> The pervasiveness of these psychological strategies shows that, whether each case was because of a genius decision or an accident of history, they conferred a substantial advantage to their practitioners.
Of course if Cortés burned all his ships then his entire force was wiped out, would news have reached home? And if it did reach home, would the news of crushing defeat and incompetent leadership have been hushed up?
So I'm not sure I consider this 'substantial advantage' proven.
Not mentioned in the article is that Caesar himself was inspired by a previous Roman general, Sulla. Sulla marched on Rome about 30 years before Caesar did, thus showing that it was possible. Caesar's march also gave rise to some expressions still used today: "the die is cast" and "crossing the Rubicon" - both of which mean "going beyond the point of no return."
Sulla is generally seen as having set the precedent for Caesar's march on Rome and dictatorship. Cicero comments that Pompey once said "If Sulla could, why can't I?". Sulla's example proved that it could be done, and therefore inspired others to attempt it; and in this respect, he has been seen as another step in the Republic's fall.
> When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve - to their villages about four hundred - and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers.
There's an example based on that work -- the game of Chicken, where you drive a car at another car, person who swerves loses.
Payoff table:
Both swerve: both lose face
Neither swerve: both die
They swerve, you don't: you gain face, they lose it
You swerve, they don't: you lose face, they gain it
So: you make it abundantly clear that you can't control your car, even if you wanted to. Tear out the steering wheel, or lash it down and jump onto the roof of the car. Now it changes your opponents options to:
Swerve: lose face
Don't: die.
(It's a trolley-problem-like scenario, don't ask too many questions about the practicalities of tearing out the steering wheel)
I read an amusing analysis of Chicken, but I can't recall where, pointing out that playing against an omniscient opponent gave you an unassailable advantage. You just determine not to swerve come what may and your all-knowing opponent would have no choice but to swerve.
This is an example of the more general game theory advantage of commitment.[0, 1] An agent in a multi-agent game benefits from being able to commit to a strategy.
Planners, of course, proceed on the assumption that the future is not 'already here', that they are not dealing with a predetermined – and therefore predictable – system, that they can determine things by their own free will, and that their plans will make the future different from what it would have been had there been no plan. And yet it is the planners, more than perhaps anyone else, who would like nothing better than to have a machine to foretell the future. Do they ever wonder whether the machine might incidentally also foretell their own plans before they have been conceived?
– EF Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (1973)
This is also why you might send an envoy to negotiate a purchase instead of going yourself and only authorize a certain amount. They insist on a higher price, they get no money at all. The risk you take is that you lose out completely when you can’t offer anymore money, but you’ve changed their options.
Only if you are the only one knowing that the opponent cannot steer the car.
If you know that a bullet is coming and keep running into it, people will call you an idiot, not courageous. You also won’t lose face if you duck, if those judging your courage know that the bullet can’t steer itself.
The current article seems to believe that this behaviour is in some sense irrational, presumably on the theory that "rationally" you should never prefer to remove a potentially useful option (which after all you could just choose not to use).
But I think that isn't the best way to look at it. What Cortés really needed was for his men to _believe_ that there was no option to retreat. As the only way for him to achieve that was to actually burn the ships, that was the price he chose to pay. But if he'd had another way to achieve that goal I expect he would have taken it.
The same goes for the chicken game: removing your control of the car is the price you may have to pay for causing your opponent to believe that you have no control of your car.
Looking at things this way, the behaviour is no more irrational than it's irrational for me to prefer a situation in which I end up with less money to a situation in which I end up with more, if I've bought something of value with that money.
The way I look at it this kind of phenomenon is like Liar's paradox; as soon as someone sets forth a system describing what constitutes rational behavior, it's human nature to think about that system and relate to it in various ways, which has the potential to generate preferences which aren't comprehended within the system (due to their ability to refer to it [explicitly countercultural preferences]). However since most systems of rationality are quantitative the system could remain valid as an approximation.
In similar vein, there is the "poison pill" defence in business where a company that does not wish to be acquired (typically by hostile takeover) makes itself unpalatable to potential acquirers.
Burning the boat Doesn’t always work well ...”in a move much like that of Cortés, he set fire to his ships and forced his men to press on. In his case, this did not end with stunning victory; Julian overextended his front, was killed, and lost the campaign. Julian’s death shows the very real risks involved in this bold strategy.”
> “an adversary is more hurt by desertion than slaughter.”
And disease, starvation, and the general problems of the march. This is one of the things I learned from Clausewitz's discussion of Napoleon's march on Moscow, the one that produces the famous Tufte diagram.
