The fall of the Ottoman Empire, while utterly unsurprising as it had been the sick man of Europe for centuries, was far more consequential, as documented in David Fromkin's master opus A Peace to End all Peace.
A beautiful read. It really must be bizarre watching an empire crumble. I can only liken it to the immediate aftershock of Brexit in London.
London (note: not Central London, that's another planet) always had this vibe to me of greyish-grimeyness mixed with a chaotic sense of unity -- like the bleak greybrown visuals coming from above and below bound everyone together under the same dull (sometimes suffocating) blanket of boredom and dysfunction, dotted with moments of spontaneity that would lend a friendly cheer or jeer alike before people hurried on to their next destination.
After Brexit, the blanket got lifted and I started seeing teeth. Sure, people used to shout at each other, but there was usually no substance to it, merely just a short disagreement between two people. Now there was something larger behind it, and I was seeing it everywhere.
Over the years, every time that I came back, the city would just get worse before my eyes. Public transport had always been bad and always been grotty, but it had never been this bad and this grotty, had it? Homelessness too had always been a problem, but I'd never seen these levels before, with what seemed like an entire community sleeping under a bridge, only to be swept away the next day either on their own volition or by the authorities. Watching my friends and family go from vibrant people with cheeky humour, to tired and vigilant individuals with a bitter edge to everything said.
Maybe it's just me getting older, but I always feel like I'm witnessing the loss of a badly defined culture/vibe that I had taken for granted before my entire life, vanishing before my eyes.
I wonder if it's just something you've become aware of recently. Certainly unfair housing and poverty have plagued the city its entire existence, and were always hotbed topics in living memory.
If by immigration, you mean the refugee crisis, that's a pan-European affair.
Another commenter here said:
> I think it's the revelation that a shared culture and experience whose existence you took for granted really never existed. You feel untethered.
I don't live there or share the viewpoint. I picked it up from people I know who live there now and how their attitudes have changed.
While it might be pan-European, the sentiment in Dublin is certainly new. People seem... fed up. Now there's been a far-right riot, the rest of the world is also aware.
I live in Ireland and work in frontline healthcare. I interact with people all across the country and the socio-economic spectrum. I can tell you that you definitely were and are likely still in a bubble. The Dublin you thought you knew never existed and the change you think you've experienced is a Dublin that was always there.
This is very common amongst my friends and colleagues in tech. They live in a different world.
Spinning out the "tech elites" trope is a bit of a jaded argument (and you're commenting on a tech forum?).
My experience of Ireland is outside of Dublin which seems to be where you've formed your negative framing of the country. The dialogue has regressed into anti-immigrant/anti-government sentiment. And no, it wasn't always that way in the same ferocity.
It might make you feel superior telling people they're out of touch as you're a "frontline worker" but sounds a lot like hubris.
> The dialogue has regressed into anti-immigrant/anti-government sentiment. And no, it wasn't always that way in the same ferocity.
This is the bubble I'm referring to. It's a delusion.
> It might make you feel superior telling people they're out of touch as you're a "frontline worker" but sounds a lot like hubris.
You may take it that way, but you own comments show just how out of touch you have been. I wonder if you've ever had a conversation outside your bubble in Ireland?
I think there is a genuine widespread problem across the west. A come down from the highs of fast economic growth, world dominance, high hopes of "the end of history" etc.
Central London actually feels very good to me when I go there. I think there is a lot of who you are and where you are involved too, and when you compare it to.
I think it's the revelation that a shared culture and experience whose existence you took for granted really never existed. You feel untethered.
I live in Northern Ireland and I get this feeling when I come upon a street festooned in Union Flags and painted kerbstones. It's like stepping into a different country.
But it turned out that everyone had a different vision of nostalgia, leading to the Brexiteers fragmenting into ever more fractious and undignified factions sabotaging each other in public.
There's no single date for the end of the British Empire, but a lot of the strife of the 60s and 70s was dealing with the economic and psychological effects of that. For many European countries with empires.
The American empire is a long way off collapse. People also underestimate collapse-inducing factors in countries with unfree political systems; we can't really see how China is doing internally.
The sense that fragmented factions actively want to choose collapse in order to accelerate their own power grab within the collapse is similar in the US to Britain, though. Not as similar to Austria-Hungary and its fragmentary nationalists. Will it have a Gavrilo Princep or a Tetsuya Yamagami? Hard to predict.
The 2020 election dispute could have turned out a lot worse than it actually did. What if Mike Pence had lost his cojones and decided to do Trump’s bidding, and then Congressional Republicans and the conservative SCOTUS majority decided to go along with it? What if blue state governors then turned around and said that the federal government has been taken over in a coup, and ordered their states to reject its authority? 2021 might have ended up rather resembling 1861.
Thankfully, in our timeline, none of that happened. But, 2024, 2028, 2032, etc, all represent opportunities for “just like 2020 but worse”. Trump is going to look for a more pliant running mate this time around, and at the moment he’s ahead in the polls. Even though, if he does win in 2024, he won’t be able to run in 2028, his attitude may well be “the election is only fair if my guy wins”
Rejecting election results risks becoming normalised, increasing the odds that future Republicans will emulate Trump in this way even long after Trump has shuffled off this mortal coil; and also that Democrats may eventually succumb to the temptation to copy this page of the Republican playbook.
Obama's first election didn't have much - just some non-politician named Trump shooting off his mouth. 2016 had actual politicians saying that it was illegitimate. Then came 2020, and Jan 6, and it wasn't just talk anymore. So yes, it seems to be escalating.
2000 was different. The vote was close enough in one state that that there was legitimate doubt about what the actual result was. It wasn't "illegitimate because I don't like the results" the way more recent ones have been.
> Obama's first election didn't have much - just some non-politician named Trump shooting off his mouth
Trump wasn't even particularly notable among the Obama birthers, who were quite nunerous, except retrospectively; he also wasn't not-a-politician, having actively campaigned for the Reform Party nomination for President in 2000 (the Reform Party had qualified for federal matching funds, bringing out a lot of nontraditional contenders) before abandoning the effort in February 2000, shortly after Jesse Ventura, who had convinced him the Reform Party was the right vehicle for his political ambitions, left the party. At the time of the Obama election, Trump was a politician who hadn't succeeded looking for an in with a major party core constituency, and grabbing on to the widespread birther conspiracies as a means of achieving that.
> he also wasn't not-a-politician, having actively campaigned for the Reform Party nomination for President in 2000 (the Reform Party had qualified for federal matching funds, bringing out a lot of nontraditional contenders)
In the US, if all you've (yet) done is run for a third party, failing to even win its Presidential nomination-you are really (at that point in time) more of a would-be politician than an actual politician.
After losing two automatic recounts, he insisted on hand recounts—but only in precincts that had heavily favored him in the first place. The whole point is that hand recounts find more votes than machine counts (they can read votes the machine would reject). If you only seek hand recounts in precincts where each newly readable vote is twice as likely to be a Gore vote, then you can quickly close the gap
Then the Florida Supreme Court completely lost its mind, doing stuff like allowing Gore to count vote gains so far in partial recounts in Gore-favoring states. See pp. 22-24 above the above.
The Supreme Court agreed 7-2 that the Florida recount process violated the equal protection law. Democrats invoked that President against Trump after the 2020 election. Nonetheless, they waged a campaign to delegitimize Bush and delegitimize the Supreme Court, based on a mess that arose out of Gore’s own sneaky efforts to litigate his away around a loss in Florida.
> Already in 2016, there were Democrats who claimed that the election wasn't fair (and therefore wasn't valid).
Those Dems were very few and far between. Hillary Clinton conceded the morning after the polls closed, and pretty much all Dems at least paid lip service to wishing Trump well in his new office.
> Those Dems were very few and far between. Hillary Clinton conceded the morning after the polls closed, and pretty much all Dems at least paid lip service to wishing Trump well in his new office.
According to [0]:
> Trump’s mendacity is arguably the Second Big Lie. Four years earlier, the Hillary Clinton campaign and leading Democrats refused to acknowledge the outcome of the 2016 election, by claiming Donald Trump was not a legitimate president. These actions, while certainly not as dramatic or as immediately damaging as the events leading to Jan. 6 (and today), helped bring us to our current situation.
> “He lost the election and he was put into office because the Russians interfered on his behalf,” ex-President Jimmy Carter said in 2019, continuing to deny Trump’s victory three years after the election.
> “He knows he’s an illegitimate president,” said Clinton, also three years later. She repeated this sentiment in 2020, telling The Atlantic the election “was not on the level,” and again when she called Trump’s win illegitimate. She piled on to this by saying, “You can run the best campaign, you can even become the nominee, and you can have the election stolen from you,” clearly referring to how she saw her 2016 campaign.
That's an opinion piece, but it isn't making up these quotes from Carter and Clinton (and it goes on to reference remarks in similar spirit by Jerry Lewis, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, Dianne Feinstein, Bernie Sanders, Chuck Schumer, among others.)
That was years later, after more details of Russian interference had become public. The salient point is that Hillary conceded the election within hours after the polls closed — and Obama (the then-incumbent) didn't try to sabotage the Electoral College's vote to keep Trump from taking office.
Yes, everyone acknowledges there is a huge difference in how Clinton reacted in the immediate aftermath of her election loss, compared to how Trump behaved in the same situation.
The opinion piece I linked argues that Democrats pushing the "2016 election was stolen" narrative provided normalization and encouragement for Republicans to push a similar narrative in 2020 - even though the actions taken in response to that narrative were very different.
