Looks like CyberNews have edited the article with more info since first I saw it, it used to look quite suspicious and untrustworthy, it now has more info. Still doesn't say exactly what a record is, or how many uniques there are.
- IDMerit asked the security researcher for proof, the researcher asked for money first, so IDMerit balked
- IDMerit basically says they have no proof they were hacked, so they weren't
- The researcher is a freelancer... for CyberNews...
Even if somebody followed up with IDMerit, it's likely they will say they are not affected. The security researcher is probably the only person who could prove whether they were or not vulnerable, at this point. If they don't come forward, we can only assume they weren't vulnerable, but we don't know. This is a good lesson for responsible disclosure in the future.
...also, this is yet another example of why we need a regulated Software Building Code, with penalties for not conforming to it. If somebody is found to be hosting a public Mongo instance with no authentication, it should be reported to a state or federal agency, so that real penalties can be applied, the way they are for other code violations. And they shouldn't have been allowed to launch with that in the first place. It shouldn't be up to random "security researchers" to police businesses.
Where the F does IDMerit even get all this data from? They have names, DOBs, addressed, phone numbers, national identity numbers for over a billion people? How?
If I was in Vegas, I would bet my life savings that the CXOs of the said ID Verification company's data isn't included in the leak. This is just like that Mc Donald's CEO's video - they never use what they create.
I bet their data is included too, for two reasons:
First, identity verification data for KYC is a little bit different from fast food or social media in that it's very difficult to live a normal life without being subject to any KYC checks. (I'm sure someone will chime in that they get paid in bitcoin and buy their groceries with cash.) If you are applying for some financial product or service that requires KYC, and they can't find any information about you, you will often either be denied that product or have to jump through a bunch of additional hoops to prove who you are. So it benefits CXOs to have their data included in these datasets, in fact if they are well paid they may well have more activity requiring KYC checks than the average person.
Second, and much more simply, one's own data often makes for a good test case since you know its accuracy.
This is actually a Fox News article and as far as I can see it's not corroborated anywhere.
I saw a reddit thread about it earlier where someone said the apparent hacker refused to actually show any of the data and was asking for money. So probably just a scam rather than a real leak.
> That review identified no exposure, vulnerability or unauthorized access within the IDMERIT environment
The fact that they didn't vet their data providers then has to be considered a form of negligence. In the end, its the company I am handing over my details to to act responsibly, not their providers.
I hate this responsibility delegating when its not a good luck, and this will continue to get worse now as the entire internet will be ID gated soon. But don't worry, all the lapse in privacy and even security in the name of 'saving the kids'.
While this leak may or may not have happened, for this type of exposure there should be criminal liability for developers and executives. Criminal negligence and prison time.
At this point I get about 1-2 emails a year telling me some company has exposed my private data in some way. It’s completely routine.
We need a law mandating the company pays at least $1k per exposed record per customer or absolutely nothing will change. The current cost of “here’s a years worth of credit monitoring” doesn’t even amount to a slap on the wrist.
the main reason for this recent change is that before they used to just not report it, it makes no financial sense to them and they only do it because of recent legislation and liability
it's the only decent development from those data protection laws that usually do anything but protect data, but credit where it's due
> We requested a security incident report from the ethical hackers as proof
So instead of paying him a fair bug bounty, they demand that he write a formal report for them and prove to them that there is even a problem.
Totally unhinged, but it gets worse:
> the response was a demand for money for the report, which confirmed our suspicion that this was a ransom-related incident.
Wow. So when the security researcher informs them that he would be happy to do some consulting work for them and informs them of his rates, they flip out and accuse his initial good samaritan decision to inform the company of the issue of being part of a plot by him to hold the company for ransom?
Whoever thought this is both totally delusional and a complete jerk. Truly, no good deed goes unpunished.
> We own and operate our proprietary platform, but we do not own, control or store customer data or the underlying data maintained by independent data sources.
This seems like a critical sentence. Is this database actually operated by IDMerit, or someone else? If so, who?
28 comments
[ 3.3 ms ] story [ 64.8 ms ] threadand I've never seen any confirmation elsewhere
Looks like CyberNews have edited the article with more info since first I saw it, it used to look quite suspicious and untrustworthy, it now has more info. Still doesn't say exactly what a record is, or how many uniques there are.
...also, this is yet another example of why we need a regulated Software Building Code, with penalties for not conforming to it. If somebody is found to be hosting a public Mongo instance with no authentication, it should be reported to a state or federal agency, so that real penalties can be applied, the way they are for other code violations. And they shouldn't have been allowed to launch with that in the first place. It shouldn't be up to random "security researchers" to police businesses.
First, identity verification data for KYC is a little bit different from fast food or social media in that it's very difficult to live a normal life without being subject to any KYC checks. (I'm sure someone will chime in that they get paid in bitcoin and buy their groceries with cash.) If you are applying for some financial product or service that requires KYC, and they can't find any information about you, you will often either be denied that product or have to jump through a bunch of additional hoops to prove who you are. So it benefits CXOs to have their data included in these datasets, in fact if they are well paid they may well have more activity requiring KYC checks than the average person.
Second, and much more simply, one's own data often makes for a good test case since you know its accuracy.
I saw a reddit thread about it earlier where someone said the apparent hacker refused to actually show any of the data and was asking for money. So probably just a scam rather than a real leak.
The fact that they didn't vet their data providers then has to be considered a form of negligence. In the end, its the company I am handing over my details to to act responsibly, not their providers.
I hate this responsibility delegating when its not a good luck, and this will continue to get worse now as the entire internet will be ID gated soon. But don't worry, all the lapse in privacy and even security in the name of 'saving the kids'.
https://www.idmerit.com/blog/idmerits-data-breach-fail-safe-...
archived for posterity: https://archive.ph/MdSfO
We need a law mandating the company pays at least $1k per exposed record per customer or absolutely nothing will change. The current cost of “here’s a years worth of credit monitoring” doesn’t even amount to a slap on the wrist.
it's the only decent development from those data protection laws that usually do anything but protect data, but credit where it's due
> We requested a security incident report from the ethical hackers as proof
So instead of paying him a fair bug bounty, they demand that he write a formal report for them and prove to them that there is even a problem.
Totally unhinged, but it gets worse:
> the response was a demand for money for the report, which confirmed our suspicion that this was a ransom-related incident.
Wow. So when the security researcher informs them that he would be happy to do some consulting work for them and informs them of his rates, they flip out and accuse his initial good samaritan decision to inform the company of the issue of being part of a plot by him to hold the company for ransom?
Whoever thought this is both totally delusional and a complete jerk. Truly, no good deed goes unpunished.
This seems like a critical sentence. Is this database actually operated by IDMerit, or someone else? If so, who?
The system is broken. We shouldn't be so vulnerable because of foundational infrastructure.