The Grande Armeé numbered 422,000 per Tufte/Minard, 1 million per Wikipedia, the same as several large music festivals; and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow; and most of the food had to be locally sourced. This necessarily resulted in the force being spread out over a huge area, and every morning when it was formed up there would be slightly fewer men.
Edit: and speaking of burning boats, when they got there, the Russians had burned the food stores of Moscow, starving both the Invaders and the citizens.
This is what one of those little steps in the graph was like: the crossing of the Berezina river - a desperate battle between 100,000 men, with combat engineering of a 100m bridge, and stragglers falling to marauding cossacks ...
Hence why the truely great generals (alexander, genghis khan, etc ) understood the importance of logistics and incompetant ones like napoleon didn't.
> and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow
Closer to 800 km than 3000. Napoleon's invasion of russia started at the neman river near lithuania. It didn't start in paris.
Now compare napoleon's "short walk" to moscow with the thousands of kilometers of logistics that alexander or genghis khan had to deal with ( and they succeeded while napoleon failed miserably ).
Another great napoleon logistic fail was his failure in egypt where he lost another army. It shows how propaganda frames the people's minds that we think that napoleon was a competent, let alone a great military leader. Objectively, Napoleon's major failures and the fact that he destroyed the french empire makes him one of the greatest military fools in human history.
Now, rerun Cortes' landing a hundred times, and in what, maybe 98 times they all end up dead, or returning home in one ship. Yes the natives would still have suffered terrible losses from disease but some other leader than Cortes would have gotten the empire.
The secret to being a trader is to not risk it all, to be there tomorrow to claim tomorrow's profit. Or perhaps the secret to poker is to stay in till you have a winning hand then risk it all.
But We have made lottery winners our heroes - I fear this is entirely the wrong model.
NB
Ceaser invaded Britain and definitely did not burn his ships - his mission was not conquest of Britain but political gains in Rome. Caesar may have risked it all - but when the odds on him where around 50:50, not at Cortes' level of risk. To me the difference is profound.
It's sad to see the submission being used as another reason to remind people of the role of luck in human affairs. That take on things involving noted individual success is a little too trendy now.
Aside from being overdone, the reason it bothers me is because it distracts from so many other points. In this case, it distracts from the main point of the article which is that not having a fallback position leads to higher commitment. It's a lesson larger than just the warfare and politics examples given. It has very broad applicability in life.
> not having a fallback position leads to higher commitment
That's what the article claims, but that doesn't necessarily make that statement accurate.
There's no proof Cortez et. al.'s troops actually felt higher commitment as a consequence of having their ships burned - we are expected to conclude that's what happened, but we have only Cortez's word to tell us this and an article demonstrating selection bias.
You can't think of an example from your own life? Imagine feeling less committed at a job and not really feeling like looking for another yet. Then, you're fired while being on the hook for all of your living expenses. You become committed to the new search then because there's no backstop.
This is a natural human response. Relatable even without testimony from Cortez's troops.
It's very easy to imagine the opposite being true and Cortez' troops falling into despair as their leader supposedly turned insane and ordered them to destroy their most valuable assets. Goes for your example too: Maybe not all people are extremely motivated by severe setbacks in life.
As an example from my own life, Job hunting has often been the other way round - when I have had no job, I would take anything - shelf stacking at a supermarket comes to mind. But I remember going through a period of fast turn around when I worked full time but spent most lunchtimes calling and emailing for my next job and literally tripled my salary in 12 months.
So sometimes having the backup plan let's you make better choices.
From the perspective of the 98% who fail sure it’s bad. On the other hand from the perspective of the sovereign they work for risking 500 men for an empire is an excellent bet. That’s a wildly asymmetric payoff there.
Cortes had a whole civilization behind him. Hundreds to thousands of years of people trading ideas and creating more and better tech. Aztecs were just isolated by themselves with a handful of other natives since they arrived in North America. Obviously the side with better tech will always win, and that's why it only took a few hundred Spaniards to take over hundreds of thousands of Aztecs.
Unit cohesion is the key element here and the idea that is transferable to other endeavors. Cortez probably realized his army was a collection of soldiers of fortune and other rogue elements and lacked the cohesion to engage serious adversaries. Burning the ships was a way of communicating to them (as was the practice of the Teutons and Persions of bringing families along,) that, to use an American Revolution saying, "we either hang together or we'll hang alone." Another example of good vs. bad unit cohesion occurs in the Korean War when the Chinese entered the war. The U.S. Army (leaving out other national units for this example,) on the west side of the peninsula fell apart when they encountered the Chinese units leading to a retreat below the 38th Parallel. U.S. Marine units, on the eastern side of the peninsula, hung together and executed a fighting withdrawal from their encircled position. In these examples I believe the difference is in leadership. The Army situation devolved into an "every man for himself" rout while the Marines knew they could rely on the unit the next hill over to stay where they were no matter what and that that unit was relying on them to stay put as well.