In turn, I think the 2020 Republican claims have been encouraging pre-emptive 2024 Democratic claims - see below examples - and if Democrats lose in 2024, they've already got these pre-planned narratives at hand to invoke
I don't think that’s the only salient point. The point being made above is about escalation. If we are talking about eroding our norms, the whole course of conduct matters.
Clinton conceded, but spent years calling Trump illegitimate and spreading falsehoods about Russian interference. At one point, half of democrats believed Russia manipulated vote tallies: https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trumps-denial-second-b... (“a 2016 Economist/YouGov poll found that half of Clinton voters thought a foreign power tampered with voting results”).
So what’s the next step in the escalation after that?
The stuff about “sabotaging the electoral college’s vote” is an escalation of what Gore did in 2000–pushing the law to its limit to win the case. What’s the next step after that? If it’s okay to request partial hand recounts only in counties you won (to unfairly get more votes), because it’s technically legal, why is it impermissible to lobby the state legislator to select alternate electors? (Which is technically constitutional.)
> why is it impermissible to lobby the state legislator to select alternate electors? (Which is technically constitutional.)
Evidently you've drunk the Kool-Aid of the ... worthies who push the "independent state legislature" doctrine.
Oh, and: You don't regard Trump's sending a mob to the Capitol (he knew they were armed, the Secret Service had told him), telling them they had to "fight like hell," egging them on via Twitter, and then waiting hours to half-heartedly call them off, doesn't count as trying to sabotage the Electoral College vote count?
> Evidently you've drunk the Kool-Aid of the ... worthies who push the "independent state legislature" doctrine.
What rayiner is talking about here has nothing to do with that doctrine. I explained in another comment 2-3 months back, so I'll just link to that rather than repeat myself: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37541248
> Evidently you've drunk the Kool-Aid of the ... worthies who push the "independent state legislature" doctrine.
It’s more well-founded in the constitution than some precedents near-and-dear to democrats…
But actually, I don’t think the standard for litigating elections should be whether you can come up with a colorable legal theory to support your position.[1] Thats why I cited the Gore example. Just because there’s a legal theory that supports trying to game manual recounts doesn’t mean you should do it. Because once that becomes the standard (and unfortunately it has) the other side will do it too.
[1] I don’t think you should be able to litigate elections at all. The rules should be set in stone a year ahead and not subject to challenge, and everything should be done in one day with public counting the way the Taiwanese do it.
> Oh, and: You don't regard Trump's sending a mob to the Capitol (he knew they were armed, the Secret Service had told him), telling them they had to "fight like hell," egging them on via Twitter, and then waiting hours to half-heartedly call them off, doesn't count as trying to sabotage the Electoral College vote count?
It’s ugly, low-brow politics, like Democrats pioneered. I’d love to ban all of it. But I’m not impressed by efforts to draw categorical distinctions between different events. Either egging on rioting and political violence is acceptable or it’s not. Democrats have apparently decided it’s acceptable.
> Just because there’s a legal theory that supports trying to game manual recounts doesn’t mean you should do it.
On that, we agree. But I've come around to the view that SCOTUS should have let the 2000 Florida recount proceed, with appropriate guardrails, instead of just shutting it down.
> Is “fight like hell” categorically different than “get in their face” .... Is lighting cities on fire for months categorically different? ... Either egging on rioting and political violence is acceptable or it’s not. Democrats have apparently decided it’s acceptable.
Your last-quoted sentence just above is nonsense; the first rhetorical question betrays black-and-white thinking; and the second rhetorical question assumes facts not in evidence. (We agree about the "Either egging on rioting ..." part.)
First of all, context matters: It's one thing for a semi-backbencher congresswoman to say "get in their face." It's another matter entirely for the outgoing POTUS to say, "fight like hell" on Vote Counting Day to an armed mob that he summoned, and then to send them off to the location of the counting, and finally to sit watching them on TV (and even encouraging them) as they storm the Capitol and cause elected representatives to flee for their lives.
Second: If you feel compelled to paint all "Democrats" with the same brush, then please don't use Maxine Waters — and sure as hell don't use sporadic acts of arson (NOT "lighting cities on fire for months") — as supposedly being representative of Dems. Otherwise, we could proclaim, "Republicans want to execute Jews who invoke Satan," or whatever TF it was that was said in the moronic video clip that was making the rounds a couple of days ago. Every large group has its outliers, and its idiots, and its dangerous idiots.
> On that, we agree. But I've come around to the view that SCOTUS should have let the 2000 Florida recount proceed, with appropriate guardrails, instead of just shutting it down.
No, the machine recount should have been the final word. It doesn’t actually matter what the votes were—from a statistical standpoint it was a tie. It’s more important that the process not seem open to manipulation (and the process happening in Florida was not something anyone could trust).
>,First of all, context matters:
No, baseline political norms must be black and white. Political parties disagree about fundamental things, like God and how to raise children. They often find each other’s values disgusting, and worry about how their kids will fare in the country the other side is creating. These people will never see eye to eye on context-laden issues. The norms must be such that you can operate within them alongside people you don’t like and don’t trust.
> It's one thing for one backbencher congresswoman to say "get in their face." It's another matter entirely for the outgoing POTUS to say, "fight like hell" on Vote Counting Day to an armed mob that he summoned and then to send them off to the location of the counting, and finally to sit watching them on TV (and even encouraging them) as they invade the Capitol and disrupt the proceedings.
It’s a difference in degree (e.g. protests to disrupt the Kavanaugh hearing) not a difference in kind. Especially when you consider something like RESISTANCE—taxpayer paid employees of the federal government basically committing mutiny against their CEO that the taxpayers duly elected.
> Second: If you feel compelled to paint all "Democrats" with the same brush, then please don't use Maxine Waters — and sure as hell don't use sporadic acts of arson (NOT "lighting cities on fire for months") — as supposedly being representative of Dems.
It wasn’t isolated acts of arson. Every storefront in my wife’s office block in DC was smashed. Courthouses were lit on fire in Portland. And the whole Democratic Party sanctioned and egged on the rioting, saying “riots are the voice of the unheard,” for months.
> It’s a difference in degree (e.g. protests to disrupt the Kavanaugh hearing) not a difference in kind.
Differences in degree can matter, sometimes hugely.
> the machine recount should have been the final word. It doesn’t actually matter what the votes were—from a statistical standpoint it was a tie. It’s more important that the process not seem open to manipulation (and the process happening in Florida was not something anyone could trust).
Hmm — very interesting thought; you might have a point there about perceived trustworthiness as opposed to actual vote count.
> an escalation of what Gore did in 2000–pushing the law to its limit to win the case
No, that escalation already happened in the 2000 election — and by the GOP: Remember the "Brooks Brothers riot" by Bush's GOP lawyers and operatives, which shut down a recount proceeding in Miami-Dade County?
You would also need to turn pretty much all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military men with a 30+ year track record of loyalty to the nation(and not an individual).
Otherwise, feel free to occupy a few buildings in DC for a couple of days, but don't cry when you're forcibly evicted by the Army and hanged for treason.
> You would also need to turn pretty much all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military men with a 30+ year track record of loyalty to the nation(and not an individual).
And had Pence gone along with the electoral vote plan — or been caught in the insurrection and his replacement been amenable to that plan, what do you think the Joint Chiefs would have done about it?
A military coup overthrowing the regime installed by an autocoup? Or just supporting the autocoup because the Constitutional issues of the autocoup are outside of military competency?
> Would an autocoup be against the Constitution? Absolutely.
In normal circumstances, the military doesn't make up its own mind about what is against the constitution - they defer to SCOTUS to do that.
Suppose Pence went along with Trump's plan, and refused to count the electoral votes of certain states, and declared Trump the winner. Biden surely would have challenged Pence's act in the Supreme Court. What if the conservative majority upheld Pence and declared Trump the legitimate winner?
Does the military oppose an autocoup if the Supreme Court declares it constitutional?
> So yes, I would expect the Joint Chiefs to support the actual election winner, by force if necessary.
In practice, I think it would really depend on how the other side responded. If the SCOTUS majority had endorsed a Trump-Pence autocoup as constitutional, Biden might have announced that even though he believed the majority decision was gravely wrong, he was going to submit to it for the sake of national peace-in that scenario, the military would almost surely accept the autocoup too.
Conversely, suppose Biden had announced that he rejects the SCOTUS decision as illegitimate. This is where things get a lot messier. Would the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) refuse an order by President Trump to enforce the SCOTUS decision? Well, operational command authority doesn't go through the JCS, it goes from the President through SECDEF directly to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands - USNORTHCOM has responsibility for the domestic US, so maybe the real question is whether the commander of USNORTHCOM would obey the President.
What if, come January 20th, there are two parallel Presidential inaugurations - one of Trump (endorsed by Congressional Republicans and the SCOTUS majority) and one of Biden (endorsed by Congressional Democrats and the SCOTUS minority) - to which President would the US military owe its allegiance? I don't think it is guaranteed that the JCS would be of one mind about that question. And even if they were - what if lower-level commanders and their units disagree? One could foresee a scenario in which some units swear allegiance to one President, others to the other, yet others refuse to swear allegiance to either and insist on remaining neutral regarding the matter.
Likely in such a scenario, some state governments would recognise one President and others the other. If military units in a state recognised the opposite President to the state government, that could create a significant risk of federal-state violence - which might give military units an incentive to adopt the position of the state in which they are based.
In a scenario in which the US military has internal disagreements over who the commander-in-chief is, US military effectiveness could collapse overnight. It could be a prime opportunity for America's enemies to attack.
In the situation we already had, it was pretty clear that Trump was full of it. You could tell that by the way things were going down in the states. You could tell by what was happening in the court cases. There was no legitimate dispute there.
