This is the sixth attempt in the past 24 hours to post this exact story. I wonder what it was about this attempt that caused it to spike up in points vs the other 5 attempts, which only maxed out at like 2 or 3 points?
The usual stochastic nature of getting to the front page, most likely. Since the WSJ is paywalled, we've re-upped the earliest Reuters post instead of https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19505863.
What makes Grindr special in this regard ? I’m sure there are other dating or social apps out there that also could be foreign owned and used for espionage....???
They could use the info collected from users who happening to have state secrets (def-cons, state employees, etc...). The bottom line is that the Chinese could use this fact to blackmail those users to cough up what they know in exchange for forceful "coming out of a closet" announcement.
Other dating apps also allow users to state their sexual preferences, so although Grindr might have a higher density of potential blackmail material, they're not even guaranteed to have the largest collection. There must be something else that sets them apart from others. (Maybe they were the first to be acquired by a Chinese company?)
My guess is the density of potential blackmail material _is_ what sets it apart from the others -- the very act of being registered on Grindr is almost a smoking gun for being non-heterosexual if you wanted to out somebody. Much better odds of finding a target that matches with your other info and much more "damning" evidence to scare people with.
edit: Furthermore, what other Chinese company owns a dating site used frequently by westerners?
For evidence, you'd probably produce screenshots of their profile and threaten to send them to people who know the blackmail victim. Now maybe having the Grindr logo on there is a bit scarier, but any other dating site with a profile listing "taboo" interests should work just as well.
Regarding your edit: I didn't mean that there was another Chinese company owning a dating site used by Westerners, but that it would explain what made Grindr special if there weren't another such company.
Unique with Grindr is that it's a safe bet that the majority of users have sent and received explicit photos. So if you want to find a congressman's dick pics that his wife doesn't know he's been sending to men..... grindr is probably a good place to do it.
Right, they got what they wanted out of it, so now they are just selling the trash. The fact that they're selling, coupled with the basis for the decision to sell, will probably crater the price. And I suspect this will have an adverse effect on Grindr's monthly-user count, which won't help that sale price. Wouldn't be surprised if Grindr folds. And that will have a deterrent effect on other companies interested in Chinese money. Because for the Chinese government, it ain't about the money.
Grindr is specifically targeted at the male homosexual and MSM audience. The information that users share about themselves on Grindr is much more likely to be sensitive than a traditional dating site.
> What makes Grindr special in this regard ? I’m sure there are other dating or social apps out there that also could be foreign owned and used for espionage....???
select opm.name, opm.address
from opm_security_clearance_files opm
join grindr_users grinder
where grinder.phone_number = opm.phone_number
and opm.clearance in ('SECRET', 'TOP SECRET', 'SCI');
If any of those people are in the closet, they could be susceptible to blackmail.
Replace grindr by some_other_site where some_other_site.orientation != 'straight' or some_other_site.fetish in (...) and it works out to the same result, no?
Yeah, definitely. I think it's arguable the same rational could even apply to a dating site for straight people. It would take a little more work and probably be less fruitful overall, but an adversary's intelligence agency could use it identify straight people (with security clearances) who may be trying to cheat on their spouses or whose marriage is disintegrating. Both of those situations could open someone up to manipulation (a honey trap [1], for instance).
Knowing someone is gay is a classic blackmail situation, particularly within the gov world. Grindr is very sexually charged, so you get the most extreme sensitive bits here, combined with high profile people that are closeted and don’t want this information leaked. Not the same situation.
Grindr is mostly used for semi-anonymous "hookups" - I am told anecdotally by people who used it and by the media at large - which is something even out and proud people might not wish the world to know (e.g. because their spouse might disprove), especially not in harsh detail.
A lot of the communication on grindr ought to be pretty explicit too given how it gets used, something you might not want to see made public either, even if you're out of the closet already.
Now the other theoretical site might be as "bad" or even more so as grindr (the fetish website you suggested), or it might be a "tame" website used mostly in a "tame" manner, which of course still has "potential" to a blackmailer, but less so than the grindrs, tinders, backpages, adultfriendfrinders, etc of this world.
