> The concepts for Smart Dust emerged from a workshop at RAND in 1992 and a series of DARPA ISAT studies in the mid-1990s due to the potential military applications of the technology.[2] The work was strongly influenced by work at UCLA and the University of Michigan during that period, as well as science fiction authors Stanislaw Lem (in novels The Invincible in 1964 and Peace on Earth in 1985), Neal Stephenson and Vernor Vinge. The first public presentation of the concept by that name was at the American Vacuum Society meeting in Anaheim in 1996.
amazing author IMO. came out of nowhere, wrote very little, kubrickian in that he doesn't want to repeat himself, idea quality is astounding in that his ideas are new, influential, and fully formed. You can read true names every 5 years and still be like 'oh that piece came true'.
Rainbow's End is the icing on the cake.
Everyone has N novels in them, maybe he just reached N.
Vernor Vinge's first use of that concept in a book was published the same year as that workshop. I wonder how the timing of that works out. It's not uncommon for the stage to be set by previous work and multiple actors putting 2 and 2 together in a fairly short period of time.
I can never keep track of who has published works as serials or as short stories prior to novelization. I don't see anything in Wikipedia about that for A Deepness in the Sky though.
It's a pity that the theme is now surveillance as the utility of sensor networks is rather high. Perhaps larger devices that could roam the planet and especially the oceans would be to better to spend money on. There's so much to learn yet we waste the opportunity snooping on each other.
all the perverted governments out there who can’t get enough of our hard coded data. if this tech existed then, then how much behind the curtain is still yet to revealed. it’s pretty common for governments not to show off advanced technologies right away. in reality, that would probably be a breach of security revealing any of those secrets.
We will monitor pollution by (checks notes) dispersing a huge swarm of tiny robots, themselves made of heavy metals, that are infeasibly difficult to recover or recycle.
Pretty sure any magnet strong enough to attract one of these from the distances required would also induce a voltage on any sufficiently long wire that’s moving through the flux lines. i.e. might cause problems for your car, for airplanes, etc.
> It's neither a bird nor a plane, but a winged microchip as small as a grain of sand that can be carried by the wind as it monitors such things as pollution levels or the spread of airborne diseases.
There is a video that demonstrates and explains the nano bots in the article and near the end of the video they stated that the bots are made out of biodegradable materials that will degrade with time/rain
Everything degrades over a long enough timescale, even plastics and metals. The question is what damage they do to ecosystems on their long cycle to be atomized and recycled.
Devices similar to this were a major plot point in the second book of the 'Zones of Thought' sci-fi series by Vernor Vinge[1]. It is a really great series that is often recommended on HN. My favorite thing about the series (as it relates to this story) is the way Vinge writes about about the consequences of uncovering code/programs/hardware that was developed thousands or millions of years in the past. There are so many layers to these ancient programs that you never truly know what you are unleashing.
Well, maybe dystopian SciFi turns out to be not as much fiction as we had hoped ;-).
Ubiquitous surveillance together with artificial intelligence are probably one of the most powerful tools for authoritarian regimes you can imagine. They already have the physical power to hurt their opponents, now they also know exactly where they need to apply this power to keep themselves at the helm and quash any resistance before it can get too organized. And the artificial intelligence doesn't need to be all that intelligent if you have enough data, it's not as if authoritarian regimes would care if they locked up a few more people than required.
You don't need microchips. Just some metallic dust that dissolves into poison when radiated with proper frequency. That's cheap and enough for crowd control. Just trying to be pragmatic.
No inside information, but from what I glean reading between the lines in various podcasts, books, etc. this tech has been used already in Afghanistan & Iraq by US special assets. I would expect it is in use elsewhere in the intelligence community. If so, that's all fine with me provided it doesn't become a warrantless tracking method employed by DHS/FBI either directly or indirectly.
e.g., sensing where enemy troops go that isn't being otherwise watched, discovering what radioisotopes or chemicals are in a plume from an otherwise disguised building...
These devices don't even have space for an antenna (limited by physical size). The power required by the sensors is dwarfed by RF transmit.