Would that be enough if Pence had folded, and the Supreme Court had folded? I don't know. But I suspect that, if it was obvious - and this one was - they would have gone with the obvious winner, not the political stunt.
(Digression: I think people wrong the Supreme Court. I think we'll see it with this "presidential immunity" question. I think we're going to see a 7-2 or better ruling against immunity, and we're going to see it quickly - in January. And I think we would have seen 7-2 or better against the "alternate electors", too. Even if Pence had folded, I don't think the SC would have.)
> Would that be enough if Pence had folded, and the Supreme Court had folded? I don't know. But I suspect that, if it was obvious - and this one was - they would have gone with the obvious winner, not the political stunt.
What is the military going to do? To act on their own initiative to protect the Constitution, without a lawful order to do so from either the commander-in-chief or the Courts, would be a military coup, even if just a countercoup. And then, come noon on January 20th, if Biden accepted the hypothetical SCOTUS ruling that Trump is still President, how could the military claim Biden is commander-in-chief if he himself didn't? Conversely, if Biden refuses to accept the SCOTUS ruling, now we are in the "two Presidents, the military has to decide which one to follow" scenario, and as I said, no guarantee every unit makes the same decision.
> And I think we would have seen 7-2 or better against the "alternate electors", too. Even if Pence had folded, I don't think the SC would have
We know Roberts is keen to protect the Court's reputation and impartiality, so I expect he would have sided with the liberals. Then he only needs one other justice to go along with him for Biden to win - most likely Kavanaugh; and with Roberts and Kavanaugh siding with the liberals, Barrett and Gorsuch might also, resulting in a 7-2 ruling against Trump-Pence.
However, different scenario: suppose Trump had convinced the Republican Secretary of State of one of the swing states to ignore the state-wide vote for Biden and submit Trump's slate of electors instead. Most probably, the state supreme court would strike it down; but, supposing they upheld it, I'm not sure SCOTUS would overturn them. Roberts might find appealing the position that "it is totally a matter for the state, the federal judiciary should not interfere", and the rest of the conservative justices would likely be willing to go along with it.
> I think we'll see it with this "presidential immunity" question. I think we're going to see a 7-2 or better ruling against immunity, and we're going to see it quickly - in January
I have a different prediction: SCOTUS will sit on the question for months and avoid ruling either way. Whichever way they rule could potentially have a big impact on the 2024 election, and those who disagree with the decision may accuse them of thereby interfering with it. So they'll delay, and the closer they get to November, the more they'll feel the urge to delay it further. If they delay until the November election, and Trump wins, that might give them an excuse to declare the matter moot.
> Suppose Pence went along with Trump's plan, and refused to count the electoral votes of certain states, and declared Trump the winner. Biden surely would have challenged Pence's act in the Supreme Court. What if the conservative majority upheld Pence and declared Trump the legitimate winner?
To make this hypothetical even more fun, imagine this decision is reached using the same legal reasoning as in Roe. What could six conservatives unconstrained by the constitutional text do? I wonder what’s lurking in the penumbras of the tenth amendment?
> To make this hypothetical even more fun, imagine this decision is reached using the same legal reasoning as in Roe. What could six conservatives unconstrained by the constitutional text do? I wonder what’s lurking in the penumbras of the tenth amendment?
To go off on a bit of a tangent-what's really "conservative" about originalism? I come from Australia, and mainstream Australian constitutional law is (on the whole) rather "originalist" by American standards [0] and yet in an Australian context that "originalism" is coded as politically neutral as opposed to "conservative" or "right-wing".
Wouldn't a truly conservative jurisprudence be something more like the natural law theorist who believes that the Constitution should be read so as to support and further adherence to natural law (as the natural law theorist understands it to be)?
Or, getting closer to your particular hypothetical, which is more conservative - originalism or "right-wing living constitutionalism"? [1]
I think you are correct. Originalism gets coded conservative in the US because of the historical circumstances of our federal constitution, and the difficulty of amending it. But right wing living constitutionalism would be more conservative.
(By the way, McGinnis was my wife’s con law professor. I remember getting into an argument with him about the singularity in the northwestern law atrium.)
> Originalism gets coded conservative in the US because of the historical circumstances of our federal constitution, and the difficulty of amending it. But right wing living constitutionalism would be more conservative.
Does "the historical circumstances of our federal constitution, and the difficulty of amending it" really explain it? Australia also has a federal system, and Australia's federal constitution is also notoriously difficult to amend.
I suspect the biggest factor is actually the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment-once courts get used to the power to strike down legislation on the grounds of constitutionally protected rights, judges begin to feel the temptation to interpret those rights in such a way as to fulfil their own policy preferences; once those so tempted get their way, inevitable debate ensues about the propriety of their having done so.
By contrast, Australia's constitution is rather light on protections of individual rights, which limits the ability of Australian judges to feel the same temptation-one feels much more secure in striking down a law as violating the 1st Amendment, than striking down a law as violating the "implied right of political communication" (Australia's equivalent-which, as the name suggests, is not explicitly in the text, only having been read into it by the Courts, and only extends to "political" matters).
So, I think that explains how originalism became much more politically coded in the US than in Australia. However, I think the fact that it got coded as "right-wing" rather than "left-wing" may be an accident of historical circumstance. Hypothetically, suppose the Lochner era didn't end in 1937, and for decades thereafter SCOTUS continued to strike down labour regulations as violating the constitutional right to due process - one could imagine in such a scenario how originalism might become appealing to many people on the political left, whereas those on the political right might have been comparatively disinterested in it. In such an alternative timeline, "originalism" might have ended up being coded the opposite way.
I wish I believed that as strongly as you do. I could see imminent collapse from several possible causes.
1. Political. We are very close to the point where neither side regards the results as legitimate if the other wins. We have Congress less concerned with governing, and more concerned with moving the lines an inch in an endless trench war. The leading candidates for president are extremely uninspiring - neither will be able to create a vision that inspires people into any unified, positive direction. The whole political scene feels like imminent collapse to me.
2. War. If we blunder into a shooting war with either Russia or China, that could be an abrupt end to the American "empire" - along with much of the American population. Even if it doesn't go nuclear, it could still be an abrupt fall from the #1 position in geopolitical power. This is made more dangerous by the childishness and amateurishness of the political leadership - a blunder feels uncomfortably likely.
3. Economic. Things came close to falling apart in 2008, in a way that could have abruptly crimped our power as a nation (which is economically based). Things feel more solid lately, but they didn't feel bad in 2007, either.
So, yeah, I would be distressed by an abrupt collapse (say, within 2 years), but I wouldn't be all that surprised...
> Hanging on in quiet desperation is the English way (1973)
Edit: although come to think of it, the British Empire so beloved of Brexiteers actually made it through the Great War (unlike Austria and Russia), hanging on right up until 1956.
Depending on how you define it, the Empire still exists (Britain still has colonies, even if they don't call them that). The return of Hong Kong to China is generally considered the "end of empire", though.
I do not think it is true that the empire is beloved by Brexiteers.
As someone born in a former colony who voted leave, I was definitely not nostalgic for the empire. If anything I feel the EU is more nostalgic for the heights of European power than the UK - all the multipolar world stuff they love.
We are going back to a two super-power world, and China is the other super power.
According to [1], in 2020 "A third of people in the UK believe Britain’s colonies were better off for being part of an empire, a higher proportion than in any of the other major colonial powers, a global survey has revealed."
And "Brexit-supporting leave voters were more than twice as pro-empire than remainers."
Further, 39% of Leave voters vs 16% of Remain voters answered yes to "Would you like Britain to still have an empire?", while 40% of Leave voters vs. 66% of Remain voters answered "no", so in that sense you could well say it's not "beloved" by Brexiteers - given they to on the balance prefer no empire, but it's beloved by a significantly larger portion of Brexiteers.
(I had been under the impression that the choice on offer was between being a rather weighty part of the EU and, under the guise of "independence", playing Airstrip One to the US' Oceania, but perhaps I am mistaken?
China is playing Eastasia, of course. Not bad for 1949 speculation, even if it was based on 1920's-1930's nonfiction.
In a different fictional universe: "Always two there are")
Yes and no. It is too early to tell too - I see the big advantages of leaving to be long term, not in the first few years.
I certainly do not see the choice the way you do. My biggest objection to the EU is that it is centralising and trying to create a new country A risky exercise without common identity. A common currency that failed to be followed by fiscal central control was a huge mistake and lead to crisis in weaker economies (and the way Greece was treated, with de facto punishment imposed in return for bailout) was a disgrace. I will admit other multilateral organisations do similar (e.g. the domestic debt default unnecessarily imposed on Sri Lanka).
The UK has been playing airstrip one for a long time anyway. In someways we should be more like the French in terms of those policies.
In general, the way the EU is headed confirms my fears. Look at the last Dutch election, for example. There is a lot of bad legislation, a lot of lobbying by corporate interests - the government of the EU is far more removed from the people than national governments (which are bad enough) are.
I visited London multiple times in the past years, and I watched in real time what you described too. People seem to have gotten grumpier, more stressed, tired.
This is the long slide from the highs of "cool Britannia", with acceleration points at 2008 and 2016. There was a slight "now what?" vibe at the Millenium, coupled with a sense of "the end of history" that we could now all relax into liberal technocracy by day with a bit of a party at night.
The lack of vision has slowly turned into a lack of hope. The huge industry marketing "fear of the other" is succeeding. Britain's always had its "community solidarity" feeling, but it also has uniquely British kinds of sullen jobsworthness, disengagement, complaining with no intention of fixing anything, resentment, and parochialism. Those are surfacing more.
The retreat of the Empire has left the governing structures intact, but on a shrunken scale. The devolved nations are treated like colonies which must be reined in from the centre periodically. London has abandoned the idea of travel to distant Manchester as too expensive, in favor of hoarding resources for a shrinking set of blue non-urban counties.
