciousness], like the people on your television screen.
How do you know that? You're merely asserting p-zombies exist, you're not proving it.
If you were talking about humanoid robots in the physical world, you'd have a point, but in a VR, NPCs exist in much the same way images of people exist on your TV screen. They're not really there. They also exist in the form of data on the computer running the VR, but data can't be conscious either, as it's entirely passive, like words in a book the computer can read from and write to.
In what way can you prove you are "really there" in a way that a simulated entity is not? Fundamentally, your matter could very well be a mathematical construct -- see the Mathematical Universe hypothesis, for instance.
> They also exist in the form of data on the computer running the VR, but data can't be conscious either, as it's entirely passive, like words in a book the computer can read from and write to.
Except they're not, because the NPCs respond intelligently to you and their environment, both of which are always changing, so they aren't anything like passive, unchanging data. No one is claiming that data that isn't changing is conscious, but NPCs don't consist of unchanging data. So they could very well be conscious, and you haven't presented an argument why such intelligent responses would not require consciousness, you've merely been asserting it.
And it's not like you don't state that consciousness can't be a computation, because you've said that the game system as a whole might be conscious. So if we agree to assume for the sake of argument that consciousness is a computation, then it will be a particular kind of computation with a certain property, like how sorting algorithms sort their input.
Which means any algorithm that has this property produces consciousness. Furthermore, personality differences and sensory input from their environment would just be parameters to such an algorithm. And if game AI needs this consciousness property to make believably intelligent characters, which is what we've been discussing, then each of the NPCs will run this algorithm with their own personality and environment configurations, and each of them will be conscious.
The best I can infer about your argument is that these computations don't have access to "real" senses, but this point is entirely irrelevant. All AI senses will reduce to a set of numbers anyway, which means even if the "sensory" inputs we hook them up to are entirely simulated, this makes no difference to the consciousness algorithm. Consciousness would be a logical property, so you can't simultaneously accept that the game system could have consciousness, but the individual NPCs would not.
> Fundamentally, your matter could very well be a mathematical construct.
My consciousness, however, is "really there". It's one of the few things anyone can be sure of.
> And it's not like you don't state that consciousness can't be a computation, because you've said that the game system as a whole might be conscious.
No. I said that the computer controlling the VR could be conscious of something. I should have been more specific about which parts. I meant the CPUs and the GPUs, certainly not the software. Their role in the whole system is the same as the man in the Chinese room. We have his word that he doesn't understand Chinese, but he does experience something. The role of the software is that of the book in the room, with a part of the book where the man can write down intermediate stages in his calculation. Or are you saying that the book is somehow conscious of understanding Chinese simply because there's space in it where the man takes notes?
You didn't answer the question. You can be sure your consciousness exists, and you grant existence to other conscious people no doubt, but you seem certain that AI consciousness is not in a game of AI NPCs that are just as intelligent as humans, yet provide no justification for that.
> Or are you saying that the book is somehow conscious of understanding Chinese simply because there's space in it where the man takes notes?
I'm saying that your attempt to define a "locus" where consciousness resides is futile. A CPU is not a person, even though a person can act like a CPU.
You're effectively asking which line in a sorting algorithm actually does the sorting. All of it does the sorting, and all of the program+scratch memory that produces intelligent behaviour, would produce consciousness as well. The CPU is completely incidental. If you compile your program for a completely different architecture, or take a snapshot and restore it on another computer, the consciousness moves with the program, it does not stay with the CPU on which it was originally running.
I'll try again. I think that consciousness only exists in "ground reality", so if the universe is a simulation, consciousness can only enter it from ground reality. I think ground reality exists - it can't be "simulations all the way down".
I'm assuming that we're in ground reality, but capable of developing realistic virtual realities.
I'm not sure what can give rise to consciousness. I think it most likely that it's related to the ability to collapse quantum states, or in Everett's interpretation, decide which universe to be in.
In that case, since the NPCs are unable to collapse quantum states, they cannot have consciousness although they behave exactly like someone who can.
Alternatively, it might require information processing by real, physical hardware. In that case, CPUs and GPUs can be conscious as well as people, insects, and even thermostats. However, as CPUs and GPUs are processing completely different kinds of information from people, I'd expect them to have completely different qualia.
What you appear to be saying is that NPCs aren't merely conscious but have qualia at least as similar to me as other people have, by virtue of them appearing to behave similarly to people.
And I am saying that as they don't really process any information - they're just instructions and data being processed by computer hardware, that they can't be conscious any more than the characters in a book can be conscious whenever anyone reads the book.
I probably haven't convinced you of anything, but I hope at least I've made my position clear.
>there aren't really any clear ideas about what consciousness is and why it's important.
I personally feel fairly clear on that though I may be wrong. It is I think awareness in the central part of the brain that beings in data from other parts and can think about it. For example if you walk across the room you don't normally have conscious awareness of your leg movements because that happens with more simple neural networks but you can focus your consciousness on that if you want to analyse or modify your walk.
There are probably different levels of consciousness as you go from say humans to dogs to mice to flies etc. and it's a bit up to the individual what you call what. Modern AI systems are probably somewhere between flies and dogs. I'll give you that to get to the human level will take a while.
I personally feel fairly clear on that though I may be wrong.
That's the thing. Many people feel clear about their particular explanation of consciousness. These explanations build on some simple intuitions, may resonate as true to others. But often don't agree with the other explanations other people make (or are fairly trivial).
It's fine for vague social consensus but very far from an engineering spec. Yet this consciousness thing seen as being shared between people like Penrose or new agers who give pure vitalist/fluffy-cloud explanations and those who attempt to logically coherent explanation.
It is I think awareness in the central part of the brain that [bring] in data from other parts and can think about it.
- Data that reflects data? Of course computers have that.
To me, what seems to be almost inescapable is the thought that a "thinking" computer will, eventually, have many, many orders of magnitude greater difference in thinking power between it and a human than a human has between itself and, say, an insect.
I've suggested before that AI focus on animal-level AI (operating in the real world) for a while and STFU about "consciousness". Blithering about consciousness doesn't seem to lead anywhere.
Penrose is strange. He once sued a toilet-paper manufacturer for supposedly copying his Penrose non-repeating tiling scheme for the embossing pattern on their toilet paper. He lost.
"Did he really say this?" That is my interpretation of what he'd said - there's no obvious evolutionary/natural selection ... impetus to it. Doesn't that make it necessarily emergent?
Eyes on the front are common to nearly all predators. I think the contrast between octopus eyes and human eyes is used frequently to deduce that eyes are indeed emergent.
It's just, calling language emergent sounds close to the view that you have to whisper furtively when you get too close to MIT: that maybe there was no evolutionary event that created language at all, it's just a really good meme[1] that makes use of other faculties that already existed in the human brain.
Maybe universal grammar isn't a physical fact about the possible ways the human brain can communicate, it's just that if we observe 6,000 variations on an idea with the same[2] origin and try hard enough to sum them up, we'll succeed.
[1] In the original sense.
[2] Or similar origins. Maybe language is a good enough idea to arise multiple times and converge, much like eyes. And I'm not sure whether to count things like Nicaraguan Sign Language as a separate origin of language.
> I always assumed that AI consciousness would be an emergent property
I think it's just perception, attention, memory, imagination and behavior learning. We have made progress on all these fields, so there is reason for optimism.
To make an analogy with AlphaGo - before the match, everyone was incredulous about it. After the match, we were stunned, but it was real. In just a few months a computer learned to beat the best human at Go. The same will be with reasoning and other high level skills.
> not a feature we would (or even could) effectively develop towards.
We, the people, are made of the same stuff as computers. We have no magic dust in us. There is no reason for consciousness to be unique to our particular way.
The difference between then and now is that we have the Church-Turing Thesis, and the less precise Universal Church-Turing Thesis.
A violation of the UCTT would be a Big Deal.