The current challenges of powering a radio device with an MPU at this size are far too great for this to be useful. Unless there is a breakthrough in radio physics, drones need to be a certain size that is much larger than this.
Unless they plan to release a billion of these, sweep them up, and then have interns/grad students probe each one to extract the collected data.
Or just, you know, use a high frequency. There are tiny antennas. You can just power it via induction (like RFID) and you're set. It still couldn't transmit super far but I bet it would work.
This isn’t true in any sense applicable to this discussion. For example a near-optical laser transmitter can be as or more efficient in joules per bit than an RF transmitter, depending on the situation.
"Frequencies from 100 GHz to 3 THz are promising bands for the next generation of wireless communication systems because of the wide swaths of unused and unexplored spectrum."
"Also, new results that give insights into power efficient beam steering algorithms".
From "Wireless Communications and Applications Above 100 GHz: Opportunities and Challenges for 6G and Beyond"
The downside to high frequencies is that they generally experience much more severe attenuation, which limits their range in atmosphere. Now, if you could get these flying microchips to simply reflect (with encoded data) a high power input signal from a base station, you might be onto something...
With the power available and in sunlight that would be impossible. I'd put a mini mirror behind a mini old-style b&w LCD screen and use the LCD to modulate reflections on the mirror, making it purely passive except for driving the LCD, which however would draw 3 orders of magnitude less power than a LED.
Doesn't that ring-like structure in the center look like an antenna? I suppose it could just be traces between the 'lobes' of the circuit on each wing. That said, it does seem like a tall order to pack in useful sensors and some way to transmit into tiny particles like these.
> Unless they plan to release a billion of these, sweep them up, and then have interns/grad students probe each one to extract the collected data.
After reading the article and watching the video, I think that's what they are aiming for. The coil can couple data and power through near-field interaction, so they'll release a large number, hope to recover a sample of them, and extract the data through field or lab instruments. I could see this being useful for recording environmental data and forensic tracing, but they look closer to RFID tags than a computing platform.
The whole article is massively misleading. The team used same basic design at three different scales: micro, meso, and macro (their terminology). They are 0.4mm, 2mm, 40mm in diameter respectively. The "IoT flier" used the macro scale design; in 40mm you definitely can already fit all sorts of antenna, although power is still an issue. All the other, smaller fliers did not have any microchips in them.
So the title "Flying microchips size of sand grain" is just plain wrong here :(
There are days when I genuinely wonder if Transmetropolitan was a prophecy of sorts. Naturally, it had those, but it also had very robust anti-censorship movements.
Remember when HN collectively lost their minds and questioned journalists integrity for suggesting that the Chinese government could have put a backdoor chip gasp the size of a grain of rice on Supermicro motherboards?
The picture in the Bloomberg article was obviously thrown together by some graphic designer because they didn't have actual pictures, and modern journalism wants many forms of media for a front page article. That doesn't take away from the claims the article made.
But Bloomberg didn't show an SOT-23 package. They showed something like an 0402 or maybe 0201 capacitor on the tip of a pencil.
Could China be hacking motherboards and then shipping them to the USA? Maybe. I'm certain that they're trying to figure out a plan at least. But the Bloomberg article was fully bunk and just FUD from the start.
And I think we all know how we'd hack Supermicro motherboards anyway: those BMCs are well known to be poorly updated, proprietary chips with full access to the keyboard / mouse / display of every single Supermicro motherboard ever made.
One would _assume_ that a Supermicro motherboard hack would involve a BMC attack, if it were to exist at all. If there's news that some hacker is using some other means than the "obvious" BMC, it'd be news, but you gotta be really, really technical and explain just how it works... so that you know, it'd be useful to IT departments to know how to defend against? (Ex: put BMC on its own VLAN at least)
It sounds like you are having difficulty drawing a distinction in your mind between the journalist who did the reporting on the story and the art department that had to come up with something that conveys "small chip" to an average reader without having actual photos.
Most stories about COVID include inaccurate artistic renditions of the virus, but that does not discredit the reporting.
There's a big difference between a physical hardware attack (that is fully unspecified and fully FUD), and an actual threat to IT departments (ex: insecure BMC that needs to be isolated into its own VLAN).