Interesting to see you guys talking about this, I just read something with Adam Curtis where he was describing Britain right now as being like the USSR before it collapsed. Disillusionment, lack of vision for the future, a growing sense of nihilism.
> It really must be bizarre watching an empire crumble. I can only liken it to the immediate aftershock of Brexit in London.
The British empire fell way before Brexit. Swinging demographic changes, neoliberalism, decolonization, globalization, delegating policy to Brussels, etc. The same thing is happening in most western nations. It doesn't have to be this way but it is.
> After Brexit, the blanket got lifted and I started seeing teeth.
I’ve seen that same regression here in the U.S. It started in late 2016, and got significantly worse with the pandemic.
We’re in a very dangerous period in history. It’s not that long ago that one group of men were cheerfully annihilating another group of men, and I worry quite a bit that we’ll return to that. I think that it might even worse than before, because there is so much less love and beauty in the world now than before.
In the same category are many of Turgenev’s books (Sketches remains my favourite) which were written contemporaneously with Russia’s abolition of serfdom. They areoptimistic yet bittersweet for modern readers privileged with hindsight of what was to come.
Similarly, Marinetti’s proclamations of an imminent techno-utopia (electricity will make crops grow faster and planes will make landowning irrelevant because we’ll live in the sky!) if we only give Italy an itty bitty bit of fascism should be required reading in Silicon Valley.
Yes, I agree, it should be required reading -- as part of an introduction to 20th century European history, of which a lot people today seem to be utterly ignorant.
The parallels you allude to are... unsettling, at the very least.
Alas, I have a nagging feeling that the problem in Silicon Valley today is not so much that its very smart, highly educated people are ignorant of history, but that being blind to it is currently in their best interest.
Turning a blind eye to obvious malice in exchange for the temporary bliss of apathy is a form of malice all on its own. Hanlon's razor is one of the dumbest memes ever devised, please stop promulgating it.
He was indeed, but he had a more complicated relation with it in the ‘20s, i.e. after fascism had actually come to power in Italy. The same could be said of many early fascist ideologues, such as Erich Suckert/Curzio Malaparte, who ended up joining the communists after WW2. Giuseppe Bottai was also a very interesting character, a (cultured) fascist through and through, but who joined the French Foreign Legion in ‘43 and actively fought against the Germans/Nazis.
All this to say that those were complicated times.
Great comment! Fascism as it was understood in the early 20's was so complex and evolving. Now we talk about it like it is a system with rules. As your comment shows you know that many early Italian fascists were techno-utopians, socialists, nationalists, industrialists, etc. And it did not end well.
I think the lesson for a modern western person is that a movement can seem kind of vague while it is happening, and therefore be idealized by people from very different points of view. But beware because the movement may crystalize into something really terrible.
What in particular have "collapsed" for the average citizen of Austria-Hungary? The economy certainly did not, nor did people's livelihoods. No one was striped of their property en masse, there wasn't a widespread uprooting of economic ties. It wasn't nearly as bad as in Germany, let alone Russia of the same period. Only thing that collapsed was the ruling class, with the abolition of monarchy, expulsion of royal family, and abolition of aristocratic privileges and titles (that wasn't even mandated by the victorious powers, just people had enough of it, because it was clear that monarchy's uppitiness and disconnect from reality started WWI it had no chance of winning, for no visible gain).
Sure there were ugly events with the red riots of Bela Kun, and white terror mostly aimed against Jews, to counter it, in Hungary, but that did not impact an average citizen, it was a political terror relatively normal for the era (not much different from KKK actions in the U.S. at same time).
There has never been a revolution in which elites were removed where the average person didn’t suffer horribly. That transformation necessitates value destruction. That destruction must be allocated away from the new elites, which by definition places the burden on the average.
Onr cannot seperate the fall of Austria-Hungary from WW1. And in the end, the whole of Eastern Europe was in a civil war that ended not so long before WW2, and involved things like the Holodomor.
So yes, the average people suffered a lot from Austria-Hubgary's collapse.
Before you could move goods from Prague to Ljubljana without encountering a hitch. Now you had three separate borders in your way. This led to decline in virtually every sector, as things previously available on internal market suddenly became exports.
Currency was the next catastrophe. Before 1918 you could buy bread with the same kroner in Vienna, Brno, Budapest and Krakow. Now you had to handle multiple currency swaps.
Finally, war erupted almost immediately between successor states. Poland against Czechoslovakia, Council Republics in Slovakia and Hungry, Poland against Ukraine ...
And to top the list you had domestic repressions, like in Czechoslovakia against Germans.
So yes, it was a crisis. After crisis, after crisis. The only reason we in central Europe don't see this era as one of horror is because things got even worse afterwards. General economic collapse by end of 1920s and well into early 1930s, followed by WWII, genocides, communist takeover etc.
Well, there is one other reason. Nation states were seen as "progressive" and "modern" for most of the 20th century. The propaganda is kind of pervasive.
> Before 1918 you could buy bread with the same kroner in Vienna, Brno, Budapest and Krakow. Now you had to handle multiple currency swaps.
That must have been pretty tough on people who lived their lives constantly travelling between Vienna, Brno, Budapest and Krakow but I suspect most people weren't like that.
Well, prior to the 20th century, in most of the world one wouldn't have needed currency changers or border checks. Passports were uncommon and most currencies were in gold or silver coinage of standardized weights. As the tensions around the world grew, passports and enforced borders became more common in the run up to WWI.
After the collapse of the empire, austria and the rest of it was conquered by either Nazi Germany or the USSR or both and most of it was on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain for the next half century+.
> The economy certainly did not, nor did people's livelihoods
You.re very wrong about this. Austria had a massive economic crisis. Hungary had 98% inflation per month for.over a year (their second worst ever recorded, but surpassed big time by the one recorded after WW2, which ended with all the Hungarian currency in circulation being worth less than 0.01¢), massive uprooting and a refugee crisis, communist revolutions in Hungary and Slovakia, wars between the successor states (including between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Hungary, then Romania and Soviet Hungary, events which you ridiculously imply didn't impact the average citizen, or were in any way comparable to what was happening in the US at the time), not to mention millions of people ending up living under the jurisdiction of countries they previously fought against. Things didn't go back to any sort of normal until 1922 in any of the successor states. The situation was very much comparable to (and in most aspects worse than) early Weimar Germany.
It's also not true that aristocratic privileges were abolished everywhere: the Habsburgergesetz abolished them in Austria in 1919, but Czechoslovakia and Hungary retained them until 1947 (even the Soviet republic didn't formally abolish them, although there were no noblemen stupid enough to try and use them in that brief period).
All that said, I do agree with you on one thing: interwar nostalgia for the Empire was pretty much limited to a small Vienna elite (a fact that the article elegantly forgets to mention). Even the populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were overwhelmingly against its restoration, and against the return of the Habsburg monarchs, when the opportunity presented itself.
My own Hungarian grandparents got stuck in Yugoslavia, pretty much an enemy nation, so they didn't have a choice in the matter. I also don't know what they thought about it at the time, but it's telling that 50 years later they had nothing good to say, no fond memories to mention about A-H at all.
Excuse me, but your history textbooks are farcically wrong. Or possibly your imagination is.
The economy of A-H collapsed so thoroughly that there were famines and bread riots. Too many men and horses were sacrificed in war and the relatively backward agriculture could not be sustained by the women, kids and the elderly who were left. Hunger was one of the immediate reasons for the collapse - it was impossible to prevent the soldiers on the frontlines from knowing that their loved ones back home were starving, and by October 1918, mutinies and mass desertions were widespread.
The countries that emerged from the collapse were often hostile to one another, which not only led to border skirmishes, but to introduction of wanton tariffs and regulations that broke precisely the economic ties that you mentioned.
For example, the textile industry in German-speaking Bohemian borderlands (Sudeten) used to export its products into a 55-million common market freely. Suddenly, this market shrank to 14 million (Czechoslovak population after 1918), some 30 per cent of its former size, as countries like Hungary, Poland and Romania introduced protectionist measures.
The resulting unhappiness of suddenly-much-poorer Sudeten Germans was later expertly exploited by Adolf Hitler.
Also, in many places, there was hyperinflation that wiped out life savings of the middle class, contributing to growth of political extremism.
Remarkable that every single individual noted in this interesting read was Jewish. Roth, Zweig, Freud, Kafka. Where there no non Jews in this multi-ethnic empire that reflected and wrote? Interestingly, the polarity of pre demise critical discontent and post demise nostalgist reflection is characteristically Jewish.
But of course, that's the undercurrent worldview you can sense from Tanakh. Losing (a temporary) home once more and wandering about, having nowhere to return to.
Of course every distinct grouping of people have a shared history and a sense of their human journey. My point was addressing the absence/silence of other points of view. What did the ethnic Hungarian think about all this, or the German or Croatian?
More interestingly, when, where, and how did nationalist thought begin to rise in the Austro-Hungarian empire? Was its dissolution organic or were midwives involved? The war famously began because of an assassination by a Serbian nationalist. (Wikipedia has nationalism modern root in the French Revolution but as a non European I find that unconvincing.)
I think the nationalism was always there in the serf/laborer class. But it was only in the 19th-ish century that firearms started to become widespread so the power gap to the warrior/vassal class closed. Before that the aristocratic layer seemed more disconnected from the lands. Also there is more visibility due to printing, rise of the middle class, etc.
We can’t know for sure (can we?) because that class didn’t document. But there are songs and related matter I suppose.