>The development represents a rare, high-profile example of CFIUS undoing an acquisition that has already been completed. Kunlun took over Grindr through two separate deals between 2016 and 2018 without submitting the acquisition for CFIUS review, according to the sources, making it vulnerable to such an intervention.
I don't approve of America surveilling her own citizens, but at least she doesn't abuse the information the way china does. Show me the reeducation camps, great firewall, etc. in America. Not perfect, certainly, but much less bad.
I didn't think CFIUS even can block sales all on their own.
My understanding was they make a recommendations and then the POTUS makes the final call, even if that might be to let CFIUS's decision stand by not making a call.
I heard from some folks in an acquisition by a foreign company going through an acquisition that they got a lot of pressure from CFIUS with requests for more and more data, and they were pretty sure the deal would be blocked. They expected the process to last months more anyway, and then... someone visited the VP and POTUS one day, took some photos, and it was automagiclly approved. The understanding was that if it was up to the POTUS anyway and he liked it, process over.
The proper solution would be not to collect personal data, especially if it is not necessary for functioning of the app, rather than worry about who is going to buy the company.
> The proper solution would be not to collect personal data, especially if it is not necessary for functioning of the app, rather than worry about who is going to buy the company.
How would that work? Even if the app doesn't collect data now, it could always be modified to collect data later. The problem isn't so much the data they collect, but the users they have.
Avoiding the collection of personal data only mitigates against actors who can only access data passively, like in data breach events. It doesn't mitigate against actors who can initiate active collection of data.
I mean that’s valid, but a gay hookup app is going to struggle with not retaining personal data - location, pictures, sexual preferences, messages, HIV status, links to other social profiles…
The app doesn't need precise location, full name, phone number or email. So if they won't collect it then there would be less useful information to leak. Having just photos without a way to identify the owner doesn't help much.
I wonder if the same owner as Tinder and OkCupid will buy this, becoming a dating (and casual sex, and etc.) superpower.
I always thought funny how OkCupid pushes ads like "You're tired of the dirty flesh market of Tinder? We hear you! Come use OkCupid!" and they have the same owner as Tinder
It makes sense, okcupid and tinder target, perhaps unintentionally at first, different markets by virtue of their different images and interactions.
And they're sufficiently different to seem like totally independent dating pools, so people are probably going to fork up cash for both even if they get ads on one of them for the other.
It's generally best to be reserved about trusting any business to put principle or mission ahead of financial rewards, so, yeah, it's probably not true that OkCupid's owners (present or past) were not in their hearts mission-focused around substance over photo-swipe matching techniques and business success just came naturally.
That said, there's nothing particularly inconsistent about having different product lines and brands for different market segments. I don't think much of any of the Swipe-to-Date apps, but lots of people seem to. Some people seem to prefer OKC. Some people would rather buy a Lexus than a Toyota, or Pizza Hut over Taco Bell.
It's not a judgement on my part, I was finding it humorous that their ads for OkCupid were basically calling Tinder cheap and shallow just as a marketing ploy to get the users on their side while sharing the same owner, a bit like finding out a vegan restaurant that markets itself by calling meat foods unhealthy actually has the same owner as burger king.
I'm not sure Match Group (Tinder, OkCupid, PlentyOfFish, Match.com, Meetic) can become much more of a dating superpower. I suppose Grindr would nearly complete the monopoly. They're still missing Zoosk, eHarmony, Grindr, Bumble and a few other smaller players.
$15 billion market cap, $1.7b in sales, $477m in profit. Only 1,400 employees. Match, despite being public, is of course roughly 80% owned by InterActiveCorp (IAC).
Nice to see someone taking the Chinese foothold in SV seriously. I've also heard people who go to work for Chinese companies are then blacklisted from US Government defense- and intel-related work for 1 year. Can anyone confirm?