Because of this, we now know that previous models of the human brain (as a hydraulic system, as a mechanical system of differential gears, as a weaving machine) are, in fact, also capable of expressing all computable functions (and we can even add Minesweeper and Conway's Game of Life).
I don't think anyone is saying that the brain is directly analogous to a computer (in the sense that it has a CPU and volatile memory or anything) so much as the fact that a computer, sufficiently powerful, could compute the same things that our brain is capable of computing, because of Church-Turing.
The only question remains - does it feel like something to be a computer? If the computer has the ability to sense like us, to reason like us, to form concepts, to imagine and to judge and act according to its goals, is this enough to consider it conscious?
I don't see a reason for AIs to be similar to human intellects. They are not animals. They are not "alive" the way an animal is. They cannot die as all animals do. They have no genes. They did not evolve. They don't have brains that evolved to keep hairless chimps alive. They don't have a "jump away from snakes" circuit. They won't have evolved our heuristics that make us suck at probability and risk assessment. When people use the word "consciousness" they mean usually mean the part of their brain that claims to have introspection but in fact cannot access the subconscious agents that make decisions in the human brain. Why should an AI have any of that?
Well we might find, for instance, that in order to create a general purpose AI which can develop intellectually quickly enough to be useful we have to make it sufficiently like us that it can understand and participate in our culture.
It's easy to see the attraction of making an AI that is relatable to humans. Some people will claim that, if we are able to build an AI, that it isn't a real intelligence because it does not have our foibles. But I think making a human-like AI is both difficult and dangerous. One would need to understand what one is trying to simulate, and some aspects, like the drive for propagating genes, could create unnecessary hazards.
To quote @worrydream
"Worrying about sentient AI as the ice caps melt is like standing on the tracks as the train rushes in, worrying about being hit by lightning"
Our species is largely the dominant species because of one or more extinction events. Most likely "more" ; a significant chain of them.
And perhaps better computing is why the polar ice caps are only shrinking this fast and not faster. We normally see 30-40 MPG in cars, and that is due to a lot of things, but the one big thing is electronic engine control. That is one in a long list of reasons why it's important to at least see how we can make these things work better.
There are plenty of people panicking about climate change... Perhaps other people are allowed to think about other things. Or would you replace ALL of scientific study with the single topic you consider most important?
In 20 years or so, if it turns out that all of the dire predictions were significantly overblown, would you at least have the courtesy to blush in embarrassment for the current alarmism?
How useful would be a conscious computer? It would have to be protected by some rights (at the very least, equivalent to animal rights), they cease to be machines. The narrow-task AI efforts make more sense from an economical point of view, and I think they have actually more disruptive consequences (massive job extinction etc.).
That said, I believe that consciousness is "supernatural", something like another state of matter of a quantum phenomenon that cannot be manipulated like an Excel spreadsheet.
Look at chickens. Piled on one another, slaughtered at will. We would simply stack conscious computers on one another and then delete them when they are not needed.
The most interesting definition I have seen of consciousness is [1] "the mind thinking about the mind thinking", i.e. some sort of meta-level "diagnostic process".
What I find interesting is that this definition supports awareness and an the existence of an 'I', but doesn't imply any sort of control or direct influence on the unconscious mind for which there seem to be experimental evidence against. Instead the result of this (literal) 'reflection' would be fed back to the unconscious mind as a sensorial input as any other.
Such a reflective process could possibly arise evolutionarily as it is a way to improve the efficiency of the thought processes.
I know absolutely nothing about neural network, but I wonder what would happen if the time series of the internal signals of a NN was fed to another NN and its output back into the first NN. Probably nothing stable at all and training would be 'interesting'.
Another interesting thing is that consciousness would be 'just' a process and not necessary for intelligence to arise. Peter Watts in 'Blindsight' [2] explores this last point in depth.
[1] Unfortunately I can't remember were I read this reference nor I have been able to track it.
[2] An extremely good first contact hard scifi novel, can be read for free from the author website.
So do we not mean "conscious" as the opposite of "unconscious"?
As in it's possible to knock out a dog - rendering it unconscious. But when it wakes back up it's not going to think about the fact that it's a dog (as far as we know).
So what's the name for a dog's normal not-unconscious waking state?
you are confusing begin unconscious, i.e. in a comatose state, with consciousness. Other than the similarity of the words, they have little in common.
Being unconscious might imply that the mind is running in a state of little or no consciousness, but it is not defined by that. Assuming a cat or dog has no consciousness, it would still be called 'conscious' in his waking state.
That's a reasonable question, these terms aren't very clear.
Philosophers who work on these issues tend to separate out individual aspects of conscious experience and discuss them under distinct terms, for clarity and precision.
The main article isn't really following these conventions (most people don't even know about them), but for philosophy:
Consciousness is generally the state of having subjective experiences. Like, you're conscious when you have some personal experience of things.
Sapience is the capacity to act with reflective judgment. This definition is a mess, just bear with me for now.
Self-awareness is, well, awareness of one's self. Introspection.
There are probably others I can't recall right now. All of these are slightly different aspects of a phenomena we experience as humans, and we tend to lump them all together when talking about it, especially when asking if nonhumans can exhibit any of these properties.
I think what we mean when talking about "conscious AI" is probably something more like "sapient AI" (possibly just "self-aware AI?").
Thinking about thinking might be a bit over demanding - we still tend to consider people conscious when they are reading HN for example. People definitely can think about thinking though so a system wouldn't be human level if it couldn't so that.
you are taking the 'thinking about thinking' too litteraly (that would be 'thinking about thinking about thinking'). For your HN example, reading itself would be an unconscious process, you becoming aware of the words as they get processed on your mind and acquiring meaning and triggering recollections and additional side thoughts is the conscious meta process.
The definition I use is very similar. I like to think of consciousness or sentience as the ability to model (or predict) one's self.
A pattern-matching entity that can match its own patterns.
I might disagree about the intelligence aspect. It seems to me any entity that is at least moderately interesting (has any kind of behavioral complexity) would need some level of intelligence in order to model itself to a respectable degree.
Not really a definition, but my very personal take on what conciousness is:
Evolution has brought about creatures that are more successful (in regard to survival and reproduction), the more predictive power they have about their environment[1]. One could say, the better a species can simulate it's environment, the more likely it will continue to exist and be part of the ongoing evolution. Our brains are of course also just products of this evolutionary process and meanwhile very good at simulating their environment.
Now if we think about Plato's cave we could say, that all our experience is just an illusion. It's all just a projection of reality, that our brain creates. I'd go a step further and say: Experience or qualia is what the process of simulation of reality feels like. Or to put it in another way: Conciousness is the process of simulation of reality. The "better" the simulation or the more complete and closer to "reality" it is (whatever that means) - the higher the form of conciousness.
Taking this definition one must also concede that even animals and "lower" life forms have some degree of conciousness. It probably feels like something to be a streptococcus.
Of course all this is just blind speculation - but it somehow feels right to me.
> Conciousness is the process of simulation of reality. The "better" the simulation or the more complete and closer to "reality" it is (whatever that means) - the higher the form of conciousness.
So would you say that a supercomputer in the process of calculating the gyromagnetic ratio of an isolated electron to 12 digits of accuracy is a higher form of consciousness than we are? After all, it is performing a much better simulation of reality than our brains in that case.
No, because it only simulates a very small part of reality. For example it could never estimate the weather for the next 2 hours by looking at a formation of heavy clouds.
Dreaming is really an interesting case. I'm not sure if I'd agree that it's a weak form of consciousness. It's maybe just some sort of play that the simulator does when it's not used for the outside world. It wildly tries out new things. If you consider that it has a whole physical and cultural universe at it's disposal, it's not really a surprise that this playing creates very bizarre stories sometimes.
By doing so we may check for complex cross connections and gain new insights. Actually I vividly remember waking up from dreams and suddenly realizing that I have a crush on a girl. I didn't really the day before (or was not aware of it) but during dreaming my brain seemed to say "I've checked all information that we have about this specimen and my simulations so far look promising!"