In industry you sometimes see a similar "against all odds" spirit that infuses an organization, usually from the top down but sometimes just the worker's commitment to a cause although usually not caused by the CEO burning a building.
Yes, dramatic and desperate 'damn close run thing' breakout with heavy losses, also including 41 Commando Royal Marines, and assisted by a lot of close air support.
I heard the same story when I was a kid but the general that did it was "Tariq ibn ziyad" in Gibraltar (the mountain is named after him). But I can't for the life of me find a enlgish source that confirms it.
It's the origin of the famous phrase "the sea is behind and the enemy is in front of you".
There is a legend that a Muslim commander (who, ironically, led the invasion of Spain) did the same thing:
> There is a legend that Ṭāriq ordered that the ships he arrived in be burnt, to prevent any cowardice. This is first mentioned over 400 years later by the geographer al-Idrisi, fasc. 5 p. 540 of Arabic text
> This strategic choice highlights the difference between logic and economists’ concept of “rationality,”
Maybe if economics were that simple. But if your increased soldiers' willpower to fight is superior to what you lost in terms of tools, then the plan should be economically viable, right?
Yes, that line in the article is naive, perhaps gratuitous. "Credible commitment" is a major concept in game theory. It's also important in certain branches of the study of international relations.
This is not a paradox, this is people managing morale. Real life is not a RTS with stats on firepower, range and healthpoints and units fighting until they die.
People come to battle for a reason, fight for a reason, obey for a reason, all which may be different. 90% of a victory is bringing the soldiers you need with the weapons you need commanded by the officers you need in the place you need them. We focus on the 10% of battles that were won by tactical geniuses, but even they, without the 90% of logistics that preceded it, would be nowhere.
Caesar was a bridge builder. Hannibal crossed the Alps in winter. Mehmed II carrying ships over land to siege Constantinople. Hitler's specialty, the Blitzkrieg, was ALL about logistics.
Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities."
At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.
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[ 5.4 ms ] story [ 100 ms ] threadOf course if Cortés burned all his ships then his entire force was wiped out, would news have reached home? And if it did reach home, would the news of crushing defeat and incompetent leadership have been hushed up?
So I'm not sure I consider this 'substantial advantage' proven.
Sulla is generally seen as having set the precedent for Caesar's march on Rome and dictatorship. Cicero comments that Pompey once said "If Sulla could, why can't I?". Sulla's example proved that it could be done, and therefore inspired others to attempt it; and in this respect, he has been seen as another step in the Republic's fall.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulla#Legacy
Kafka also has a nice related aphorism: "Beyond a certain point there is no return. This point has to be reached."
"There was a point where we needed to stop, and we have clearly passed it.
So let's keep going and see what happens."
(literally)
> When they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve - to their villages about four hundred - and to the private dwellings that remained; they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them; that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more ready for undergoing all dangers.
Spoiler: It did not work out so great for them.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precommitment
Payoff table: Both swerve: both lose face Neither swerve: both die They swerve, you don't: you gain face, they lose it You swerve, they don't: you lose face, they gain it
So: you make it abundantly clear that you can't control your car, even if you wanted to. Tear out the steering wheel, or lash it down and jump onto the roof of the car. Now it changes your opponents options to:
Swerve: lose face Don't: die.
(It's a trolley-problem-like scenario, don't ask too many questions about the practicalities of tearing out the steering wheel)
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precommitment
[1] https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/game-theory/commitment/...
https://youtu.be/S0qjK3TWZE8?t=72
– EF Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered (1973)
https://youtu.be/S0qjK3TWZE8
Only if you are the only one knowing that the opponent cannot steer the car.
If you know that a bullet is coming and keep running into it, people will call you an idiot, not courageous. You also won’t lose face if you duck, if those judging your courage know that the bullet can’t steer itself.
The current article seems to believe that this behaviour is in some sense irrational, presumably on the theory that "rationally" you should never prefer to remove a potentially useful option (which after all you could just choose not to use).
But I think that isn't the best way to look at it. What Cortés really needed was for his men to _believe_ that there was no option to retreat. As the only way for him to achieve that was to actually burn the ships, that was the price he chose to pay. But if he'd had another way to achieve that goal I expect he would have taken it.