I don’t find the idea that the serf/laborer class harbored “nationalist” thoughts to be very convincing, tbh. Conceptually, the critical attribute is group identity. For that class, religion definitively provided that (supporting proof being the European religious wars) but I wonder if non religious identity extended beyond the village or maybe guilds for the skilled laborers. In each of these cases, there is a structural basis for affinity — one being faith and the other profession.
In general, I wonder if there is any historical basis to the idea that nationalism was an artificial intellectual concept that later infected the general population. Also important to note we should distinguish patriotism (broadly read as support for the sovereign system) from nationalism. The latter more typically is suppressed by patriotic elements in any given society as national boundaries and political boundaries rarely are coincidental.
It's hard for me to visualize a world where lines of communication were as narrow as back then. The point about group identity is great; what if the Serb village over here in the north had no or very vague idea about all these Serb villages in the south; or had no idea how many total Serb villages there were altogether? But once publishing and communication took off, perhaps people became more aware of the extent of the group and they coagulated. Germany is also a great example, starting from dozens of little states.
I can see that in urban environments and in the country cathedral and university towns also could provide information outlets. I know too little about German history to pretend to informed commentary :) but my sense of it is that the emergence of the German nation was a project that had multiple dimensions of support in society, including the nobility and the clergy. It also happened post Napoleon (occupation in parts) and that definitely may have helped gel latent ethnic affinity between the various German principalities.
But I return back to my earlier comment about songs and proles. An expert in 17th century folk songs of European people can shed light on what preoccupied the minds of the lower classes. I sincerely doubt it was ethnic fervor.
> Wikipedia has nationalism modern root in the French Revolution but as a non European I find that unconvincing.
This is just an armchair theory of mine: the seeds were planted by Luther who insisted that every nation should have a Bible in their native language. This naturally forms a strong identity. Those sprouts were then nurtured by westphalian nation-state system. Which then got infused by ideas of French revolution via a short period of Napoleonic empire throughout Europe. And in Balkans too. Any references to older events of identity in history should be regarded upon as suspect of revisionism for current political purpose.
Pretty "cool" is how if you're on the wrong part of map of this empire this kind of thing happened TWICE in your lifetime, first the Austro-Hungarian and then with Yugoslavia.
I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desart. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
Incredible essay. Really captures the notion that I’ve been thinking about lately, that when you’re young, the existing political, national structures seem so permanent and effectively eternal, yet they are just a snapshot of a constantly evolving arrangement.
Collapsing empires make for great music, the self ironic existence on in fantasy uniform, the diminishing in all things, the ridiculousness of the previous generation still thinking and play acting as God's chosen people.
"Vienna and the greater Austro-Hungarian empire erupted into palpable excitement in the summer of 1914"
This was really only true in German-speaking circles which were trying to ape the German Empire with its saber-rattling Kaiser. In places like Prague or Laibach, it was the local German-Austrians who staged the excited parades, not the Czechs nor Slovenes. Most other nationalities were apprehensive about going to war, especially on such a weak pretext.
The Hungarians had to be pressed into agreement (they had veto power in the Dual Monarchy), because they knew that the Hungarian part of the monarchy was ill prepared for war. (In fact, so was the Austrian part, but the deficiencies in Hungary, such as very bad railway infrastructure, were even worse.) They also did not want to add more minorities into the mix in case of a successful conquest, given that they were already outnumbered by non-Hungarians in their kingdom anyway.
Slavic nations disliked or outright hated the very idea of waging war against the Serbs and Russians, but didn't have veto powers and were forced into participation anyway. This contributed greatly to the latter disintegration of the empire. The first military of future Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak legion, was mostly composed of POWs and defectors willing to fight against Austria-Hungary, even though they faced execution when caught.
> going to war, especially on such a weak pretext.
Weak pretext? Serbia had funded the terrorist assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. It’s difficult to imagine a stronger reason to go to war.
Germany’s misbehaviour in Belgium leads people to forget that the bad actor at the very start of the Great War was Russia, followed shortly thereafter by France and tailed by Britain.
Franz Ferdinand was somewhat of an outcast of the family, not just because of his morganatic marriage, but also because of his plans to federalize the country and his intense dislike and distrust of the Hungarians. The consensus immediately after his death was that the murder actually "solved" a difficult succession situation for the Hapsburgs. Few people in early July 1914 expected A-H to escalate towards the infamous ultimatum.
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[ 0.22 ms ] story [ 149 ms ] threadLondon (note: not Central London, that's another planet) always had this vibe to me of greyish-grimeyness mixed with a chaotic sense of unity -- like the bleak greybrown visuals coming from above and below bound everyone together under the same dull (sometimes suffocating) blanket of boredom and dysfunction, dotted with moments of spontaneity that would lend a friendly cheer or jeer alike before people hurried on to their next destination.
After Brexit, the blanket got lifted and I started seeing teeth. Sure, people used to shout at each other, but there was usually no substance to it, merely just a short disagreement between two people. Now there was something larger behind it, and I was seeing it everywhere.
Over the years, every time that I came back, the city would just get worse before my eyes. Public transport had always been bad and always been grotty, but it had never been this bad and this grotty, had it? Homelessness too had always been a problem, but I'd never seen these levels before, with what seemed like an entire community sleeping under a bridge, only to be swept away the next day either on their own volition or by the authorities. Watching my friends and family go from vibrant people with cheeky humour, to tired and vigilant individuals with a bitter edge to everything said.
Maybe it's just me getting older, but I always feel like I'm witnessing the loss of a badly defined culture/vibe that I had taken for granted before my entire life, vanishing before my eyes.
Everyone talking about immigration, unfair housing and poverty. It's gone from being a friendly place to a suspicious one in a handful of years.
If by immigration, you mean the refugee crisis, that's a pan-European affair.
Another commenter here said:
> I think it's the revelation that a shared culture and experience whose existence you took for granted really never existed. You feel untethered.
I think that may have happened to you.
While it might be pan-European, the sentiment in Dublin is certainly new. People seem... fed up. Now there's been a far-right riot, the rest of the world is also aware.
That's the point, it's not new. You and others are just realising that the shared culture and experience you thought was universal was just a bubble.
This is very common amongst my friends and colleagues in tech. They live in a different world.
My experience of Ireland is outside of Dublin which seems to be where you've formed your negative framing of the country. The dialogue has regressed into anti-immigrant/anti-government sentiment. And no, it wasn't always that way in the same ferocity.
It might make you feel superior telling people they're out of touch as you're a "frontline worker" but sounds a lot like hubris.
This is the bubble I'm referring to. It's a delusion.
> It might make you feel superior telling people they're out of touch as you're a "frontline worker" but sounds a lot like hubris.
You may take it that way, but you own comments show just how out of touch you have been. I wonder if you've ever had a conversation outside your bubble in Ireland?
Central London actually feels very good to me when I go there. I think there is a lot of who you are and where you are involved too, and when you compare it to.
I live in Northern Ireland and I get this feeling when I come upon a street festooned in Union Flags and painted kerbstones. It's like stepping into a different country.
I’d hazard a guess that many British felt that same feeling long before Brexit, and that’s part of what caused Brexit in the first place.
There's no single date for the end of the British Empire, but a lot of the strife of the 60s and 70s was dealing with the economic and psychological effects of that. For many European countries with empires.
The sense that fragmented factions actively want to choose collapse in order to accelerate their own power grab within the collapse is similar in the US to Britain, though. Not as similar to Austria-Hungary and its fragmentary nationalists. Will it have a Gavrilo Princep or a Tetsuya Yamagami? Hard to predict.
The 2020 election dispute could have turned out a lot worse than it actually did. What if Mike Pence had lost his cojones and decided to do Trump’s bidding, and then Congressional Republicans and the conservative SCOTUS majority decided to go along with it? What if blue state governors then turned around and said that the federal government has been taken over in a coup, and ordered their states to reject its authority? 2021 might have ended up rather resembling 1861.
Thankfully, in our timeline, none of that happened. But, 2024, 2028, 2032, etc, all represent opportunities for “just like 2020 but worse”. Trump is going to look for a more pliant running mate this time around, and at the moment he’s ahead in the polls. Even though, if he does win in 2024, he won’t be able to run in 2028, his attitude may well be “the election is only fair if my guy wins”
Rejecting election results risks becoming normalised, increasing the odds that future Republicans will emulate Trump in this way even long after Trump has shuffled off this mortal coil; and also that Democrats may eventually succumb to the temptation to copy this page of the Republican playbook.
To be fair, all they did was talk...
Is it escalating?
I think so, yes.
Obama's first election didn't have much - just some non-politician named Trump shooting off his mouth. 2016 had actual politicians saying that it was illegitimate. Then came 2020, and Jan 6, and it wasn't just talk anymore. So yes, it seems to be escalating.
2000 was different. The vote was close enough in one state that that there was legitimate doubt about what the actual result was. It wasn't "illegitimate because I don't like the results" the way more recent ones have been.
Trump wasn't even particularly notable among the Obama birthers, who were quite nunerous, except retrospectively; he also wasn't not-a-politician, having actively campaigned for the Reform Party nomination for President in 2000 (the Reform Party had qualified for federal matching funds, bringing out a lot of nontraditional contenders) before abandoning the effort in February 2000, shortly after Jesse Ventura, who had convinced him the Reform Party was the right vehicle for his political ambitions, left the party. At the time of the Obama election, Trump was a politician who hadn't succeeded looking for an in with a major party core constituency, and grabbing on to the widespread birther conspiracies as a means of achieving that.
In the US, if all you've (yet) done is run for a third party, failing to even win its Presidential nomination-you are really (at that point in time) more of a would-be politician than an actual politician.
Gore tried to lawyer his way to victory in an unseemly way: https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_pa...