I sometimes also dream of deceased persons. The brain maybe again and again tries to make sense of this deeply unsettling experience and to somehow integrate that unexplainable into the simulation.
(BTW sorry for misspelling consciousness all the time in my post above - it was a little too late here)
Right, as far as I understand it that's also close to how Tononi's and Koch's Integrated Information Theory[1] try to explain conscious phenomena. In their parlance the computer would have a low value of phi.
I was surprised that this theory is not even mentioned in the article, even though Aaronson has quite some opinion on it.[2]
If you read fiction, you will probably enjoy Anathem by Neal Stephenson.
"Consciousness is the process of simulation of reality" is a starting point. The question is asked "How does the simulation work?" Why are we so good at simulating certain kinds of counterfactual scenarios? Why do we consider some to be plausible (e.g. worrying about a friend moving away) while others we disregard as immediately absurd (e.g. worrying about being attacked by pink nerve-gas-farting dragons)?
Like most of his books, it's a great yarn in an interesting world. The ideas he's exploring are rooted in platonism (how can a theoretical mathematical abstraction affect physical systems?), quantum physics, and the nature of consciousness. It takes a while to really get rolling, and when it does it snowballs fast, but I found it to be very enjoyable from the start.
Douglass Hoffstadter wrote about consciousness like this in many of his metamagical themas columns. By analogy he mused that consciousness might arise as a higher level construct which would watch and supervise lower level functions. While he didn't really bother to develop his arguments too far the articles all had a very enjoyable Hosffstadterian writing style that made them a real pleasure to read.
What you're referring to about NNs fed into one another sounds similar to generative adversarial nets. They are indeed able to optimise but they're very effective. Though far from consciousness.
From some quick googling, they don't seem what I have in mind. The nets are still trained one from the output of the other or from external data. I want a net to be fed with the internal state of another net. But maybe it doesn't make sense.
That's introspection. It's distinct from the hard problem of consciousness.
Consider that it's not difficult to make computer programs that introspect. A quine is a trivial example. But since people argue over whether computer programs can be conscious, and it's dead obvious that some computer programs introspect (i.e. operate on their own source code or perform diagnostics on their own state), I think it's clear that people have more than just introspection in mind when they say "consciousness".
Computers won't become conscious anymore than the person in Searles chinese room understand chinese or the individual neuron in my brain understand the thoughts it's passing along.
But the system which the computer is a part of though might create consciousness.
I think a lot of our problems with thinking about consciousness is that we think of it as a thing that exist some specific place rather than as a component in a feedback loop.
What we fundamentally are, are pattern recognizing feedback loops, on top of pattern recognizing feedback loops.
You may say that, but I've literally never met anyone who thought that consciousness in a computer might arise in any other way than how you've described.
We haven't met, but I think the same way as the guy who you replied. Being a FL is a bit of oversimplification, but the general idea might be an accurate description of what goes on in your brain.
TIL: Scott Aaronson really has a bee in his bonnet about Penrose. Well, not really just learned, if you've read his books/writings you'd know that. But he really seems like he feels the need to go after him.
Could we be missing something fundamental in our understanding of the world? Like when nobody knew radioactivity until 20th century and until then it was all green-glowing magic deep down in the mines?
Currently the paradigm of our epoch is to look at everything as a computing problem. Before it was hydraulics, then electricity etc. Maybe in 100 years our successors will be dealing with a more complete picture and their children will be laughing at schools that we thought consciousness was related to computing?
Consciousness is a word searching for a meaning. It's telling that this entire thread is people explaining their own personal definition of this reification that we use to separate ourselves from the animals.
Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation. Computers are nothing but consciousness, unless they're freeing memory.
> Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation.
And how'd you go about verifying that? I know that I'm conscious, but you could be a p-zombie. That means if I poke you with a toothpick, you will scream in agony (responding to stimulus), but that doesn't give me any information about whether or not you are conscious.
We're all p-zombies. When we get poked with toothpicks we will scream in agony, the thought of being poked with toothpicks will appear internally, and we will in turn react to that thought, the reaction based on our upbringing. We have our outer senses, sight, touch, and then our inner senses, that can sense the 'thoughts' that were triggered by outer sense stimulation. The thought is just another form of sensory stimulation, but it is internally generated, indirectly based on an external source. Our reaction to those thoughts depends on how we've seen other people react to similar situations, that have generated those thoughts in us.
I'm not that comfortable with the hand wavy physicalist view that consciousness arises from the physical processes of the brain.
If that were the case, why can't I simply design an artificial brain, a cyber brain, and upload myself in 1000 bodies?
What really spoke to me in Aaronson's entire lecture is the whole quantum no-cloning restriction. Bell State can't help you either, because you can't violate causality.
Suppose for a second that you could violate the laws of physics in U', a universe where anything goes. You can even have free energy too, i.e. no increasing entropy. I would still argue that creating uncountably infinite copies of yourself will still yield only the original conscious, while the rest are merely simulations.
FWIW, I don't think "microtubules" is sufficient either, because that's equally hand-wavy and a restatement of ghost in the machine. At least that's how I parse it.
Let's not violate the laws of physics and go back to the fundamental laws of nature.
We know:
1. Entropy is always increasing.
2. Life is negative entropy gatherer. (It decreases it's own entropy by increasing the entropy of its surroundings, to live.)
3. If we plot all living organisms by their negative entropy, it corresponds roughly to their awareness. The more negative entropy, the more awareness, the more "conscious".
Hypothesis:
Grandparent commenter said Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation.
Entropy is information, the more entropy the more information there is to process.
Awareness and consciousness is the ability to process information. The more negative entropy the bigger the ability to process information.
Entropy and consciousness are two sides of the same coin. Consciousness, awareness, is negative entropy.
As another commenter said[1]: "The universe splits itself into two parts - an observer and an observed."
Because it necessarily violates quantum no-cloning. I think the state of any human at time t is a quantum state, more specifically a linear superposition of n distinct states with probability amplitudes.
I don't necessarily agree with the lookup table analogy - sure, consciousness is finite, but it is also a chaotic system. Else, it would be extremely easy to predict every possible set of actions I will make in my entire life. As Aaronson mentions, I don't think you could do that without killing me using something like Laplace's demon.
It's relatively easy to create a simulation of me - that's merely a problem of data. A simulation wouldn't be conscious though, it would be like me, but not me proper.
I think there is some intrinsic property that gives rise to consciousness, as of yet undiscovered. Hard to say though, after all, are we all not information?
It's strange that you find the physicalist account "hand-wavy", but then use a physicalist model to dispute mind uploads. So do you accept physicalism or don't you?
My initial thought about this is to reformulate the question as: "Can humans become conscious?". I don't think most people would claim that sperm and egg cells are concious. I also don't expect many people to argue that all humans come from joining these two, non-concious elements. Most (but maybe not all!) would probably agree that that embryo, consisting of a handful of cells, is not concious.
Yet, we interact with people all the time, and at least some of those we consider to be concious. So, by definition the answer to the question is yes. But I think that exploring why that is so, can also shed some light on what we mean by "being concious", how one might demonstrate that something is (or isn't) concious -- and how much of being concious relates to being able to relate to other that we consider to be concious as well.
If we could (and was willing) to raise a child without any human contact, what would such a thing become? Would it really become something we would call human? Concious?
I think that going down this line of questioning, we'll find some ideas about emergent systems, part-whole relations and in general a lot of complexity.
I think it also hard to claim that if we can merge a sperm and egg cell, and create a new concious system, that we couldn't be able to create some artificial (meaning, constructed by us, not "found" in nature) system that develops into being concious.
INMHO, the controversy isn't if an artificial construct can become concious, but what conciousness is, and how we know it's there.
Consciousness is no bright line rule. Humans like to believe that we are on one side of a great divide between conscious and unconscious animals. But all there is is a gradient between us and the bacteria, with infinite stops in between.