The minute you start thinking about "how do I protect my company's computers from this attack?" is the minute the Bloomberg article falls apart. Asking for further details just resulted in Bloomberg clamming up and remaining silent on any additional details.
Bloomberg has had multiple years at this point to provide the details needed to be useful to IT departments everywhere about their purported attack. At some point, we just gotta assume that they were making things up.
-----
Lets say Bloomberg is correct about these hypothetical chips being placed into ill-specified motherboards. No attack is perfect: this is all computer equipment after all. It needs to be powered, it needs to have communications to the outside world, it needs to have spy-information (aka: taking information from the motherboard).
Its unlikely that a small chip with low-power could interface with high-speed components (ie: RAM, PCIe, Southbridge, SATA), it wouldn't have enough power. Etc. etc. Whatever the hypothetical attack is, there would be physical requirements it needs to satisfy.
All point back to the BMC: a low-bandwidth interface with huge amounts of information, with highly proprietary / likely insecure code running. So we think about how hardware could be used to hack this interface.
At which point, we immediately enter the realm of ridiculousness, because BMCs are CPUs in their own rights and simply run software to do their job. For a "zero-hardware" attack, China could just be rewriting BMC firmware or something way, way, waaaaay easier than what was described in the Bloomberg article.
Now China doesn't have to worry about replacing chips at all, and they still get all their spy-craft working.
------
But guess what? I think most IT departments are well aware of the proprietary and possibly insecure BMC interface. That's why there's a lot of discussions online about how to protect that interface.
Right, so a small chip sitting on the SPI bus for the flash would fit all of what you said and give attackers another capability: persistency in the face of replacing the flash itself. And yes, it'd probably be something small, like rewriting one of the keys stored in flash.
And BMC networks are extremely high value targets. Tons of exploits from running ancient code, and DMA access to the the rest of the system, often without even an IOMMU in the way.
The Bloomberg article doesn't talk about BMCs however. That's __me__ talking about BMCs.
I don't need the Bloomberg article distracting the discussion. Its clear that the Bloomberg article was just fully and completely useless. It contributed no useful, technical details to the discussion.
We're sitting here arguing about how Bloomberg might have written the article better. At some point, we just gotta realize that Bloomberg wasn't helpful at the discussion at all.
Which is fine: Bloomberg is primarily a trading / commodities / financial newspaper. To expect expertise in technical issues (better than typical Hacker News discussion) is probably expecting too much from that group of journalists. But lets not pretend that the article under discussion was useful to any of us here.
> The Bloomberg article doesn't talk about BMCs however. That's __me__ talking about BMCs.
You are not the only one talking about BMCs. The entire discussion has centered on that since the beginning. I'm not sure how you thought that you invented that line of discussion.
> We're sitting here arguing about how Bloomberg might have written the article better. At some point, we just gotta realize that Bloomberg wasn't helpful at the discussion at all.
> Which is fine: Bloomberg is primarily a trading / commodities / financial newspaper. To expect expertise in technical issues (better than typical Hacker News discussion) is probably expecting too much from that group of journalists. But lets not pretend that the article under discussion was useful to any of us here.
People coming forward about a successful foreign state sponsored attack on AWS and Apple server infra is a pretty big story for HN, even if it doesn't have all the details you'd like.
Bloomberg's followup article (and probably the original article) doesn't seem to discuss BMCs at all.
I'm not saying that I invented the line of argument. I'm saying that Hacker News, the community, brought up BMCs. Its not a talking point of the Bloomberg article at all.
The fact remains: we're already in a fully tangential point compared to Bloomberg's "facts" (of which there are very few. Its largely just allegations and FUD).
--------
The most frustrating thing is that Bloomberg very well could be correct. But the articles they wrote are absolute crap on this subject.
> People coming forward about a successful foreign state sponsored attack on AWS and Apple server infra is a pretty big story for HN, even if it doesn't have all the details you'd like.
Without the details of how it happened or the mechanism, then it doesn't matter.