After losing two automatic recounts, he insisted on hand recounts—but only in precincts that had heavily favored him in the first place. The whole point is that hand recounts find more votes than machine counts (they can read votes the machine would reject). If you only seek hand recounts in precincts where each newly readable vote is twice as likely to be a Gore vote, then you can quickly close the gap
Then the Florida Supreme Court completely lost its mind, doing stuff like allowing Gore to count vote gains so far in partial recounts in Gore-favoring states. See pp. 22-24 above the above.
The Supreme Court agreed 7-2 that the Florida recount process violated the equal protection law. Democrats invoked that President against Trump after the 2020 election. Nonetheless, they waged a campaign to delegitimize Bush and delegitimize the Supreme Court, based on a mess that arose out of Gore’s own sneaky efforts to litigate his away around a loss in Florida.
Those Dems were very few and far between. Hillary Clinton conceded the morning after the polls closed, and pretty much all Dems at least paid lip service to wishing Trump well in his new office.
According to [0]:
> Trump’s mendacity is arguably the Second Big Lie. Four years earlier, the Hillary Clinton campaign and leading Democrats refused to acknowledge the outcome of the 2016 election, by claiming Donald Trump was not a legitimate president. These actions, while certainly not as dramatic or as immediately damaging as the events leading to Jan. 6 (and today), helped bring us to our current situation.
> “He lost the election and he was put into office because the Russians interfered on his behalf,” ex-President Jimmy Carter said in 2019, continuing to deny Trump’s victory three years after the election.
> “He knows he’s an illegitimate president,” said Clinton, also three years later. She repeated this sentiment in 2020, telling The Atlantic the election “was not on the level,” and again when she called Trump’s win illegitimate. She piled on to this by saying, “You can run the best campaign, you can even become the nominee, and you can have the election stolen from you,” clearly referring to how she saw her 2016 campaign.
That's an opinion piece, but it isn't making up these quotes from Carter and Clinton (and it goes on to reference remarks in similar spirit by Jerry Lewis, Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, Dianne Feinstein, Bernie Sanders, Chuck Schumer, among others.)
[0] https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trumps-denial-second-b...
The opinion piece I linked argues that Democrats pushing the "2016 election was stolen" narrative provided normalization and encouragement for Republicans to push a similar narrative in 2020 - even though the actions taken in response to that narrative were very different.
In turn, I think the 2020 Republican claims have been encouraging pre-emptive 2024 Democratic claims - see below examples - and if Democrats lose in 2024, they've already got these pre-planned narratives at hand to invoke
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-pu...
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/27/opinions/gop-blueprint-to...
https://progressive.org/op-eds/gop-plan-steal-2024-election-...
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/democracy-...
Clinton conceded, but spent years calling Trump illegitimate and spreading falsehoods about Russian interference. At one point, half of democrats believed Russia manipulated vote tallies: https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trumps-denial-second-b... (“a 2016 Economist/YouGov poll found that half of Clinton voters thought a foreign power tampered with voting results”).
So what’s the next step in the escalation after that?
The stuff about “sabotaging the electoral college’s vote” is an escalation of what Gore did in 2000–pushing the law to its limit to win the case. What’s the next step after that? If it’s okay to request partial hand recounts only in counties you won (to unfairly get more votes), because it’s technically legal, why is it impermissible to lobby the state legislator to select alternate electors? (Which is technically constitutional.)
Why shouldn’t we do it first, before you do?
We?
> why is it impermissible to lobby the state legislator to select alternate electors? (Which is technically constitutional.)
Evidently you've drunk the Kool-Aid of the ... worthies who push the "independent state legislature" doctrine.
Oh, and: You don't regard Trump's sending a mob to the Capitol (he knew they were armed, the Secret Service had told him), telling them they had to "fight like hell," egging them on via Twitter, and then waiting hours to half-heartedly call them off, doesn't count as trying to sabotage the Electoral College vote count?
What rayiner is talking about here has nothing to do with that doctrine. I explained in another comment 2-3 months back, so I'll just link to that rather than repeat myself: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37541248
It’s more well-founded in the constitution than some precedents near-and-dear to democrats…
But actually, I don’t think the standard for litigating elections should be whether you can come up with a colorable legal theory to support your position.[1] Thats why I cited the Gore example. Just because there’s a legal theory that supports trying to game manual recounts doesn’t mean you should do it. Because once that becomes the standard (and unfortunately it has) the other side will do it too.
[1] I don’t think you should be able to litigate elections at all. The rules should be set in stone a year ahead and not subject to challenge, and everything should be done in one day with public counting the way the Taiwanese do it.
> Oh, and: You don't regard Trump's sending a mob to the Capitol (he knew they were armed, the Secret Service had told him), telling them they had to "fight like hell," egging them on via Twitter, and then waiting hours to half-heartedly call them off, doesn't count as trying to sabotage the Electoral College vote count?
Is “fight like hell” categorically different than “get in their face” https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/politics/maxine-waters-trump-.... Is lighting cities on fire for months categorically different?
It’s ugly, low-brow politics, like Democrats pioneered. I’d love to ban all of it. But I’m not impressed by efforts to draw categorical distinctions between different events. Either egging on rioting and political violence is acceptable or it’s not. Democrats have apparently decided it’s acceptable.
On that, we agree. But I've come around to the view that SCOTUS should have let the 2000 Florida recount proceed, with appropriate guardrails, instead of just shutting it down.
> Is “fight like hell” categorically different than “get in their face” .... Is lighting cities on fire for months categorically different? ... Either egging on rioting and political violence is acceptable or it’s not. Democrats have apparently decided it’s acceptable.
Your last-quoted sentence just above is nonsense; the first rhetorical question betrays black-and-white thinking; and the second rhetorical question assumes facts not in evidence. (We agree about the "Either egging on rioting ..." part.)
First of all, context matters: It's one thing for a semi-backbencher congresswoman to say "get in their face." It's another matter entirely for the outgoing POTUS to say, "fight like hell" on Vote Counting Day to an armed mob that he summoned, and then to send them off to the location of the counting, and finally to sit watching them on TV (and even encouraging them) as they storm the Capitol and cause elected representatives to flee for their lives.
Second: If you feel compelled to paint all "Democrats" with the same brush, then please don't use Maxine Waters — and sure as hell don't use sporadic acts of arson (NOT "lighting cities on fire for months") — as supposedly being representative of Dems. Otherwise, we could proclaim, "Republicans want to execute Jews who invoke Satan," or whatever TF it was that was said in the moronic video clip that was making the rounds a couple of days ago. Every large group has its outliers, and its idiots, and its dangerous idiots.
No, the machine recount should have been the final word. It doesn’t actually matter what the votes were—from a statistical standpoint it was a tie. It’s more important that the process not seem open to manipulation (and the process happening in Florida was not something anyone could trust).
>,First of all, context matters:
No, baseline political norms must be black and white. Political parties disagree about fundamental things, like God and how to raise children. They often find each other’s values disgusting, and worry about how their kids will fare in the country the other side is creating. These people will never see eye to eye on context-laden issues. The norms must be such that you can operate within them alongside people you don’t like and don’t trust.
> It's one thing for one backbencher congresswoman to say "get in their face." It's another matter entirely for the outgoing POTUS to say, "fight like hell" on Vote Counting Day to an armed mob that he summoned and then to send them off to the location of the counting, and finally to sit watching them on TV (and even encouraging them) as they invade the Capitol and disrupt the proceedings.
It’s a difference in degree (e.g. protests to disrupt the Kavanaugh hearing) not a difference in kind. Especially when you consider something like RESISTANCE—taxpayer paid employees of the federal government basically committing mutiny against their CEO that the taxpayers duly elected.
> Second: If you feel compelled to paint all "Democrats" with the same brush, then please don't use Maxine Waters — and sure as hell don't use sporadic acts of arson (NOT "lighting cities on fire for months") — as supposedly being representative of Dems.
It wasn’t isolated acts of arson. Every storefront in my wife’s office block in DC was smashed. Courthouses were lit on fire in Portland. And the whole Democratic Party sanctioned and egged on the rioting, saying “riots are the voice of the unheard,” for months.
Differences in degree can matter, sometimes hugely.
> the machine recount should have been the final word. It doesn’t actually matter what the votes were—from a statistical standpoint it was a tie. It’s more important that the process not seem open to manipulation (and the process happening in Florida was not something anyone could trust).
Hmm — very interesting thought; you might have a point there about perceived trustworthiness as opposed to actual vote count.
No, that escalation already happened in the 2000 election — and by the GOP: Remember the "Brooks Brothers riot" by Bush's GOP lawyers and operatives, which shut down a recount proceeding in Miami-Dade County?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brooks_Brothers_riot
Otherwise, feel free to occupy a few buildings in DC for a couple of days, but don't cry when you're forcibly evicted by the Army and hanged for treason.
And had Pence gone along with the electoral vote plan — or been caught in the insurrection and his replacement been amenable to that plan, what do you think the Joint Chiefs would have done about it?
A military coup overthrowing the regime installed by an autocoup? Or just supporting the autocoup because the Constitutional issues of the autocoup are outside of military competency?
Would an autocoup be against the Constitution? Absolutely.
So yes, I would expect the Joint Chiefs to support the actual election winner, by force if necessary.
In normal circumstances, the military doesn't make up its own mind about what is against the constitution - they defer to SCOTUS to do that.
Suppose Pence went along with Trump's plan, and refused to count the electoral votes of certain states, and declared Trump the winner. Biden surely would have challenged Pence's act in the Supreme Court. What if the conservative majority upheld Pence and declared Trump the legitimate winner?
Does the military oppose an autocoup if the Supreme Court declares it constitutional?
> So yes, I would expect the Joint Chiefs to support the actual election winner, by force if necessary.
In practice, I think it would really depend on how the other side responded. If the SCOTUS majority had endorsed a Trump-Pence autocoup as constitutional, Biden might have announced that even though he believed the majority decision was gravely wrong, he was going to submit to it for the sake of national peace-in that scenario, the military would almost surely accept the autocoup too.
Conversely, suppose Biden had announced that he rejects the SCOTUS decision as illegitimate. This is where things get a lot messier. Would the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) refuse an order by President Trump to enforce the SCOTUS decision? Well, operational command authority doesn't go through the JCS, it goes from the President through SECDEF directly to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands - USNORTHCOM has responsibility for the domestic US, so maybe the real question is whether the commander of USNORTHCOM would obey the President.
What if, come January 20th, there are two parallel Presidential inaugurations - one of Trump (endorsed by Congressional Republicans and the SCOTUS majority) and one of Biden (endorsed by Congressional Democrats and the SCOTUS minority) - to which President would the US military owe its allegiance? I don't think it is guaranteed that the JCS would be of one mind about that question. And even if they were - what if lower-level commanders and their units disagree? One could foresee a scenario in which some units swear allegiance to one President, others to the other, yet others refuse to swear allegiance to either and insist on remaining neutral regarding the matter.
Likely in such a scenario, some state governments would recognise one President and others the other. If military units in a state recognised the opposite President to the state government, that could create a significant risk of federal-state violence - which might give military units an incentive to adopt the position of the state in which they are based.
In a scenario in which the US military has internal disagreements over who the commander-in-chief is, US military effectiveness could collapse overnight. It could be a prime opportunity for America's enemies to attack.
Would that be enough if Pence had folded, and the Supreme Court had folded? I don't know. But I suspect that, if it was obvious - and this one was - they would have gone with the obvious winner, not the political stunt.
(Digression: I think people wrong the Supreme Court. I think we'll see it with this "presidential immunity" question. I think we're going to see a 7-2 or better ruling against immunity, and we're going to see it quickly - in January. And I think we would have seen 7-2 or better against the "alternate electors", too. Even if Pence had folded, I don't think the SC would have.)
What is the military going to do? To act on their own initiative to protect the Constitution, without a lawful order to do so from either the commander-in-chief or the Courts, would be a military coup, even if just a countercoup. And then, come noon on January 20th, if Biden accepted the hypothetical SCOTUS ruling that Trump is still President, how could the military claim Biden is commander-in-chief if he himself didn't? Conversely, if Biden refuses to accept the SCOTUS ruling, now we are in the "two Presidents, the military has to decide which one to follow" scenario, and as I said, no guarantee every unit makes the same decision.
> And I think we would have seen 7-2 or better against the "alternate electors", too. Even if Pence had folded, I don't think the SC would have
We know Roberts is keen to protect the Court's reputation and impartiality, so I expect he would have sided with the liberals. Then he only needs one other justice to go along with him for Biden to win - most likely Kavanaugh; and with Roberts and Kavanaugh siding with the liberals, Barrett and Gorsuch might also, resulting in a 7-2 ruling against Trump-Pence.
However, different scenario: suppose Trump had convinced the Republican Secretary of State of one of the swing states to ignore the state-wide vote for Biden and submit Trump's slate of electors instead. Most probably, the state supreme court would strike it down; but, supposing they upheld it, I'm not sure SCOTUS would overturn them. Roberts might find appealing the position that "it is totally a matter for the state, the federal judiciary should not interfere", and the rest of the conservative justices would likely be willing to go along with it.
> I think we'll see it with this "presidential immunity" question. I think we're going to see a 7-2 or better ruling against immunity, and we're going to see it quickly - in January
I have a different prediction: SCOTUS will sit on the question for months and avoid ruling either way. Whichever way they rule could potentially have a big impact on the 2024 election, and those who disagree with the decision may accuse them of thereby interfering with it. So they'll delay, and the closer they get to November, the more they'll feel the urge to delay it further. If they delay until the November election, and Trump wins, that might give them an excuse to declare the matter moot.
To make this hypothetical even more fun, imagine this decision is reached using the same legal reasoning as in Roe. What could six conservatives unconstrained by the constitutional text do? I wonder what’s lurking in the penumbras of the tenth amendment?
To go off on a bit of a tangent-what's really "conservative" about originalism? I come from Australia, and mainstream Australian constitutional law is (on the whole) rather "originalist" by American standards [0] and yet in an Australian context that "originalism" is coded as politically neutral as opposed to "conservative" or "right-wing".
Wouldn't a truly conservative jurisprudence be something more like the natural law theorist who believes that the Constitution should be read so as to support and further adherence to natural law (as the natural law theorist understands it to be)?
Or, getting closer to your particular hypothetical, which is more conservative - originalism or "right-wing living constitutionalism"? [1]
[0] https://static1.squarespace.com/static/596ef6aec534a5c54429e...
[1] https://lawliberty.org/adrian-vermeule-unwitting-new-origina...
(By the way, McGinnis was my wife’s con law professor. I remember getting into an argument with him about the singularity in the northwestern law atrium.)
Does "the historical circumstances of our federal constitution, and the difficulty of amending it" really explain it? Australia also has a federal system, and Australia's federal constitution is also notoriously difficult to amend.
I suspect the biggest factor is actually the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment-once courts get used to the power to strike down legislation on the grounds of constitutionally protected rights, judges begin to feel the temptation to interpret those rights in such a way as to fulfil their own policy preferences; once those so tempted get their way, inevitable debate ensues about the propriety of their having done so.
By contrast, Australia's constitution is rather light on protections of individual rights, which limits the ability of Australian judges to feel the same temptation-one feels much more secure in striking down a law as violating the 1st Amendment, than striking down a law as violating the "implied right of political communication" (Australia's equivalent-which, as the name suggests, is not explicitly in the text, only having been read into it by the Courts, and only extends to "political" matters).
So, I think that explains how originalism became much more politically coded in the US than in Australia. However, I think the fact that it got coded as "right-wing" rather than "left-wing" may be an accident of historical circumstance. Hypothetically, suppose the Lochner era didn't end in 1937, and for decades thereafter SCOTUS continued to strike down labour regulations as violating the constitutional right to due process - one could imagine in such a scenario how originalism might become appealing to many people on the political left, whereas those on the political right might have been comparatively disinterested in it. In such an alternative timeline, "originalism" might have ended up being coded the opposite way.
I wish I believed that as strongly as you do. I could see imminent collapse from several possible causes.
1. Political. We are very close to the point where neither side regards the results as legitimate if the other wins. We have Congress less concerned with governing, and more concerned with moving the lines an inch in an endless trench war. The leading candidates for president are extremely uninspiring - neither will be able to create a vision that inspires people into any unified, positive direction. The whole political scene feels like imminent collapse to me.
2. War. If we blunder into a shooting war with either Russia or China, that could be an abrupt end to the American "empire" - along with much of the American population. Even if it doesn't go nuclear, it could still be an abrupt fall from the #1 position in geopolitical power. This is made more dangerous by the childishness and amateurishness of the political leadership - a blunder feels uncomfortably likely.
3. Economic. Things came close to falling apart in 2008, in a way that could have abruptly crimped our power as a nation (which is economically based). Things feel more solid lately, but they didn't feel bad in 2007, either.
So, yeah, I would be distressed by an abrupt collapse (say, within 2 years), but I wouldn't be all that surprised...
Edit: although come to think of it, the British Empire so beloved of Brexiteers actually made it through the Great War (unlike Austria and Russia), hanging on right up until 1956.
The sun will not set on it as long as it holds Pitcairn: https://what-if.xkcd.com/48/
As someone born in a former colony who voted leave, I was definitely not nostalgic for the empire. If anything I feel the EU is more nostalgic for the heights of European power than the UK - all the multipolar world stuff they love.
We are going back to a two super-power world, and China is the other super power.
According to [1], in 2020 "A third of people in the UK believe Britain’s colonies were better off for being part of an empire, a higher proportion than in any of the other major colonial powers, a global survey has revealed."
And "Brexit-supporting leave voters were more than twice as pro-empire than remainers."
Further, 39% of Leave voters vs 16% of Remain voters answered yes to "Would you like Britain to still have an empire?", while 40% of Leave voters vs. 66% of Remain voters answered "no", so in that sense you could well say it's not "beloved" by Brexiteers - given they to on the balance prefer no empire, but it's beloved by a significantly larger portion of Brexiteers.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/uk-more-nostal...
(I had been under the impression that the choice on offer was between being a rather weighty part of the EU and, under the guise of "independence", playing Airstrip One to the US' Oceania, but perhaps I am mistaken?
China is playing Eastasia, of course. Not bad for 1949 speculation, even if it was based on 1920's-1930's nonfiction.
In a different fictional universe: "Always two there are")
I certainly do not see the choice the way you do. My biggest objection to the EU is that it is centralising and trying to create a new country A risky exercise without common identity. A common currency that failed to be followed by fiscal central control was a huge mistake and lead to crisis in weaker economies (and the way Greece was treated, with de facto punishment imposed in return for bailout) was a disgrace. I will admit other multilateral organisations do similar (e.g. the domestic debt default unnecessarily imposed on Sri Lanka).
The UK has been playing airstrip one for a long time anyway. In someways we should be more like the French in terms of those policies.
In general, the way the EU is headed confirms my fears. Look at the last Dutch election, for example. There is a lot of bad legislation, a lot of lobbying by corporate interests - the government of the EU is far more removed from the people than national governments (which are bad enough) are.