The interesting twist in Enders Game (and other scifi) is that the alien invaders do not understand humans as conscious beings. I see no reason to believe that there aren't beings on earth, animals, who are farther up the spectrum than we. There are some very large brains out there that we do not understand.
There are many interesting lines of reasoning around this. The idea of Gaia as a concious system is one. If the earth thinks at the speed of one thought every year, or 100 years -- and perhaps communicates with other such beings -- how would we know? (I don't have strong feelings about concrete ideas about Gaia as a concious system, one way or the other -- other than that I find it an interesting idea, and a good storytelling tool)
A person has left and right hemispheres in their brain. Under some circumstances, losing one of these hemispheres will result in an almost normal functional human being. Imagine, with advances in biology and medicine, one day we can separate one person's brain, and place one half in one body, and the other half in another (artificial body or one whose original owner became brain dead), and both functioning as people. Are they two people, or one?
I think it depends on the observer. Some people would choose to see (one or both cases) as two people, and some would choose to see them as one.
But let us go back into history. The universe started from the big bang, as a big expanding cloud of hot gases. It was one point, and then it became one cloud. Billions of years and lots of things happening later, bits of that cloud grew eyes, legs and started to think for themselves. Are those individual bits of the universe, many individuals, or one universe?
I think, both. It's like asking a network of neurons, are you one, or many?
The universe is a conscious system. It can see itself through many eyes. It sees different parts of itself. It is having many thoughts.
I, a shard of the universe, have replied to you, another shard of the universe, by typing this on yet another shard of the same universe, at the same time as my own neurons are communicating to each other.
When I was talking about part and whole, I was more thinking about a person really can become concious alone, or if being concious is also partially at least influenced by being part of a culture and group communication and so on. This also goes into if or how language is connected to thinking. Can we have language without having someone to communicate with (ever)? Can we become concious without communication and language? (I'm not saying we cannot, but that these are interesting questions to ask).
Also related to part and whole, and emergent systems, I was thinking about things like ant colonies - and how they might (or might not) relate to big organism that happens to be made out of cells with the same DNA, like us.
Humans like to believe that we are on one side of a great divide between conscious and unconscious animals. But all there is is a gradient between us and the bacteria, with infinite stops in between.
The interesting twist in Enders Game (and other scifi) is that the alien invaders do not understand humans as conscious beings. I see no reason to believe that there aren't beings on earth, animals, who are farther up the spectrum than we.
Ahh, that's funny. It's the Blub Paradox [0] all over again! People generally seem to believe that they are special. That they live in a singularly special time in history. That their generation is on the cusp of some indefinable revolution. This bias seems to be extremely pervasive. Another pervasive example is the belief among evangelical Christians that Jesus will return to earth during our lifetime [1].
Also note that the situation doesn't seem like it can really be framed in terms of the usual: "an observer is investigating something which is distinct from herself." In this situation there is not a hard distinction between what we are and what we are trying to describe.
Consciousness appears (intuitively, on the surface) to be the thing which creates the possibility of describing consciousness. A description of consciousness must account for itself. A theory of consciousness must be written such that it writes itself.
When Marvin Minsky described one perspective on consciousness as "hey, we don't understand consciousness, and we don't understand gravity, maybe consciousness is made of gravity", I thought he was just mocking the ever-popular idea that "maybe consciousness is made of quantum mechanics".
I didn't know that there really was a prominent thinker who postulated gravity (and quantum mechanics) as the place where subjective consciousness is hiding.
I don't think anyone's seriously put forward the idea that consciousness and quantum mechanics are related because they're both mysterious, so that is a straw man. In any case, we do understand gravity and quantum mechanics pretty well, at least compared to consciousness.
The reason some people think QM and consciousness are related is that some interpretations of quantum mechanics requires a conscious observer to collapse the wave function and make the final measurement (e.g. by taking a reading from a measuring apparatus, or listening to someone else (who they can't be sure is conscious) telling you the measurement over lunch. I'm not familiar with Penrose's argument re gravity, but so far general relativity has resisted attempts to quantize it, so maybe he's saying that GR and QM must be incorporated into a more general theory yet to be worked out, like electricity and magnetism are incorporated into Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism.
It's a straw man, sure. It's an exaggeration about people being willingly baffled by physics.
May I ask, where did you get the part about "conscious observer"? Yes, there's a thing in QM about observation collapsing the wave function, and there's disagreement on what that actually means. But I can't imagine that an interpretation promoted by actual physicists would use a squishy term like "conscious" in their hard science.
'Consciousness-causes-collapse' is also known as the 'Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation' [1]. Yes, THAT Von Neumann.
It's got no explanatory power over other interpretations, obviously. But actual physicists demonstrably used squishy terms like "conscious" when talking about their hard science. Embarrassing, but true.
At some point a measurement is made, and the only way you can be sure of the result is by consciously experiencing it. And until you ask your colleague, her quantum state is entangled with whatever is being measured, and with the measuring apparatus.
I don't see why it's embarrassing about physicists and other scientists using "squishy" terms about things they know (or even suspect) are there but can't explain. Magnetism was just as squishy a term until it was understood. The only difference is that consciousness seems to be exclusively a first-person experience, but that arguably makes it even more real. (You might be a brain in a vat, in which case everything you sense would be bogus, but your experience of it would still be real.)
This was an unexpectedly interesting talk, considering that from the framing I expected it to consist of essentially "Penrose, everyone thinks the Godelian thing is stupid, please just stop." Instead we got a theory (very theoretical, but still interesting) relating consciousness to the cosmological boundaries of the universe.
If only I understood it! Does anyone else know how to interpret the sentence "in order for you to be unpredictable and unclonable, someone else’s ignorance of your causal antecedents would have to extend all the way back to ignorance about the initial state of the universe"? That and the following couple of paragraphs seem to establish something really interesting, but I haven't been able to follow it.
The idea seems quite simple. If you want to be able to tell that you can't decide what the person is doing, you need to lack something about his previous state.
Which means that even if you know everything that happened between the initial state of the universe and now, you still can't predict that person decision. So you would have to ignore some things about the whole initial state of the universe.
Because the only possible things that can explain you not being able to predict that person are :
1) The decision is completely non causal... Which destroy a lot of things, because a non causal decision having impact would destroy the chain of causality.
2) Or! There is something in the initial state of the universe that you can't know. Hence the person acts are unpredictable but still causal.
> And so my friends predict that we might face choices like, do we want to ban or tightly control AI research, because it could lead to our sidelining or extermination? Ironically, a skeptical view, like Penrose’s, would suggest that AI research can proceed full speed ahead, because there’s not such a danger!
I don't think runaway general AIs must be conscious in order to be a danger, but that might depend on specific definitions of consciousness.
God that was long. wew
I think it all boils down to literally putting too much attention into physical objects. Can it be done? Of course there are actually many examples and none of the resulting objects were healthy to be around, and for obvious reason. Consciousness is meant to explore the universe and the "idea" that suddenly we should step backwards into a robot (my office), after a million years of evolution is absolutely and perfectly ludicrous to even suggest.
You want your self driving cars and self cleaning kitchens. A machine can never replace a partner or ally, or child for that matter. Ultimately if you want to create a conscious being it would have to be on the scale of a planet in order to achieve what we are talking about.
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[ 2.8 ms ] story [ 222 ms ] threadWhat about DRM? We can copy programs because we make them or we know specifications of the original computer it was meant to be run on or we can guess (because there aren't that many architectures, etc.)
What if a DRM scheme didn't need to run on modern architectures, was written in new programming languages from machine language and up, on entirely new paradigms? Do you think it would be easy to copy? What if it was unethical and illegal to do anything that could stop the program, or break the hardware? Would it even be surprising that we couldn't emulate it?
Even today's DRM schemes have not all been broken, and not all programs can be run on other substrates. The ones that have been reverse engineered is because they're written for architectures that are already known, and there's just specifics that need to be figured out. (Or so is the impression I get from reverse engineering discussions).