We exist in a zero-day world: there are attacks I will never understand in my lifetime, happening today. Welcome to modern computer security.
What's important is understanding as many of these attacks as possible, so that we can build the proper security mechanisms and policies to defend ourselves correctly. Without an action plan, the news is basically null and void. It doesn't matter if China hacks us per se, it could be Russia or Iran tomorrow. There's always state actors trying to do things.
It might not have been useful to you, but it was useful to the people who might be targets of this type of attack. I know of at least two organizations that are now randomly x-raying datacenter components and comparing them to reference designs.
You also seem to confuse an article being helpful to you with an article being correct. You clearly are not in a line of work where you need to worry about this, and that is ok. But it does not invalidate the article at all.
The NSA's TRINITY chip circa 2008 was smaller than a penny and the workhorse behind implants that hid inside ethernet headers on motherboards and USB cables. The CIA has a team dedicated to interdicting shipments and modifying firmware or hardware. It is absolutely foolish to assume other countries intelligence services are not capable of the same.
> "We think that we beat nature," Rogers said. "At least in the narrow sense that we have been able to build structures that fall with more stable trajectories and at slower terminal velocities than equivalent seeds that you would see from plants or trees."
I don’t think nature had the same goal. As long as the local minima is good enough for survival nature would be happy
This reminds me of the nanoparticle smog from The Diamond Age. If these things come into heavy use they're going to be the new microplastics and we can all see it coming.
Before jumping to conclusions, note that the microcontroller equipped flyer is reported to be about 5cm in diameter. Not exactly size of sand grain.
From the article:
> Mechanical simulation results and photograph of a 3D IoT macroflier with a circuit to measure fine dust pollution through the light dosimetry method. The weight of the IoT flier is 19.7mg (d≈5cm), with payload 198mg (Supplementary Fig.23
Looking at the supplementary material, the "IoT macroflier" is pretty close to https://www.ti.com/tool/TIDM-RF430-TEMPSENSE with some wings stuck to it.. The scale is pretty similar too, that patch is about 35mm maybe. The sensor is different (photodiode vs temperature) but that doesn't really change the overall design much.
108 comments
[ 2.9 ms ] story [ 169 ms ] thread> The concepts for Smart Dust emerged from a workshop at RAND in 1992 and a series of DARPA ISAT studies in the mid-1990s due to the potential military applications of the technology.[2] The work was strongly influenced by work at UCLA and the University of Michigan during that period, as well as science fiction authors Stanislaw Lem (in novels The Invincible in 1964 and Peace on Earth in 1985), Neal Stephenson and Vernor Vinge. The first public presentation of the concept by that name was at the American Vacuum Society meeting in Anaheim in 1996.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartdust
Better almost that he never wrote CotS and left us hanging. :(
Rainbow's End is the icing on the cake.
Everyone has N novels in them, maybe he just reached N.
And yeah, he's amazing!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vernor_Vinge
What Silicon Valley keeps forgetting is that Rainbow's End wasn't supposed to be aspirational.
Except for the robot EV taxis, that's pretty cool I guess.
https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2021/09/23/microflier1-013b...
https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2021/09/23/microflier_sq-3e...
http://fennetic.net/irc/extropy/ext13.pdf
http://fennetic.net/irc/extropy/ext14.pdf
I can never keep track of who has published works as serials or as short stories prior to novelization. I don't see anything in Wikipedia about that for A Deepness in the Sky though.
It's a pity that the theme is now surveillance as the utility of sensor networks is rather high. Perhaps larger devices that could roam the planet and especially the oceans would be to better to spend money on. There's so much to learn yet we waste the opportunity snooping on each other.
Sounds like an Onion headline honestly.
> It's neither a bird nor a plane, but a winged microchip as small as a grain of sand that can be carried by the wind as it monitors such things as pollution levels or the spread of airborne diseases.
Idle thoughts, what happens if you swallow one? Seems possible and not good.
Why is this a thing? I shouldn’t need to worry about swallowing gnat-sized batteries! But it’s Not Good, yes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Deepness_in_the_Sky#Localize...
Like, the implications of these things are fascinating and scary.