> blacklisted from US Government defense- and intel-related work for 1 year
While I don't have the knowledge to confirm or deny this, I find it pretty lenient of the US not only because it's only a year, but also because it's open enough about it. Keeping in mind Aurora and the Lockheed Martin F35 hack, and that national security opposing a superpower is not a problem that solves itself, I find it does not undermine American values or freedoms.
It's not a question of whether you have a Chinese spouse; that's not correct, and that would be racist.
It's a question of whether or not you or your spouse have ongoing relationships with Chinese nationals and could, as a result, be subject to influence by the Chinese government.
If you were married to someone who, say, had fled China and had no connection to anyone there, that's likely to be fine. If you're married to someone who has a whole extended family back in China and visits them four times a year, well, that's pretty obviously a potential vulnerability that's going to be considered as part of a background investigation.
It's not a question of ethnicity or race, it's a question of having avenues of influence by a foreign government.
That’s still just a matter of race, so long as Americans and Chinese people are not entirely free to go live and work in either country without restriction. It’s just a proxy for race. If you are born in a China, of course your extended family is going to be under the control of the Chinese government. Same for Americans in America.
I understand your issue with the policy, and I think this is a fine stance to take in cases where relations between two countries are good. Sadly, that is not the case between the US and China. Focusing on race here completely ignores the geopolitical situation. This issue is also completely moot in any case where the influence of a foreign power isn't a concern, as many others have mentioned.
I'd also refute the idea that nationality is a proxy for race, especially for a country as large and diverse as China. China is _far_ from the only nation with an Asian populace--many of the ethnicities in China can be found in neighboring countries and across Asia.
Is it ethnic profiling though? A thought experiment is to imagine a country nearly identical to the US in ethnic composition, culture, size, GDP, etc but is rivals with the US on the same level China is. If you were going to apply for a security clearance in the USA and your spouse and their family was from this rival bizarroUSA, I think you'd be subject to similar scrutiny. Just a question of where your (or your spouse's) national loyalties lie.
Oh, I totally get it. Well, sort of. I don't think China is the same level of rivalry that we had with the USSR. They're playing the game we asked and invited them to play.
But that aside, I hear you. My major confusion is that I never see the woke crowd running in to get super sensitive about things like this when the topic is Chinese people. I feel like they'd lose their shit if we were talking about Arabs, for example.
So you can't marry a Chinese American for he/she is both Chinese and American at the same time by your logic, or they should not even exist in the first hand?
I didn't think being from China was a racial condition. What if it were a Russian spouse? Same thing. In national security background checks they are concerned about connections to foreign governments. Yes it is discrimination on foreign ties such as travel, family, or dual citizenship.
How is it naked racism? I doubt this is a race based restriction so much as a nationality based one. I would be shocked if it effected anyone with a spouse of second generation or later.
Nationality is a proxy for race. Discrimination based on nationality is discrimination based on race.
Just like race, one has no say in where they were born. You don’t get to arbitrarily change it if you don’t like the one that was assigned to you by the people with the most arms in the region in which you happen to be born.
A few things. It's based on nation, not race. The government doesn't care if your spouse is a 5th generation Chinese-American, they care if you have close family that is under the influence of a foreign government. It's not an auto-blacklist or anything, you can be born in China and still have a US security clearance.
Discriminating based on citizenship status is usually illegal, but US security clearance is typically contingent on being a US citizen. The relevant anti-discrimination laws have an exemption for "national security purposes"
Except it's not racial... It wouldn't matter if your hypothetical Chinese spouse is descended from Han Chinese, Russians, Mongols, Koreans, Tamils, or Marco Polo.
It is naive to think that principles and virtues need apply when it comes to national security. There are horrible but difficult things being done right now in every country's intelligence communities to protect the citizens of those countries. Racism has nothing to do with it.
It’s not racism. It’s any foreign government, including allies. They closely scrutinize your connections to foreign nationals. They especially scrutinize people with connections to rivals and adversaries, though.
It sounds like you just don't understand how security clearances work.