For example, I can take the idea of a narwhal horn and the idea of a horse and mix them together to create a unicorn. My conscious mind took the excerpt of a narwhal horn and strung it together with the excerpt of a horse body. And I didn't just stick the horn on some random part of the horse's body, there was a contextual understanding behind it - a narwhal horn belongs on the forehead, the head of a horse is the thing with eyes and a nose.
Can a computer do that? No way, not presently at least. There's waaayy too much going on in the process of excerptification for a computer to replicate just this one facet of our consciousness.
I'd bet a thousands dollars that the underlying principles Deep Dreams uses to infer fractal and continuous images are the same we have in our brains.
That's 100% wrong. It does create abstract representations and it can imagine back. For example, there is this neural net that can do "woman + glasses = woman wearing glasses" on images, without any tags. It can combine concepts and generate new images. There is also another one that can "dream" images of bedrooms. It can even interpolate 10 intermediary bedrooms between any two images, and they look very good.
You absolutely could with a generative adversarial network and the right training dataset. They can interpolate between images in a semantic way, and add and subtract components of the semantic representation. While it's not narwhals and horses, here's an example of using images of men with and without glasses along with a woman without glasses to generate a woman with glasses: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Newmu/dcgan_code/master/im...
More results here: https://github.com/Newmu/dcgan_code And note that this field is advancing so rapidly that these results have already been improved on despite being only six months old.
By backward I meant the images done by the Deep Dreams program. They retrofit (hence the back) 'dog' signals fractally. This is a pretty amazing primitive to me. Trying to recognize 'concepts' even through that much distortion.
Excerptification, as you describe it, sounds like a game of analogies. AI is not far from solving this kind of problem, as long as it is expressed symbolically.
Here's a paper discussing one AGI system, implemented in Haskell, that might be appropriate for work with analogy problems that require "imagination" as well as raw "perception":
Claes Strannegård; Rickard von Haugwitz; Johan Wessberg; Balkenius Christian (2013). "A Cognitive Architecture Based on Dual Process Theory" http://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/178583
Can a computer running a file server realize it is only storing pirated movies and stop it it without being explicitly programmed to do so? A conscious computer could.
"Being aware" can be observed externally (by us) from an attempt by the entity to independently influence whatever state the entity was in.
Can a person from 1975 know your hard drive was full of pirated content? Probably he knows no title from your library, so he could not assume one way or another. It's as if specific "programming" was missing from him, or people from 1975 aren't passing your consciousness test.
It's a question of are there meta-patterns and meta-meta patterns.
I've done things where a minimal set of rules in a filter led to very mildly emergent phenomena in control systems. I didn't tell it what the answers were; I told it how to find the answer ( this is much less impressive than it sounds - think of a filter into basically a running average ) .
I joked that this was AI, but I'm not sure I was really joking because it's a difficult question. In the end, it was just a (perhaps unnecessarily complex) feedback leg. But it worked when nothing else would - but once you find the thing you're looking for, you tend to stop looking.
This really seem inescapable to me. The remaining arguments all seem like smokescreens. Being able to copy computer programs? Reproducing the running state of even a moderately complex distributed system is effectively impossible, so this argument bothers me not at all.
Even if there is some quantum gravitational aspect of human consciousness, the idea that you'd be able to distinguish between that and a reasonable computational approximation of it seems far-fetched at best.
That said, I feel that we are extremely far away from producing a computer-based consciousness. Even human consciousness needs a couple of years of full-speed processing to reach the point at which it could even vaguely be considered conscious by adult standards. Most likely 5-10 years after we give up on the notion of creating an AI we'll discover that we created one 15 years ago but just haven't yet been able to recognize it as an emergent property of a hugely complex system.
That's a feature of the Xen hypervisor.[1] You can even migrate a process from one machine to another without stopping it.
[1] http://wiki.prgmr.com/mediawiki/index.php/Chapter_9:_Xen_Mig...
And even the Xen example is rough; the new copy of the system will be mostly functionally identical, but any reliance on the state of external things (like remote storage or IO or the state of unfair nondeterministic locks) will rapidly cause state to diverge.
Which only begs the question about how high-fidelity a copy has to be to be a "copy", even in the case of a hypothetical consciousness copy, and leads into the even more subtle question of the time evolution of a person and whether the me of now and the me of twenty seconds ago can be said to represent the same singular "consciousness" at all.
It is possible to migrate the state of a distributed system by designing a protocol such that all of the components stop sending information around, so that you can be sure you did not miss anything. But I think that violates the spirit of the phrase "running state", since you essentially stopped the system. It's also not necessarily so that post-migration, the system will act the same.
To be more precise: any "possible outcome" of the snapshot was also possible at some point during the original execution. And likewise, any "impossible outcome" of the snapshot was also ruled out at some point in the original. So if viewed from the outside, the fact that you took and restored a snapshot is indistinguishable from the normal situation of having an asynchronous network. It can't cause the system to exhibit any behaviors that weren't otherwise allowable.
(Apologies if I'm just restating what you already know; other readers may not be aware of it. This might be the same property that you're calling "integrity".)
This is reminiscent of one of Scott Aaronson's comments from the original article. If quantum effects are significant in the brain, then it's impossible -- even in principle -- to "perfectly" copy it such that the original and the copy are guaranteed to behave identically. But if the original and the copy are statistically indistinguishable, it amounts to the same thing.
Views of distance to the production of "conscious" machines are likely all over the place because there aren't really any clear ideas about what consciousness is and why it's important.
* Is it one state of mind that represents another state of mind? We trivially can construct computers with states which reflect each other.
* Is it being able to act without external control, ie, apparently randomly? Computers can do that better than people right now.
And despite the fogginess and disagreement about what consciousness is, it's highly valued and thought necessary by many people looking into this stuff. If you think about that for a second, it's a reason to be even more skeptical about it.
What's unclear, and some deem impossible, is how we can externally detect consciousness. A machine could act and respond in a manner indistinguishable from humans but still be unconscious.
To avoid any discussion of consciousness becoming a discussion of the meaning of the word "consciousness" we have to accept that consciousness (like everything else in the real world) is not a boolean property, but rather a subjective "I know it when I see it" sort of thing. Or in Bayesian terms, it's a weighted evaluation of evidence against a vast array of mostly unknown priors.
That's why I think it will sneak up on us; there will be systems that some very small group of people (mostly crazy) think are conscious, then systems that a slightly larger group of people (maybe more crazy, maybe less) think are conscious, until one day You wake up and realize that You are one of the crazy people.
But directed attempts to satisfy some definition of "consciousness" in a system will just result in a counterexample to that definition.
There are some types of behaviour that could make it clear a machine was conscious from a practical point of view. Say you had a robot teacher and threw something when it's back was turned and you tried to frame a fellow classmate but the robot saw through it and told you not to do that. It would be fairly clear it was conscious of what was going on from a practical point of view. You could of course say it's not real consciousness because it a robot but how do you know a human teacher is conscious beyond such behaviour?
A statement like "They've figured out what we're up to and are thinking how to stop us, though luckily they are not conscious." doesn't really make sense regardless of what the they is.
I could go one further and say "I believe the absolute broadest consensus defines consciousness as having a conscious experience." and only say slightly less vague than your statement.
Conscious, subjectivity, awareness in some of their meanings are just synonyms for some internal experience or other. There's a sense that this internal experience reflects things in a unique way, that it's not controlled by outside constrains, that it reflects a person's unique choices not controlled by any fixed pattern or program. But it's just primarily an intuition.
Also Dennett has an excellent rebuttal to the concept of p-zombies (unconscious entities indistinguishable from conscious ones) imo.
The evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies is in your living room, if you have a television. You can see people on it and they behave intelligently. Are they conscious? Of course not, they're just red, green, and blue dots. Maybe we could make this a bit more realistic?