Ubiquitous surveillance together with artificial intelligence are probably one of the most powerful tools for authoritarian regimes you can imagine. They already have the physical power to hurt their opponents, now they also know exactly where they need to apply this power to keep themselves at the helm and quash any resistance before it can get too organized. And the artificial intelligence doesn't need to be all that intelligent if you have enough data, it's not as if authoritarian regimes would care if they locked up a few more people than required.
The current challenges of powering a radio device with an MPU at this size are far too great for this to be useful. Unless there is a breakthrough in radio physics, drones need to be a certain size that is much larger than this.
Unless they plan to release a billion of these, sweep them up, and then have interns/grad students probe each one to extract the collected data.
This isn’t true in any sense applicable to this discussion. For example a near-optical laser transmitter can be as or more efficient in joules per bit than an RF transmitter, depending on the situation.
Do you have to aim that laser transmitter?
* you have more options than with RF (optics or phased array)
* you’ll get better angular precision at a given transmitter size
"Also, new results that give insights into power efficient beam steering algorithms".
From "Wireless Communications and Applications Above 100 GHz: Opportunities and Challenges for 6G and Beyond"
Also, plans are to use directed energy, not classical wave like RF.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6G_(network)
EDIT: Unless you meant for downloading after retrieval. That could work...
After reading the article and watching the video, I think that's what they are aiming for. The coil can couple data and power through near-field interaction, so they'll release a large number, hope to recover a sample of them, and extract the data through field or lab instruments. I could see this being useful for recording environmental data and forensic tracing, but they look closer to RFID tags than a computing platform.
So the title "Flying microchips size of sand grain" is just plain wrong here :(
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03847-y
the abstract and its references are visible for examination.
theres a lot of links to follow up on if anyone wants to thumb through the background.
Those Bloomberg reporters showing pictures of lol capacitors did them no favors.
We know the difference between processors and capacitors around here.
-------
The picture in this article is actually plausible. It's not just a capacitor that is getting hyped up by ignorant reporters.
Maybe for a two-legged device like a capacitor, but for something in, say, a SOT-23 package, you can't be sure what it is from the outside.
Then again, maybe even something in a capacitor-like package could both communicate and be powered.
Could China be hacking motherboards and then shipping them to the USA? Maybe. I'm certain that they're trying to figure out a plan at least. But the Bloomberg article was fully bunk and just FUD from the start.
And I think we all know how we'd hack Supermicro motherboards anyway: those BMCs are well known to be poorly updated, proprietary chips with full access to the keyboard / mouse / display of every single Supermicro motherboard ever made.
One would _assume_ that a Supermicro motherboard hack would involve a BMC attack, if it were to exist at all. If there's news that some hacker is using some other means than the "obvious" BMC, it'd be news, but you gotta be really, really technical and explain just how it works... so that you know, it'd be useful to IT departments to know how to defend against? (Ex: put BMC on its own VLAN at least)
Most stories about COVID include inaccurate artistic renditions of the virus, but that does not discredit the reporting.
The minute you start thinking about "how do I protect my company's computers from this attack?" is the minute the Bloomberg article falls apart. Asking for further details just resulted in Bloomberg clamming up and remaining silent on any additional details.
Bloomberg has had multiple years at this point to provide the details needed to be useful to IT departments everywhere about their purported attack. At some point, we just gotta assume that they were making things up.
-----
Lets say Bloomberg is correct about these hypothetical chips being placed into ill-specified motherboards. No attack is perfect: this is all computer equipment after all. It needs to be powered, it needs to have communications to the outside world, it needs to have spy-information (aka: taking information from the motherboard).
Its unlikely that a small chip with low-power could interface with high-speed components (ie: RAM, PCIe, Southbridge, SATA), it wouldn't have enough power. Etc. etc. Whatever the hypothetical attack is, there would be physical requirements it needs to satisfy.
All point back to the BMC: a low-bandwidth interface with huge amounts of information, with highly proprietary / likely insecure code running. So we think about how hardware could be used to hack this interface.