Its about allegiance to a country. Not your race.
If you come to the US from China, revoke your Chinese citizenship, become a US citizen and limit your contact to Chinese citizens, you can get a security clearance.
> Its about allegiance to a country. Not your race.
Also vulnerability to manipulation. So you'll be denied if you're heavily in debt and have a gambling problem, even if you're absolutely loyal and patriotic.
You would think people would know better but if you ever get bored and decided to browse clearance rejection decisions you see dozens of people losing their clearance each year because they looked at porn on their work computer.
There is a list of countries (Iran and friends, I'm not sure if China was on the list) that if you have or had ever previously held citizenship you are permanently barred from working with ITAR controlled materiel.
The reason being that otherwise there's nothing stopping you from renouncing your citizenship, stealing the secrets, and defecting in exchange for being granted citizenship again.
Chinese is used both as a race and citizenship marker, I’m using it here as the latter and not the former. Chinese themselves are hard pressed to come up with a suitable distinction.
Eg Uighurs aren’t referred to as Chinese when they emigrate abroad like Han are, even though they are both supposedly Chinese when citizens of the PRC. In that case, if I married a Uighur with a PRC passport, my security clearance would still be in jeapordy, if I married a Chinese (Han) or Uighur with a Canadian passport, there is less of a problem depending on when/if they naturalized.
Actually when you get denied a clearance they give you a statement of reasons (SOR) in your rejection letter which you have a certain period to rebut. (I think 30 days?)
> I've also heard people who go to work for Chinese companies are then blacklisted from US Government defense- and intel-related work for 1 year. Can anyone confirm?
I definitely want confirmation on this. I could see the security-clearance folks being skeptical of someone who moved to mainland China to work, but not of someone who, say had a job in the US at a Chinese-owned company like AMC [1] or Riot Games [2].
There isn't some hard rule like that. If you have no family connections to china, moved over to join some cool company, then came back a year later because you got bored, your interim clearance would probably be denied, and your background investigation would probably take longer but you could still get a clearance.
A few years ago, I was told by someone knowledgeable about clearances that I shouldn't visit China or Russia if I was interested in getting a clearance or applying for defense or intelligence related work in the next couple of years.
As a practical example, I'm guessing there's concern that they could get personal sexuality information about someone in the military and extort them with it.
Yes, they already have it, and that is the concern. If someone in Chinese intelligence wanted high quality extortion material, Chinese ownership of Grindr means they could probably get it with relative ease.
And now you just know that they're going to make some "offline backups" before the company changes hands. It's not likely that Grindr has bank-level auditing of whether a single bribed/coerced employee plugs in a flash drive.
Presumably Grindr is going to continue to exist and gain new users, possibly for quite a long time. Just because they already have data on 27 million doesn't mean we should just shrug and leave it open for future millions more.
Part of the process of getting a security clearance is proving you can't be blackmailed.
Lots of things you would think are disqualifying aren't, as long as you disclose them (being involved with BDSM is the most obvious answer I'm aware of).
The fact that they're LGBT isn't the issue with the repeal of don't ask don't tell. But if they're not out and they don't disclose then yes, this information is absolutely valuable.
Money stuff is another disqualifying event. If you're heavily in debt then you're vulnerable to being paid off in exchange for something against the interests of the United States.
There's no magic AI in Grindr that can answer the question "Show me all people that work for DoD that are into gay sex". There has to be some engineer or group of engineers to do it. It is the same with a Hinge/OKC/Match/etc.
Because they don't have a bunch of location information for everyone on grindr?
If only someone did something in the last few years that would make this data super valuable. Like if Chinese intelligence broke into the US governments HR system and absconded with the data (including all their personal information including where they live).
Many American businesspeople conceal their sexual orientation so that they can do business without being executed or imprisoned (possibly effecting an unofficial torture and execution) in bigoted countries, particularly in the Middle East, where capital is in great supply right now.
Also, it's not just about orientation, it's also about affairs, or adjacency to related petty crimes, which make these people vulnerable to blackmail in private and U.S. security life. e.g. a Chinese asset and you hit it off, maybe take some ecstasy or do something you didn't want your husband/boyfriend to know about, and they have it on video. Maybe it's still doable even if the database itself is not compromised, but probably more expensive and time consuming.
Added:
Most Americans' home addresses (usually all of them, going back decades), phone numbers (again, usually all of them, going back decades), and birthdates are available in several privately owned publicly searchable databases which you have to specifically tell not to list these things. DoD broadly, and the Air Force, Army, and Navy at least all instruct personnel to ask that their information be delisted from these databases. Let's say you search for Grindr phone numbers and names in these databases, and find all the people who are not listed. That would be a pretty good start if you're looking for vulnerable people.
The endgame vulnerability of a dating app containing PII including STD infection status, falling victim to insurmountable abuse or gaming via automation, AI or ML could rapidly or stealthily generate fast spreading health epidemics with extreme precision and strategy.
Left unspoken is that the behavior of users of the app is ipso facto a security risk, regardless of who happens to own the platform they're using. This was why the US historically was leery about employing homosexuals in security contexts - they are vulnerable to blackmail and engage in behavior that makes them physically vulnerable (eg anonymous chemsex) on top of that.
Look, I know these seem like vile stereotypes, but honestly, make a profile and go on grindr and take a look at what people put in their profiles and the pictures they choose. No, it isn't universal, but grinder is a substantially less wholesome place than other dating site, including tinder.
In fact it's because of this very stigma that Grindr makes for particularly good blackmail material - whether you think the stigma is warranted or not.
But being LGBT in China is much more accepted than in the west, so I don't see the point here...although not if they had sex tapes or is critiqued by the official media
"Same-sex couples are unable to marry or adopt, and households headed by such couples are ineligible for the same legal protections available to opposite-sex couples."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_China
For extortion based on Grindr data to work it only requires the target to not want the information released. The target might be in a relationship and be cheating on their partner etc or any number of other reasons that have nothing to do with how generally accepted homosexuality is where they live.
This is a very tinfoil-hat-y perspective, but is it possible that this action gained support inside the Trump White House because it makes life more difficult for Grindr?
I think the theory that it's about potential blackmail and extortion is a more likely explanation, and overall I think it makes sense for the government to take this action, but it might have been boosted by ulterior motives (see also CNN/AT&T/Time Warner).
It still creates financial turmoil for Grindr, especially given that it was considering an IPO. The IPO would have been a financial windfall for many employees, whereas an acquisition may mean no immediate liquidity for those employees' shares and may have less desirable terms (because it's forced and has to be completed by some deadline). This may hurt morale.
An additional security concern is Grindr’s location tracking. If you haven’t used it, it broadcasts people as “N feet away” on a grid (sorted by distance).
That information could be used to discern the locations of military personnel.
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[ 5.9 ms ] story [ 173 ms ] threadedit: Furthermore, what other Chinese company owns a dating site used frequently by westerners?
Regarding your edit: I didn't mean that there was another Chinese company owning a dating site used by Westerners, but that it would explain what made Grindr special if there weren't another such company.
There are many users of the app who are not open about their lifestyle (“DL”)
select opm.name, opm.address
from opm_security_clearance_files opm
join grindr_users grinder
where grinder.phone_number = opm.phone_number
and opm.clearance in ('SECRET', 'TOP SECRET', 'SCI');
If any of those people are in the closet, they could be susceptible to blackmail.
Simple explanation that likely explains the security panel's reasoning behind their statements.
Also explains why a phone number as an identity token is a horrible idea.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recruitment_of_spies#Love,_hon...
Grindr is mostly used for semi-anonymous "hookups" - I am told anecdotally by people who used it and by the media at large - which is something even out and proud people might not wish the world to know (e.g. because their spouse might disprove), especially not in harsh detail. A lot of the communication on grindr ought to be pretty explicit too given how it gets used, something you might not want to see made public either, even if you're out of the closet already.
Now the other theoretical site might be as "bad" or even more so as grindr (the fetish website you suggested), or it might be a "tame" website used mostly in a "tame" manner, which of course still has "potential" to a blackmailer, but less so than the grindrs, tinders, backpages, adultfriendfrinders, etc of this world.
why would grindr have that? Hell, they dont even validate the random string you can put in the email field
>The development represents a rare, high-profile example of CFIUS undoing an acquisition that has already been completed. Kunlun took over Grindr through two separate deals between 2016 and 2018 without submitting the acquisition for CFIUS review, according to the sources, making it vulnerable to such an intervention.
People are starting to wake up to the fact that china won't stop until the west stops it.
Makes sense.
My understanding was they make a recommendations and then the POTUS makes the final call, even if that might be to let CFIUS's decision stand by not making a call.
I heard from some folks in an acquisition by a foreign company going through an acquisition that they got a lot of pressure from CFIUS with requests for more and more data, and they were pretty sure the deal would be blocked. They expected the process to last months more anyway, and then... someone visited the VP and POTUS one day, took some photos, and it was automagiclly approved. The understanding was that if it was up to the POTUS anyway and he liked it, process over.
How would that work? Even if the app doesn't collect data now, it could always be modified to collect data later. The problem isn't so much the data they collect, but the users they have.
Avoiding the collection of personal data only mitigates against actors who can only access data passively, like in data breach events. It doesn't mitigate against actors who can initiate active collection of data.
I always thought funny how OkCupid pushes ads like "You're tired of the dirty flesh market of Tinder? We hear you! Come use OkCupid!" and they have the same owner as Tinder
And they're sufficiently different to seem like totally independent dating pools, so people are probably going to fork up cash for both even if they get ads on one of them for the other.
That said, there's nothing particularly inconsistent about having different product lines and brands for different market segments. I don't think much of any of the Swipe-to-Date apps, but lots of people seem to. Some people seem to prefer OKC. Some people would rather buy a Lexus than a Toyota, or Pizza Hut over Taco Bell.
$15 billion market cap, $1.7b in sales, $477m in profit. Only 1,400 employees. Match, despite being public, is of course roughly 80% owned by InterActiveCorp (IAC).
While I don't have the knowledge to confirm or deny this, I find it pretty lenient of the US not only because it's only a year, but also because it's open enough about it. Keeping in mind Aurora and the Lockheed Martin F35 hack, and that national security opposing a superpower is not a problem that solves itself, I find it does not undermine American values or freedoms.
It's a question of whether or not you or your spouse have ongoing relationships with Chinese nationals and could, as a result, be subject to influence by the Chinese government.
If you were married to someone who, say, had fled China and had no connection to anyone there, that's likely to be fine. If you're married to someone who has a whole extended family back in China and visits them four times a year, well, that's pretty obviously a potential vulnerability that's going to be considered as part of a background investigation.
It's not a question of ethnicity or race, it's a question of having avenues of influence by a foreign government.
Don’t get it twisted. It’s just racism.
I'd also refute the idea that nationality is a proxy for race, especially for a country as large and diverse as China. China is _far_ from the only nation with an Asian populace--many of the ethnicities in China can be found in neighboring countries and across Asia.
The residents of those various places, as I understand things, see it differently.
I feel like the reception would be different if we were talking about "woke-friendly" demographics.
But that aside, I hear you. My major confusion is that I never see the woke crowd running in to get super sensitive about things like this when the topic is Chinese people. I feel like they'd lose their shit if we were talking about Arabs, for example.
Just like race, one has no say in where they were born. You don’t get to arbitrarily change it if you don’t like the one that was assigned to you by the people with the most arms in the region in which you happen to be born.
Discriminating based on citizenship status is usually illegal, but US security clearance is typically contingent on being a US citizen. The relevant anti-discrimination laws have an exemption for "national security purposes"
So, the latter: they get a free pass to do racial and national origin discrimination. That was my answer, thank you.