I think one piece of media that summarized the general feeling of it all for me was the song "The Truth of the Twilight"[0,1].
0: https://genius.com/16860113
1: https://yewtu.be/watch?v=vnRYapgm72k
It seems to me we are not too far from witnessing the next one falling.
Surely there's an even closer comparison within living memory: the fall of the soviet union.
The lack of vision has slowly turned into a lack of hope. The huge industry marketing "fear of the other" is succeeding. Britain's always had its "community solidarity" feeling, but it also has uniquely British kinds of sullen jobsworthness, disengagement, complaining with no intention of fixing anything, resentment, and parochialism. Those are surfacing more.
The retreat of the Empire has left the governing structures intact, but on a shrunken scale. The devolved nations are treated like colonies which must be reined in from the centre periodically. London has abandoned the idea of travel to distant Manchester as too expensive, in favor of hoarding resources for a shrinking set of blue non-urban counties.
Couldn't have said it better. Lack of Vision, Lack of Leadership, and Lack of execution.
https://www.youtube.com/@FallofCivilizations/videos
Maybe it will be some solace that's excellent work done by one your countrymen :)
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38514078
The British empire fell way before Brexit. Swinging demographic changes, neoliberalism, decolonization, globalization, delegating policy to Brussels, etc. The same thing is happening in most western nations. It doesn't have to be this way but it is.
He discusses at some lengths parallels to Brexit and broadly the feeling you describe here
I’ve seen that same regression here in the U.S. It started in late 2016, and got significantly worse with the pandemic.
We’re in a very dangerous period in history. It’s not that long ago that one group of men were cheerfully annihilating another group of men, and I worry quite a bit that we’ll return to that. I think that it might even worse than before, because there is so much less love and beauty in the world now than before.
Similarly, Marinetti’s proclamations of an imminent techno-utopia (electricity will make crops grow faster and planes will make landowning irrelevant because we’ll live in the sky!) if we only give Italy an itty bitty bit of fascism should be required reading in Silicon Valley.
The parallels you allude to are... unsettling, at the very least.
Alas, I have a nagging feeling that the problem in Silicon Valley today is not so much that its very smart, highly educated people are ignorant of history, but that being blind to it is currently in their best interest.
Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by ignorance, especially when such ignorance is motivated by financial interests.
---
[a] https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/21810-it-is-difficult-to-ge...
All this to say that those were complicated times.
I think the lesson for a modern western person is that a movement can seem kind of vague while it is happening, and therefore be idealized by people from very different points of view. But beware because the movement may crystalize into something really terrible.
Sure there were ugly events with the red riots of Bela Kun, and white terror mostly aimed against Jews, to counter it, in Hungary, but that did not impact an average citizen, it was a political terror relatively normal for the era (not much different from KKK actions in the U.S. at same time).
?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperinflation#Austria
There has never been a revolution in which elites were removed where the average person didn’t suffer horribly. That transformation necessitates value destruction. That destruction must be allocated away from the new elites, which by definition places the burden on the average.
Coming from a successor states that's not what our history says, so I'd love to hear your better sources.
So yes, the average people suffered a lot from Austria-Hubgary's collapse.
Before you could move goods from Prague to Ljubljana without encountering a hitch. Now you had three separate borders in your way. This led to decline in virtually every sector, as things previously available on internal market suddenly became exports. Currency was the next catastrophe. Before 1918 you could buy bread with the same kroner in Vienna, Brno, Budapest and Krakow. Now you had to handle multiple currency swaps.
Finally, war erupted almost immediately between successor states. Poland against Czechoslovakia, Council Republics in Slovakia and Hungry, Poland against Ukraine ... And to top the list you had domestic repressions, like in Czechoslovakia against Germans.
So yes, it was a crisis. After crisis, after crisis. The only reason we in central Europe don't see this era as one of horror is because things got even worse afterwards. General economic collapse by end of 1920s and well into early 1930s, followed by WWII, genocides, communist takeover etc.
Well, there is one other reason. Nation states were seen as "progressive" and "modern" for most of the 20th century. The propaganda is kind of pervasive.
Just some of the wars I mentioned:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Ukrainian_War
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish%E2%80%93Czechoslovak_Wa...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions_and_interventions_...
That must have been pretty tough on people who lived their lives constantly travelling between Vienna, Brno, Budapest and Krakow but I suspect most people weren't like that.
You.re very wrong about this. Austria had a massive economic crisis. Hungary had 98% inflation per month for.over a year (their second worst ever recorded, but surpassed big time by the one recorded after WW2, which ended with all the Hungarian currency in circulation being worth less than 0.01¢), massive uprooting and a refugee crisis, communist revolutions in Hungary and Slovakia, wars between the successor states (including between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Hungary, then Romania and Soviet Hungary, events which you ridiculously imply didn't impact the average citizen, or were in any way comparable to what was happening in the US at the time), not to mention millions of people ending up living under the jurisdiction of countries they previously fought against. Things didn't go back to any sort of normal until 1922 in any of the successor states. The situation was very much comparable to (and in most aspects worse than) early Weimar Germany.
It's also not true that aristocratic privileges were abolished everywhere: the Habsburgergesetz abolished them in Austria in 1919, but Czechoslovakia and Hungary retained them until 1947 (even the Soviet republic didn't formally abolish them, although there were no noblemen stupid enough to try and use them in that brief period).
All that said, I do agree with you on one thing: interwar nostalgia for the Empire was pretty much limited to a small Vienna elite (a fact that the article elegantly forgets to mention). Even the populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were overwhelmingly against its restoration, and against the return of the Habsburg monarchs, when the opportunity presented itself.
My own Hungarian grandparents got stuck in Yugoslavia, pretty much an enemy nation, so they didn't have a choice in the matter. I also don't know what they thought about it at the time, but it's telling that 50 years later they had nothing good to say, no fond memories to mention about A-H at all.
The economy of A-H collapsed so thoroughly that there were famines and bread riots. Too many men and horses were sacrificed in war and the relatively backward agriculture could not be sustained by the women, kids and the elderly who were left. Hunger was one of the immediate reasons for the collapse - it was impossible to prevent the soldiers on the frontlines from knowing that their loved ones back home were starving, and by October 1918, mutinies and mass desertions were widespread.
The countries that emerged from the collapse were often hostile to one another, which not only led to border skirmishes, but to introduction of wanton tariffs and regulations that broke precisely the economic ties that you mentioned.
For example, the textile industry in German-speaking Bohemian borderlands (Sudeten) used to export its products into a 55-million common market freely. Suddenly, this market shrank to 14 million (Czechoslovak population after 1918), some 30 per cent of its former size, as countries like Hungary, Poland and Romania introduced protectionist measures.
The resulting unhappiness of suddenly-much-poorer Sudeten Germans was later expertly exploited by Adolf Hitler.
Also, in many places, there was hyperinflation that wiped out life savings of the middle class, contributing to growth of political extremism.
More interestingly, when, where, and how did nationalist thought begin to rise in the Austro-Hungarian empire? Was its dissolution organic or were midwives involved? The war famously began because of an assassination by a Serbian nationalist. (Wikipedia has nationalism modern root in the French Revolution but as a non European I find that unconvincing.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gavrilo_Princip
I don’t find the idea that the serf/laborer class harbored “nationalist” thoughts to be very convincing, tbh. Conceptually, the critical attribute is group identity. For that class, religion definitively provided that (supporting proof being the European religious wars) but I wonder if non religious identity extended beyond the village or maybe guilds for the skilled laborers. In each of these cases, there is a structural basis for affinity — one being faith and the other profession.
In general, I wonder if there is any historical basis to the idea that nationalism was an artificial intellectual concept that later infected the general population. Also important to note we should distinguish patriotism (broadly read as support for the sovereign system) from nationalism. The latter more typically is suppressed by patriotic elements in any given society as national boundaries and political boundaries rarely are coincidental.
But I return back to my earlier comment about songs and proles. An expert in 17th century folk songs of European people can shed light on what preoccupied the minds of the lower classes. I sincerely doubt it was ethnic fervor.
This is just an armchair theory of mine: the seeds were planted by Luther who insisted that every nation should have a Bible in their native language. This naturally forms a strong identity. Those sprouts were then nurtured by westphalian nation-state system. Which then got infused by ideas of French revolution via a short period of Napoleonic empire throughout Europe. And in Balkans too. Any references to older events of identity in history should be regarded upon as suspect of revisionism for current political purpose.
This was really only true in German-speaking circles which were trying to ape the German Empire with its saber-rattling Kaiser. In places like Prague or Laibach, it was the local German-Austrians who staged the excited parades, not the Czechs nor Slovenes. Most other nationalities were apprehensive about going to war, especially on such a weak pretext.
The Hungarians had to be pressed into agreement (they had veto power in the Dual Monarchy), because they knew that the Hungarian part of the monarchy was ill prepared for war. (In fact, so was the Austrian part, but the deficiencies in Hungary, such as very bad railway infrastructure, were even worse.) They also did not want to add more minorities into the mix in case of a successful conquest, given that they were already outnumbered by non-Hungarians in their kingdom anyway.
Slavic nations disliked or outright hated the very idea of waging war against the Serbs and Russians, but didn't have veto powers and were forced into participation anyway. This contributed greatly to the latter disintegration of the empire. The first military of future Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak legion, was mostly composed of POWs and defectors willing to fight against Austria-Hungary, even though they faced execution when caught.
Weak pretext? Serbia had funded the terrorist assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. It’s difficult to imagine a stronger reason to go to war.
Germany’s misbehaviour in Belgium leads people to forget that the bad actor at the very start of the Great War was Russia, followed shortly thereafter by France and tailed by Britain.