The same goes for the chicken game: removing your control of the car is the price you may have to pay for causing your opponent to believe that you have no control of your car.
Looking at things this way, the behaviour is no more irrational than it's irrational for me to prefer a situation in which I end up with less money to a situation in which I end up with more, if I've bought something of value with that money.
[0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shareholder_rights_plan#Common...
And disease, starvation, and the general problems of the march. This is one of the things I learned from Clausewitz's discussion of Napoleon's march on Moscow, the one that produces the famous Tufte diagram.
The Grande Armeé numbered 422,000 per Tufte/Minard, 1 million per Wikipedia, the same as several large music festivals; and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow; and most of the food had to be locally sourced. This necessarily resulted in the force being spread out over a huge area, and every morning when it was formed up there would be slightly fewer men.
Edit: and speaking of burning boats, when they got there, the Russians had burned the food stores of Moscow, starving both the Invaders and the citizens.
http://nowscape.com/images/map_napoleon_moscow.gif
https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2F...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berezina
From my school lessons, it wasn't deliberate.
> and they almost all had to walk the ~3,000 kilometers to Moscow
Closer to 800 km than 3000. Napoleon's invasion of russia started at the neman river near lithuania. It didn't start in paris.
Now compare napoleon's "short walk" to moscow with the thousands of kilometers of logistics that alexander or genghis khan had to deal with ( and they succeeded while napoleon failed miserably ).
Another great napoleon logistic fail was his failure in egypt where he lost another army. It shows how propaganda frames the people's minds that we think that napoleon was a competent, let alone a great military leader. Objectively, Napoleon's major failures and the fact that he destroyed the french empire makes him one of the greatest military fools in human history.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devotio
The secret to being a trader is to not risk it all, to be there tomorrow to claim tomorrow's profit. Or perhaps the secret to poker is to stay in till you have a winning hand then risk it all.
But We have made lottery winners our heroes - I fear this is entirely the wrong model.
NB Ceaser invaded Britain and definitely did not burn his ships - his mission was not conquest of Britain but political gains in Rome. Caesar may have risked it all - but when the odds on him where around 50:50, not at Cortes' level of risk. To me the difference is profound.
Aside from being overdone, the reason it bothers me is because it distracts from so many other points. In this case, it distracts from the main point of the article which is that not having a fallback position leads to higher commitment. It's a lesson larger than just the warfare and politics examples given. It has very broad applicability in life.
That's what the article claims, but that doesn't necessarily make that statement accurate.
There's no proof Cortez et. al.'s troops actually felt higher commitment as a consequence of having their ships burned - we are expected to conclude that's what happened, but we have only Cortez's word to tell us this and an article demonstrating selection bias.
This is a natural human response. Relatable even without testimony from Cortez's troops.
So sometimes having the backup plan let's you make better choices.
People here should be familiar with this dynamic.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vicksburg_campaign
In industry you sometimes see a similar "against all odds" spirit that infuses an organization, usually from the top down but sometimes just the worker's commitment to a cause although usually not caused by the CEO burning a building.
Yes, dramatic and desperate 'damn close run thing' breakout with heavy losses, also including 41 Commando Royal Marines, and assisted by a lot of close air support.
It's the origin of the famous phrase "the sea is behind and the enemy is in front of you".
> There is a legend that Ṭāriq ordered that the ships he arrived in be burnt, to prevent any cowardice. This is first mentioned over 400 years later by the geographer al-Idrisi, fasc. 5 p. 540 of Arabic text
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariq_ibn_Ziyad#cite_ref-7
> This strategic choice highlights the difference between logic and economists’ concept of “rationality,”
Maybe if economics were that simple. But if your increased soldiers' willpower to fight is superior to what you lost in terms of tools, then the plan should be economically viable, right?
People come to battle for a reason, fight for a reason, obey for a reason, all which may be different. 90% of a victory is bringing the soldiers you need with the weapons you need commanded by the officers you need in the place you need them. We focus on the 10% of battles that were won by tactical geniuses, but even they, without the 90% of logistics that preceded it, would be nowhere.
Caesar was a bridge builder. Hannibal crossed the Alps in winter. Mehmed II carrying ships over land to siege Constantinople. Hitler's specialty, the Blitzkrieg, was ALL about logistics.
https://onepeterfive.com/burn-ships-hernan-cortes-new-world/
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Ruta_de_...
Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities."
-- Sun Tzu, Art of War, Maneuvering
https://suntzusaid.com/book/7
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
https://suntzusaid.com/book/8
At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.
https://suntzusaid.com/book/11