You're now in a very realistic virtual reality. Your character is conscious, because you are. So is the character being played by your friend over there (assuming he's not a p-zombie). But what about the characters next to you? Maybe Doug Lenat and Geoffrey Hinton collaborated and developed an AI as intelligent as a person, and that's what controls them. They can't be conscious, because they're just pixels like the dots on your flat-screen TV, so not conscious in the virtual reality, and they're not conscious in the real world either, because they're just software, which is an epiphenomenon, like wetness or tidiness. The computer which runs the VR, and the AIs, might be conscious but that would be a very different consciousness from yours. Maybe it senses voltage levels at its memory addresses, but it certainly wouldn't see you or the submachine gun you're carrying in the VR.
Maybe we already are in a virtual reality. Nick Bostrom thinks we might be. If it's sufficiently realistic, there might be no way to tell, and no way to tell whether everyone is conscious, or nobody is conscious except you.
I don't see how that constitutes evidence for the conceivability of p-zombies. They're obviously distinguishable from conscious entities with a simple test: ask a TV person a question.
> Maybe Doug Lenat and Geoffrey Hinton collaborated and developed an AI as intelligent as a person, and that's what controls them
How do you know the AI isn't conscious? You're simply asserting that it isn't. For all you know, "AI as intelligent as a person" literally isn't possible without consciousness, which makes your assertion inconceivable.
Which is why the whole p-zombie thought experiment doesn't convince anyone: if you already think consciousness is physical, then p-zombies aren't conceivable and the thought experiment isn't convincing, and if you already think consciousness is not physical, then p-zombies merely assert the same conclusion you already hold and you're "convinced".
Where and how the information processing actually occurs to produce this intelligence doesn't seem relevant. The NPCs are individually either as intelligent as a person, and equally distinct, or they are not. If they are, they may be conscious. You said they are so intelligent, and therefore, you have no idea whether they are or are not conscious.
> It might sense some electrical signals originating from you and your friend's bodysuits, but that isn't going to feel anything like the experience you and your friend are having.
I don't see how that's relevant to whether the game system or NPCs are conscious.
But the AI software/algorithm is exactly what would produce the consciousness, if it were possible to do. So if it runs this algorithm individually for each NPC, then each NPC is conscious. And it clearly must run the algorithm individually because each NPC finds itself in different circumstances, and so must respond differently to its environment, even if they all share the same "personality".
> It doesn't use senses the same way you do.
I still don't see why that's relevant. Sensory inputs are still just inputs. The AI algorithm also has such inputs since each NPC must respond to its environment.
Firstly, NPCs tautologically don't experience the same qualia, but that doesn't mean they don't experience qualia of their own. Like I said, they respond to their environment, which means they have senses of a sort.
> It just behaves as if it does [produce consciousness], like the people on your television screen.
How do you know that? You're merely asserting p-zombies exist, you're not proving it.
In what way can you prove you are "really there" in a way that a simulated entity is not? Fundamentally, your matter could very well be a mathematical construct -- see the Mathematical Universe hypothesis, for instance.
> They also exist in the form of data on the computer running the VR, but data can't be conscious either, as it's entirely passive, like words in a book the computer can read from and write to.
Except they're not, because the NPCs respond intelligently to you and their environment, both of which are always changing, so they aren't anything like passive, unchanging data. No one is claiming that data that isn't changing is conscious, but NPCs don't consist of unchanging data. So they could very well be conscious, and you haven't presented an argument why such intelligent responses would not require consciousness, you've merely been asserting it.
And it's not like you don't state that consciousness can't be a computation, because you've said that the game system as a whole might be conscious. So if we agree to assume for the sake of argument that consciousness is a computation, then it will be a particular kind of computation with a certain property, like how sorting algorithms sort their input.
Which means any algorithm that has this property produces consciousness. Furthermore, personality differences and sensory input from their environment would just be parameters to such an algorithm. And if game AI needs this consciousness property to make believably intelligent characters, which is what we've been discussing, then each of the NPCs will run this algorithm with their own personality and environment configurations, and each of them will be conscious.
The best I can infer about your argument is that these computations don't have access to "real" senses, but this point is entirely irrelevant. All AI senses will reduce to a set of numbers anyway, which means even if the "sensory" inputs we hook them up to are entirely simulated, this makes no difference to the consciousness algorithm. Consciousness would be a logical property, so you can't simultaneously accept that the game system could have consciousness, but the individual NPCs would not.
My consciousness, however, is "really there". It's one of the few things anyone can be sure of.
> And it's not like you don't state that consciousness can't be a computation, because you've said that the game system as a whole might be conscious.
No. I said that the computer controlling the VR could be conscious of something. I should have been more specific about which parts. I meant the CPUs and the GPUs, certainly not the software. Their role in the whole system is the same as the man in the Chinese room. We have his word that he doesn't understand Chinese, but he does experience something. The role of the software is that of the book in the room, with a part of the book where the man can write down intermediate stages in his calculation. Or are you saying that the book is somehow conscious of understanding Chinese simply because there's space in it where the man takes notes?
You didn't answer the question. You can be sure your consciousness exists, and you grant existence to other conscious people no doubt, but you seem certain that AI consciousness is not in a game of AI NPCs that are just as intelligent as humans, yet provide no justification for that.
> Or are you saying that the book is somehow conscious of understanding Chinese simply because there's space in it where the man takes notes?
I'm saying that your attempt to define a "locus" where consciousness resides is futile. A CPU is not a person, even though a person can act like a CPU.
You're effectively asking which line in a sorting algorithm actually does the sorting. All of it does the sorting, and all of the program+scratch memory that produces intelligent behaviour, would produce consciousness as well. The CPU is completely incidental. If you compile your program for a completely different architecture, or take a snapshot and restore it on another computer, the consciousness moves with the program, it does not stay with the CPU on which it was originally running.
I'm assuming that we're in ground reality, but capable of developing realistic virtual realities.
I'm not sure what can give rise to consciousness. I think it most likely that it's related to the ability to collapse quantum states, or in Everett's interpretation, decide which universe to be in.
In that case, since the NPCs are unable to collapse quantum states, they cannot have consciousness although they behave exactly like someone who can.
Alternatively, it might require information processing by real, physical hardware. In that case, CPUs and GPUs can be conscious as well as people, insects, and even thermostats. However, as CPUs and GPUs are processing completely different kinds of information from people, I'd expect them to have completely different qualia.
What you appear to be saying is that NPCs aren't merely conscious but have qualia at least as similar to me as other people have, by virtue of them appearing to behave similarly to people.
And I am saying that as they don't really process any information - they're just instructions and data being processed by computer hardware, that they can't be conscious any more than the characters in a book can be conscious whenever anyone reads the book.
I probably haven't convinced you of anything, but I hope at least I've made my position clear.
A useless definition from an empirical perspective.
> What's unclear, and some deem impossible, is how we can externally detect consciousness.
Defined that way, its impossible to objectively verify by definition.
I personally feel fairly clear on that though I may be wrong. It is I think awareness in the central part of the brain that beings in data from other parts and can think about it. For example if you walk across the room you don't normally have conscious awareness of your leg movements because that happens with more simple neural networks but you can focus your consciousness on that if you want to analyse or modify your walk.
There are probably different levels of consciousness as you go from say humans to dogs to mice to flies etc. and it's a bit up to the individual what you call what. Modern AI systems are probably somewhere between flies and dogs. I'll give you that to get to the human level will take a while.
That's the thing. Many people feel clear about their particular explanation of consciousness. These explanations build on some simple intuitions, may resonate as true to others. But often don't agree with the other explanations other people make (or are fairly trivial).
It's fine for vague social consensus but very far from an engineering spec. Yet this consciousness thing seen as being shared between people like Penrose or new agers who give pure vitalist/fluffy-cloud explanations and those who attempt to logically coherent explanation.
It is I think awareness in the central part of the brain that [bring] in data from other parts and can think about it.
- Data that reflects data? Of course computers have that.
[1]http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/automaton-robots-b...
Penrose is strange. He once sued a toilet-paper manufacturer for supposedly copying his Penrose non-repeating tiling scheme for the embossing pattern on their toilet paper. He lost.
So yeah.
Chomsky considers language to be a thing that physically evolved in humans. Are eyes an emergent property?
Eyes on the front are common to nearly all predators. I think the contrast between octopus eyes and human eyes is used frequently to deduce that eyes are indeed emergent.
But we have nothing on the raptors.
Maybe universal grammar isn't a physical fact about the possible ways the human brain can communicate, it's just that if we observe 6,000 variations on an idea with the same[2] origin and try hard enough to sum them up, we'll succeed.
[1] In the original sense.
[2] Or similar origins. Maybe language is a good enough idea to arise multiple times and converge, much like eyes. And I'm not sure whether to count things like Nicaraguan Sign Language as a separate origin of language.
I think it's just perception, attention, memory, imagination and behavior learning. We have made progress on all these fields, so there is reason for optimism.
To make an analogy with AlphaGo - before the match, everyone was incredulous about it. After the match, we were stunned, but it was real. In just a few months a computer learned to beat the best human at Go. The same will be with reasoning and other high level skills.
> not a feature we would (or even could) effectively develop towards.
We, the people, are made of the same stuff as computers. We have no magic dust in us. There is no reason for consciousness to be unique to our particular way.
I'm sure we're on to something, but I think it best we take it all with a grain of salt.
A violation of the UCTT would be a Big Deal.
Because of this, we now know that previous models of the human brain (as a hydraulic system, as a mechanical system of differential gears, as a weaving machine) are, in fact, also capable of expressing all computable functions (and we can even add Minesweeper and Conway's Game of Life).
I don't think anyone is saying that the brain is directly analogous to a computer (in the sense that it has a CPU and volatile memory or anything) so much as the fact that a computer, sufficiently powerful, could compute the same things that our brain is capable of computing, because of Church-Turing.
And perhaps better computing is why the polar ice caps are only shrinking this fast and not faster. We normally see 30-40 MPG in cars, and that is due to a lot of things, but the one big thing is electronic engine control. That is one in a long list of reasons why it's important to at least see how we can make these things work better.
In 20 years or so, if it turns out that all of the dire predictions were significantly overblown, would you at least have the courtesy to blush in embarrassment for the current alarmism?
That said, I believe that consciousness is "supernatural", something like another state of matter of a quantum phenomenon that cannot be manipulated like an Excel spreadsheet.
Look at chickens. Piled on one another, slaughtered at will. We would simply stack conscious computers on one another and then delete them when they are not needed.
What I find interesting is that this definition supports awareness and an the existence of an 'I', but doesn't imply any sort of control or direct influence on the unconscious mind for which there seem to be experimental evidence against. Instead the result of this (literal) 'reflection' would be fed back to the unconscious mind as a sensorial input as any other.
Such a reflective process could possibly arise evolutionarily as it is a way to improve the efficiency of the thought processes.
I know absolutely nothing about neural network, but I wonder what would happen if the time series of the internal signals of a NN was fed to another NN and its output back into the first NN. Probably nothing stable at all and training would be 'interesting'.
Another interesting thing is that consciousness would be 'just' a process and not necessary for intelligence to arise. Peter Watts in 'Blindsight' [2] explores this last point in depth.
[1] Unfortunately I can't remember were I read this reference nor I have been able to track it.
[2] An extremely good first contact hard scifi novel, can be read for free from the author website.
As in it's possible to knock out a dog - rendering it unconscious. But when it wakes back up it's not going to think about the fact that it's a dog (as far as we know).
So what's the name for a dog's normal not-unconscious waking state?
Being unconscious might imply that the mind is running in a state of little or no consciousness, but it is not defined by that. Assuming a cat or dog has no consciousness, it would still be called 'conscious' in his waking state.
Philosophers who work on these issues tend to separate out individual aspects of conscious experience and discuss them under distinct terms, for clarity and precision.
The main article isn't really following these conventions (most people don't even know about them), but for philosophy:
Consciousness is generally the state of having subjective experiences. Like, you're conscious when you have some personal experience of things.
Sapience is the capacity to act with reflective judgment. This definition is a mess, just bear with me for now.
Self-awareness is, well, awareness of one's self. Introspection.
There are probably others I can't recall right now. All of these are slightly different aspects of a phenomena we experience as humans, and we tend to lump them all together when talking about it, especially when asking if nonhumans can exhibit any of these properties.
I think what we mean when talking about "conscious AI" is probably something more like "sapient AI" (possibly just "self-aware AI?").
A few millenia of discussion about the meaning of sapience summarized here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wisdom/
A pattern-matching entity that can match its own patterns.
I might disagree about the intelligence aspect. It seems to me any entity that is at least moderately interesting (has any kind of behavioral complexity) would need some level of intelligence in order to model itself to a respectable degree.
Evolution has brought about creatures that are more successful (in regard to survival and reproduction), the more predictive power they have about their environment[1]. One could say, the better a species can simulate it's environment, the more likely it will continue to exist and be part of the ongoing evolution. Our brains are of course also just products of this evolutionary process and meanwhile very good at simulating their environment.
Now if we think about Plato's cave we could say, that all our experience is just an illusion. It's all just a projection of reality, that our brain creates. I'd go a step further and say: Experience or qualia is what the process of simulation of reality feels like. Or to put it in another way: Conciousness is the process of simulation of reality. The "better" the simulation or the more complete and closer to "reality" it is (whatever that means) - the higher the form of conciousness.
Taking this definition one must also concede that even animals and "lower" life forms have some degree of conciousness. It probably feels like something to be a streptococcus.
Of course all this is just blind speculation - but it somehow feels right to me.
[1] https://www.quantamagazine.org/20151119-life-is-information-...
So would you say that a supercomputer in the process of calculating the gyromagnetic ratio of an isolated electron to 12 digits of accuracy is a higher form of consciousness than we are? After all, it is performing a much better simulation of reality than our brains in that case.
By doing so we may check for complex cross connections and gain new insights. Actually I vividly remember waking up from dreams and suddenly realizing that I have a crush on a girl. I didn't really the day before (or was not aware of it) but during dreaming my brain seemed to say "I've checked all information that we have about this specimen and my simulations so far look promising!"
I sometimes also dream of deceased persons. The brain maybe again and again tries to make sense of this deeply unsettling experience and to somehow integrate that unexplainable into the simulation.
(BTW sorry for misspelling consciousness all the time in my post above - it was a little too late here)
I was surprised that this theory is not even mentioned in the article, even though Aaronson has quite some opinion on it.[2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory
[2] http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
"Consciousness is the process of simulation of reality" is a starting point. The question is asked "How does the simulation work?" Why are we so good at simulating certain kinds of counterfactual scenarios? Why do we consider some to be plausible (e.g. worrying about a friend moving away) while others we disregard as immediately absurd (e.g. worrying about being attacked by pink nerve-gas-farting dragons)?
Like most of his books, it's a great yarn in an interesting world. The ideas he's exploring are rooted in platonism (how can a theoretical mathematical abstraction affect physical systems?), quantum physics, and the nature of consciousness. It takes a while to really get rolling, and when it does it snowballs fast, but I found it to be very enjoyable from the start.
Consider that it's not difficult to make computer programs that introspect. A quine is a trivial example. But since people argue over whether computer programs can be conscious, and it's dead obvious that some computer programs introspect (i.e. operate on their own source code or perform diagnostics on their own state), I think it's clear that people have more than just introspection in mind when they say "consciousness".
Even if it's true how could you tell?
$DEITY bless Roger Penrose nonetheless.
But the system which the computer is a part of though might create consciousness.
I think a lot of our problems with thinking about consciousness is that we think of it as a thing that exist some specific place rather than as a component in a feedback loop.
What we fundamentally are, are pattern recognizing feedback loops, on top of pattern recognizing feedback loops.
Currently the paradigm of our epoch is to look at everything as a computing problem. Before it was hydraulics, then electricity etc. Maybe in 100 years our successors will be dealing with a more complete picture and their children will be laughing at schools that we thought consciousness was related to computing?
Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation. Computers are nothing but consciousness, unless they're freeing memory.
And how'd you go about verifying that? I know that I'm conscious, but you could be a p-zombie. That means if I poke you with a toothpick, you will scream in agony (responding to stimulus), but that doesn't give me any information about whether or not you are conscious.
If that were the case, why can't I simply design an artificial brain, a cyber brain, and upload myself in 1000 bodies?
What really spoke to me in Aaronson's entire lecture is the whole quantum no-cloning restriction. Bell State can't help you either, because you can't violate causality.
Suppose for a second that you could violate the laws of physics in U', a universe where anything goes. You can even have free energy too, i.e. no increasing entropy. I would still argue that creating uncountably infinite copies of yourself will still yield only the original conscious, while the rest are merely simulations.
FWIW, I don't think "microtubules" is sufficient either, because that's equally hand-wavy and a restatement of ghost in the machine. At least that's how I parse it.
We know:
1. Entropy is always increasing.
2. Life is negative entropy gatherer. (It decreases it's own entropy by increasing the entropy of its surroundings, to live.)
3. If we plot all living organisms by their negative entropy, it corresponds roughly to their awareness. The more negative entropy, the more awareness, the more "conscious".
Hypothesis:
Grandparent commenter said Consciousness is the state of being awake, hence able to react normally to sensory stimulation.
Entropy is information, the more entropy the more information there is to process.
Awareness and consciousness is the ability to process information. The more negative entropy the bigger the ability to process information.
Entropy and consciousness are two sides of the same coin. Consciousness, awareness, is negative entropy.
As another commenter said[1]: "The universe splits itself into two parts - an observer and an observed."
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11827988
What makes you think you can't, at least in principle?
I don't necessarily agree with the lookup table analogy - sure, consciousness is finite, but it is also a chaotic system. Else, it would be extremely easy to predict every possible set of actions I will make in my entire life. As Aaronson mentions, I don't think you could do that without killing me using something like Laplace's demon.
It's relatively easy to create a simulation of me - that's merely a problem of data. A simulation wouldn't be conscious though, it would be like me, but not me proper.
I think there is some intrinsic property that gives rise to consciousness, as of yet undiscovered. Hard to say though, after all, are we all not information?
Yet, we interact with people all the time, and at least some of those we consider to be concious. So, by definition the answer to the question is yes. But I think that exploring why that is so, can also shed some light on what we mean by "being concious", how one might demonstrate that something is (or isn't) concious -- and how much of being concious relates to being able to relate to other that we consider to be concious as well.
If we could (and was willing) to raise a child without any human contact, what would such a thing become? Would it really become something we would call human? Concious?
I think that going down this line of questioning, we'll find some ideas about emergent systems, part-whole relations and in general a lot of complexity.
I think it also hard to claim that if we can merge a sperm and egg cell, and create a new concious system, that we couldn't be able to create some artificial (meaning, constructed by us, not "found" in nature) system that develops into being concious.
INMHO, the controversy isn't if an artificial construct can become concious, but what conciousness is, and how we know it's there.
The interesting twist in Enders Game (and other scifi) is that the alien invaders do not understand humans as conscious beings. I see no reason to believe that there aren't beings on earth, animals, who are farther up the spectrum than we. There are some very large brains out there that we do not understand.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1331769/Doctors-stun...
A person has left and right hemispheres in their brain. Under some circumstances, losing one of these hemispheres will result in an almost normal functional human being. Imagine, with advances in biology and medicine, one day we can separate one person's brain, and place one half in one body, and the other half in another (artificial body or one whose original owner became brain dead), and both functioning as people. Are they two people, or one?
I think it depends on the observer. Some people would choose to see (one or both cases) as two people, and some would choose to see them as one.
But let us go back into history. The universe started from the big bang, as a big expanding cloud of hot gases. It was one point, and then it became one cloud. Billions of years and lots of things happening later, bits of that cloud grew eyes, legs and started to think for themselves. Are those individual bits of the universe, many individuals, or one universe?
I think, both. It's like asking a network of neurons, are you one, or many?
The universe is a conscious system. It can see itself through many eyes. It sees different parts of itself. It is having many thoughts.
I, a shard of the universe, have replied to you, another shard of the universe, by typing this on yet another shard of the same universe, at the same time as my own neurons are communicating to each other.
Another interesting way of articulating this might be: "The universe splits itself into two parts - an observer and an observed."
Also related to part and whole, and emergent systems, I was thinking about things like ant colonies - and how they might (or might not) relate to big organism that happens to be made out of cells with the same DNA, like us.
The interesting twist in Enders Game (and other scifi) is that the alien invaders do not understand humans as conscious beings. I see no reason to believe that there aren't beings on earth, animals, who are farther up the spectrum than we.
Ahh, that's funny. It's the Blub Paradox [0] all over again! People generally seem to believe that they are special. That they live in a singularly special time in history. That their generation is on the cusp of some indefinable revolution. This bias seems to be extremely pervasive. Another pervasive example is the belief among evangelical Christians that Jesus will return to earth during our lifetime [1].
[0] http://www.paulgraham.com/avg.html
[1] http://www.people-press.org/2010/06/22/section-3-war-terrori...
Consciousness appears (intuitively, on the surface) to be the thing which creates the possibility of describing consciousness. A description of consciousness must account for itself. A theory of consciousness must be written such that it writes itself.
I didn't know that there really was a prominent thinker who postulated gravity (and quantum mechanics) as the place where subjective consciousness is hiding.
The reason some people think QM and consciousness are related is that some interpretations of quantum mechanics requires a conscious observer to collapse the wave function and make the final measurement (e.g. by taking a reading from a measuring apparatus, or listening to someone else (who they can't be sure is conscious) telling you the measurement over lunch. I'm not familiar with Penrose's argument re gravity, but so far general relativity has resisted attempts to quantize it, so maybe he's saying that GR and QM must be incorporated into a more general theory yet to be worked out, like electricity and magnetism are incorporated into Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism.
May I ask, where did you get the part about "conscious observer"? Yes, there's a thing in QM about observation collapsing the wave function, and there's disagreement on what that actually means. But I can't imagine that an interpretation promoted by actual physicists would use a squishy term like "conscious" in their hard science.
It's got no explanatory power over other interpretations, obviously. But actual physicists demonstrably used squishy terms like "conscious" when talking about their hard science. Embarrassing, but true.
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Wigner_int...
At some point a measurement is made, and the only way you can be sure of the result is by consciously experiencing it. And until you ask your colleague, her quantum state is entangled with whatever is being measured, and with the measuring apparatus.
I don't see why it's embarrassing about physicists and other scientists using "squishy" terms about things they know (or even suspect) are there but can't explain. Magnetism was just as squishy a term until it was understood. The only difference is that consciousness seems to be exclusively a first-person experience, but that arguably makes it even more real. (You might be a brain in a vat, in which case everything you sense would be bogus, but your experience of it would still be real.)
If only I understood it! Does anyone else know how to interpret the sentence "in order for you to be unpredictable and unclonable, someone else’s ignorance of your causal antecedents would have to extend all the way back to ignorance about the initial state of the universe"? That and the following couple of paragraphs seem to establish something really interesting, but I haven't been able to follow it.
Which means that even if you know everything that happened between the initial state of the universe and now, you still can't predict that person decision. So you would have to ignore some things about the whole initial state of the universe.
Because the only possible things that can explain you not being able to predict that person are : 1) The decision is completely non causal... Which destroy a lot of things, because a non causal decision having impact would destroy the chain of causality. 2) Or! There is something in the initial state of the universe that you can't know. Hence the person acts are unpredictable but still causal.
I don't think runaway general AIs must be conscious in order to be a danger, but that might depend on specific definitions of consciousness.