Its about allegiance to a country. Not your race.
If you come to the US from China, revoke your Chinese citizenship, become a US citizen and limit your contact to Chinese citizens, you can get a security clearance.
Also a security clearance is not a right.
Also vulnerability to manipulation. So you'll be denied if you're heavily in debt and have a gambling problem, even if you're absolutely loyal and patriotic.
You would think people would know better but if you ever get bored and decided to browse clearance rejection decisions you see dozens of people losing their clearance each year because they looked at porn on their work computer.
1. There was a man who loved his dog in a way that one is not supposed to love a dog.
2. There were a couple people who liked crotch ventilation while riding around on a motorcycle.
The reason being that otherwise there's nothing stopping you from renouncing your citizenship, stealing the secrets, and defecting in exchange for being granted citizenship again.
Eg Uighurs aren’t referred to as Chinese when they emigrate abroad like Han are, even though they are both supposedly Chinese when citizens of the PRC. In that case, if I married a Uighur with a PRC passport, my security clearance would still be in jeapordy, if I married a Chinese (Han) or Uighur with a Canadian passport, there is less of a problem depending on when/if they naturalized.
You're wrong. You should read the link forks25 posted to one of the decisions: http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/industrial/2018/16-04107.h1.pdf
I looked through some others, and here's one where a Chinese person was denied clearance on account of foreign ties: http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/industrial/2019/17-03450.a1.pdf
And here's another were someone was denied for alcoholism: http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/industrial/2019/18-00782.a1.pdf
All the reasoning seems very clear to me.
I definitely want confirmation on this. I could see the security-clearance folks being skeptical of someone who moved to mainland China to work, but not of someone who, say had a job in the US at a Chinese-owned company like AMC [1] or Riot Games [2].
[1] http://fortune.com/2016/03/18/the-biggest-american-companies...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot_Games
[0] http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/industrial/2018/16-04107.h1.pdf
Seems really quite plausible to me.
Not sure how this works as far as who should or shouldn't own these companies but there is some potential utility there, with very very little cost.
Lots of things you would think are disqualifying aren't, as long as you disclose them (being involved with BDSM is the most obvious answer I'm aware of).
The fact that they're LGBT isn't the issue with the repeal of don't ask don't tell. But if they're not out and they don't disclose then yes, this information is absolutely valuable.
Money stuff is another disqualifying event. If you're heavily in debt then you're vulnerable to being paid off in exchange for something against the interests of the United States.
If only someone did something in the last few years that would make this data super valuable. Like if Chinese intelligence broke into the US governments HR system and absconded with the data (including all their personal information including where they live).
Oh wait...
Also, it's not just about orientation, it's also about affairs, or adjacency to related petty crimes, which make these people vulnerable to blackmail in private and U.S. security life. e.g. a Chinese asset and you hit it off, maybe take some ecstasy or do something you didn't want your husband/boyfriend to know about, and they have it on video. Maybe it's still doable even if the database itself is not compromised, but probably more expensive and time consuming.
Added: Most Americans' home addresses (usually all of them, going back decades), phone numbers (again, usually all of them, going back decades), and birthdates are available in several privately owned publicly searchable databases which you have to specifically tell not to list these things. DoD broadly, and the Air Force, Army, and Navy at least all instruct personnel to ask that their information be delisted from these databases. Let's say you search for Grindr phone numbers and names in these databases, and find all the people who are not listed. That would be a pretty good start if you're looking for vulnerable people.
In fact it's because of this very stigma that Grindr makes for particularly good blackmail material - whether you think the stigma is warranted or not.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_China#Summary_t...
"Same-sex couples are unable to marry or adopt, and households headed by such couples are ineligible for the same legal protections available to opposite-sex couples." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_China
I think the theory that it's about potential blackmail and extortion is a more likely explanation, and overall I think it makes sense for the government to take this action, but it might have been boosted by ulterior motives (see also CNN/AT&T/Time Warner).
That information could be used to discern the locations of military personnel.