At which point, we immediately enter the realm of ridiculousness, because BMCs are CPUs in their own rights and simply run software to do their job. For a "zero-hardware" attack, China could just be rewriting BMC firmware or something way, way, waaaaay easier than what was described in the Bloomberg article.
Now China doesn't have to worry about replacing chips at all, and they still get all their spy-craft working.
------
But guess what? I think most IT departments are well aware of the proprietary and possibly insecure BMC interface. That's why there's a lot of discussions online about how to protect that interface.
And BMC networks are extremely high value targets. Tons of exploits from running ancient code, and DMA access to the the rest of the system, often without even an IOMMU in the way.
I don't need the Bloomberg article distracting the discussion. Its clear that the Bloomberg article was just fully and completely useless. It contributed no useful, technical details to the discussion.
We're sitting here arguing about how Bloomberg might have written the article better. At some point, we just gotta realize that Bloomberg wasn't helpful at the discussion at all.
Which is fine: Bloomberg is primarily a trading / commodities / financial newspaper. To expect expertise in technical issues (better than typical Hacker News discussion) is probably expecting too much from that group of journalists. But lets not pretend that the article under discussion was useful to any of us here.
You are not the only one talking about BMCs. The entire discussion has centered on that since the beginning. I'm not sure how you thought that you invented that line of discussion.
> We're sitting here arguing about how Bloomberg might have written the article better. At some point, we just gotta realize that Bloomberg wasn't helpful at the discussion at all.
> Which is fine: Bloomberg is primarily a trading / commodities / financial newspaper. To expect expertise in technical issues (better than typical Hacker News discussion) is probably expecting too much from that group of journalists. But lets not pretend that the article under discussion was useful to any of us here.
People coming forward about a successful foreign state sponsored attack on AWS and Apple server infra is a pretty big story for HN, even if it doesn't have all the details you'd like.
Bloomberg's followup article (and probably the original article) doesn't seem to discuss BMCs at all.
I'm not saying that I invented the line of argument. I'm saying that Hacker News, the community, brought up BMCs. Its not a talking point of the Bloomberg article at all.
The fact remains: we're already in a fully tangential point compared to Bloomberg's "facts" (of which there are very few. Its largely just allegations and FUD).
--------
The most frustrating thing is that Bloomberg very well could be correct. But the articles they wrote are absolute crap on this subject.
> People coming forward about a successful foreign state sponsored attack on AWS and Apple server infra is a pretty big story for HN, even if it doesn't have all the details you'd like.
Without the details of how it happened or the mechanism, then it doesn't matter.
We exist in a zero-day world: there are attacks I will never understand in my lifetime, happening today. Welcome to modern computer security.
What's important is understanding as many of these attacks as possible, so that we can build the proper security mechanisms and policies to defend ourselves correctly. Without an action plan, the news is basically null and void. It doesn't matter if China hacks us per se, it could be Russia or Iran tomorrow. There's always state actors trying to do things.
You also seem to confuse an article being helpful to you with an article being correct. You clearly are not in a line of work where you need to worry about this, and that is ok. But it does not invalidate the article at all.
The NSA's TRINITY chip circa 2008 was smaller than a penny and the workhorse behind implants that hid inside ethernet headers on motherboards and USB cables. The CIA has a team dedicated to interdicting shipments and modifying firmware or hardware. It is absolutely foolish to assume other countries intelligence services are not capable of the same.
And for nearly every other computer security issue, simply the presence of the possibility is enough to take action.
I know numerous people who are concerned about nanobots in vaccines. When I see stories like this I expect it will reinforce their concerns.
I don’t think nature had the same goal. As long as the local minima is good enough for survival nature would be happy
Hitachis RFID-'Powder' was developed almost twenty years ago.
https://thefutureofthings.com/3221-hitachi-develops-worlds-s...
From the article:
> Mechanical simulation results and photograph of a 3D IoT macroflier with a circuit to measure fine dust pollution through the light dosimetry method. The weight of the IoT flier is 19.7mg (d≈5cm), with payload 198mg (Supplementary Fig.23
Edit: screenshot https://ibb.co/sKw7tqt
I thought posting emoji wasnt possible on hn?! This one seems acceptable: