I think this has been posted in response to this news story [1] to clarify that GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted even without a duress PIN/password.
On a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted.
What GrapheneOS is missing is a complete backup and restore solution so that people can preventively wipe their smartphone before crossing the border. It would be nice to have the possibility to backup/restore every app and their data from an ssh/sftp server the way google/apple users do with google cloud / icloud. I'd rather wipe my smartphone, only add a couple of direct contacts, a copy of my passport and the pdf of my plane tickets, take the plane and cross the border with a smartphone with very little but real personal data they already know and be able to provide my PIN/password to law enforcement if they ask for it, abiding with law if such a law exist (which is the case in my home country), than using a duress and risk prosecution.
Sure that doesn't protect your data from any other attack vector but it allows you to travel with less risk of getting detained by law enforcement of a country you are visiting. You get asked your password, you can give it, and they see a phone that is used like a dumbphone. If you get questioned for that a simple "my phone died yesterday, a friend just gave me his old pixel". If you need more stuff/information during your travel you would basically only need to remember the passphrase to access a password manager or a remote ssh server but you can restore only the stuff you need when travelling and and wipe again at any moment.
Having said that maybe it is better to set this up some way but not have it builtin so that law enforcement doesn't expect that any grapheneos user would have his data on an sftp server somewhere by default. Otherwise we are back to point 0 where they would ask to connect to it and restore to a phone they own. Oh and have a dummy google account you only used to purchase a couple of silly stuff on amazon, aliexpress and shein and random subscription of various "non risky subjects" on youtube. The gmail address would quickly be filled with enough spam to look genuine.
I am travelling abroad in 3 weeks for a month and I am seriously considering wiping up my grapheneOS phone before flying. I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Or maybe I should just leave my main phone at home and only travel with a new empty 150€ phone with only my main family emergency contacts. I don't remember ever being asked to show my smartphone at a border but you never know when it will happen. Thanksfully until you reboot it there is nothing that shows from the lockscreen that it is not running the regular google pixel android.
"my phone died yesterday, a friend just gave me his old pixel" - please don't do this. That's lying to law enforcement and they can prosecute. Just say it's your travel phone.
There was some comment here somewhere arguing that 16 characters for a password is too little, but that he used the pattern lock. Looks like it was deleted.
Anyway. The pattern lock in Android provides Log2(389112) =~ 18.57 bits of entropy. This is less than 3 random characters, or 4 lowercase letters, or a decimal PIN digit password of 6 characters.
Granted, you could use mnemonics for long passwords, but how convenient is to input those long passwords?
I wonder why don't they just allow for longer passwords and just use a hash digest when it's too long, rather than just disallowing people from using strong passwords that they will remember. This pushes people to reuse passwords, send them to themselves, and other bad practices.
It's fairly easy to open up a phone and probe inner circuitry.
I suspect that'll be the next step for malicious actors. I doubt very much the phone is fully resistant to having malicious data injected onto various busses.
although it is wonderful to know that there exists a piece of hardware in the world that is not conspiring against its users, the outcome of entering a duress password should be indistinguishable to the user that grabs hold of the mobile phone. The duress password should wipe off the real user account information but present the kidnappers with a full-fledged operating system populated with real-looking content to entertain the police officers with polite meaningless e-mails saying things like
> > On Apr 11, 2015, at 5:45 PM, Jim Steyer Hey John, > > > > We know you're a true master of cuisine and we have appreciated that for > years ... > > > > But walnut sauce for the pasta? Mary, plz tell us the straight story, > was the sauce actually very tasty? > > > > > Jim
I always leave my phone and laptop off when going through TSA or Passport Control. I don't think in the US you an be compelled into giving up your password. They are free to confiscate the device but with it powered down good luck trying to break the password.
I was just told if I don’t give my pin they take my green card. You cannot call a lawyer so do you want to gamble or give your pin? WhatsApp just needs Face ID with unique pin not the main app one.
Does it protect it in After First Unlock mode? I often use my device and if I lock it before LE or another bad actor catches it then it's kind of useless if it doesn't protect my data in after first unlock (locked) mode. Especially with LE agencies having tools like Cellebrite at their station for same day analysis. Most people probably won't have time to reboot their device.
Similar to how I use Veracrypt, but I leave my PC running, because I hate spending time booting up again. So LE could decrypt my stuff using RAM extraction stuff.
Yes, it provides strong protection while profiles are in After First Unlock state. It automatically reboots 18 hours after locking by default so there's a time limit on having a working exploit which is highly unlikely. The timer can be set as low as 10 minutes by users.
18 hours was chosen to avoid ever triggering for people who use their phone a couple times a day. For most people, it only needs to be a bit longer than their maximum sleep time to avoid triggering in practice. It's mostly fine if it reboots during the night anyway but people may miss an urgent non-carrier call, etc.
Cellebrite's documentation on Cellebrite Premium capabilities is repeatedly leaked. As of a couple months ago, it still shows they lack exploits for locked GrapheneOS devices updated past a certain 2022 patch level.
It's really comical when you want to have same security guarantees as you get on apple devices you are a criminal. Search more: "apple devices automatically restart", "apple device full encryption", "apple lockdown mode".
edit: this was a response to another comment opps.
Of course, the same authorities angry at GrapheneOS are also angry at Apple. The main problem is that you can't call iPhone users criminals, you'd get laughed out of the room.
But installing a third-party OS? That's weird. Weird enough to exoticize and marginalize.
#1. The download and restore backup method would work for people in general- except it doesn't capture what people would need. Exmaple: I have some thermal cameras that rely on old 32 bit apps that do not run on anything android 12 onwards- If i wipe those old phones, and restore- the apps often wanted to reach out to a server for initial activation- they would fail upon reinstall and i'd be out of the apps that are required to control my cameras and related equipment,which is worth thousands and thousands and thousands. And it'd be all dead weight and rendered useless.
(and competitors today do not compete- for example try finding a 640*480 30 hz or better form factor thermal camera that attaches to phones - they dont exist anymore)
\The solution is full imaging- but there isnt a way to fully image phones and restore backups today. There used to be it seems- but not really with the latest stuff at the time of this post
.
On another note:Veracrypt- The weakness of truecrypt and veracrypt, the hidden OS option only worked if you converted your computer to MBR, which means you can't have a hard drive too large. Making a UEFI hidden OS has not been done yet.
And the Hidden Volume option- isn't 'as' useful, and of course, your OS might make a copy and put it somewhere, you have to be careful. As a example: Any time I open a file, using the software tool Everything to search and confirm this- you can easily see Windows makes copies and temp files and whatnot in randomly named locations- that's the sort of behavior that would screw people over
We need fully image-backup capable Phones. I mean fully. Not just backing up some apps- as this refuses to backup apps you have that are no longer on app stores, or that Play Protect doesn't like, etc.
Next- Plausible deniability is a way forward- but you need multiple profiles, that are cryptographically indistinguishable, along with the phone being hardened so GreyKey /Cellebrite won't be able to exploit a way in. This needs to be built this way from the ground up ideally, eventually.
There has been research about making devices that treat all block space the same way so you can't tell if someone has 1, or 50 profiles or partitions, etc- and even stuff that overlaps.
Often it needs to be fixed size partitions, but it is apparently NOT impossible to create.
I am aware of Shufflecake attempting to make a solution for Linux, and yes, a Hidden OS option that is forensic- invisible.
But nothing has come out - and especially, for phones.
I hope Graphene OS or another group, eventually works on this for phones. I do wonder if it would require a Linux phone, or something built from the ground up rather than current phone architecture.
It would be nice to see the day where, if you travel to a hostile country, you can tell them you have just one profile, and if they ask, you could theoretically mention a 2nd, and then show it- but you might have 3 more - and they'd all be immune to forensic inspection if the system is built right.(Yes, there's often issues you have to be careful of ,like setting this up so you dont destroy data when in other profiles,)
This is how you solve this problem in the long run-make computing devices impossible to analyze, but standard.
27 comments
[ 641 ms ] story [ 876 ms ] threadOn a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted.
[1] A US man is being prosecuted after allegedly using a GrapheneOS duress PIN to wipe his Pixel during a border search – https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro...
[2] A Journalist had his mobile phone seized. Did using GrapheneOS protect his data? – https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Journalist-Richard-Me...
(The Computer Weekly item was submitted but saw no significant discussion.)
Sure that doesn't protect your data from any other attack vector but it allows you to travel with less risk of getting detained by law enforcement of a country you are visiting. You get asked your password, you can give it, and they see a phone that is used like a dumbphone. If you get questioned for that a simple "my phone died yesterday, a friend just gave me his old pixel". If you need more stuff/information during your travel you would basically only need to remember the passphrase to access a password manager or a remote ssh server but you can restore only the stuff you need when travelling and and wipe again at any moment.
Having said that maybe it is better to set this up some way but not have it builtin so that law enforcement doesn't expect that any grapheneos user would have his data on an sftp server somewhere by default. Otherwise we are back to point 0 where they would ask to connect to it and restore to a phone they own. Oh and have a dummy google account you only used to purchase a couple of silly stuff on amazon, aliexpress and shein and random subscription of various "non risky subjects" on youtube. The gmail address would quickly be filled with enough spam to look genuine.
I am travelling abroad in 3 weeks for a month and I am seriously considering wiping up my grapheneOS phone before flying. I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Or maybe I should just leave my main phone at home and only travel with a new empty 150€ phone with only my main family emergency contacts. I don't remember ever being asked to show my smartphone at a border but you never know when it will happen. Thanksfully until you reboot it there is nothing that shows from the lockscreen that it is not running the regular google pixel android.
Anyway. The pattern lock in Android provides Log2(389112) =~ 18.57 bits of entropy. This is less than 3 random characters, or 4 lowercase letters, or a decimal PIN digit password of 6 characters.
Granted, you could use mnemonics for long passwords, but how convenient is to input those long passwords?
I wonder why don't they just allow for longer passwords and just use a hash digest when it's too long, rather than just disallowing people from using strong passwords that they will remember. This pushes people to reuse passwords, send them to themselves, and other bad practices.
I suspect that'll be the next step for malicious actors. I doubt very much the phone is fully resistant to having malicious data injected onto various busses.
> > On Apr 11, 2015, at 5:45 PM, Jim Steyer Hey John, > > > > We know you're a true master of cuisine and we have appreciated that for > years ... > > > > But walnut sauce for the pasta? Mary, plz tell us the straight story, > was the sauce actually very tasty? > > > > > Jim
Perhaps the solution is that some apps and data is in a locked area that would require a further pin once the device is unlocked.
So the duress pin unlocks the device but wipes that region.
It then appears that the secure or locked part was never setup.
I think many OSs offer Locked data options, Google Photos, Samsung etc.
Or restores app data to a restore point of your choosing making it seem like everything is fine.
Make it untraceable you had it setup and it'll help deal with any potential legal issues.
Similar to how I use Veracrypt, but I leave my PC running, because I hate spending time booting up again. So LE could decrypt my stuff using RAM extraction stuff.
18 hours was chosen to avoid ever triggering for people who use their phone a couple times a day. For most people, it only needs to be a bit longer than their maximum sleep time to avoid triggering in practice. It's mostly fine if it reboots during the night anyway but people may miss an urgent non-carrier call, etc.
Cellebrite's documentation on Cellebrite Premium capabilities is repeatedly leaked. As of a couple months ago, it still shows they lack exploits for locked GrapheneOS devices updated past a certain 2022 patch level.
edit: this was a response to another comment opps.
But installing a third-party OS? That's weird. Weird enough to exoticize and marginalize.
A few things:
#1. The download and restore backup method would work for people in general- except it doesn't capture what people would need. Exmaple: I have some thermal cameras that rely on old 32 bit apps that do not run on anything android 12 onwards- If i wipe those old phones, and restore- the apps often wanted to reach out to a server for initial activation- they would fail upon reinstall and i'd be out of the apps that are required to control my cameras and related equipment,which is worth thousands and thousands and thousands. And it'd be all dead weight and rendered useless.
(and competitors today do not compete- for example try finding a 640*480 30 hz or better form factor thermal camera that attaches to phones - they dont exist anymore)
\The solution is full imaging- but there isnt a way to fully image phones and restore backups today. There used to be it seems- but not really with the latest stuff at the time of this post
.
On another note:Veracrypt- The weakness of truecrypt and veracrypt, the hidden OS option only worked if you converted your computer to MBR, which means you can't have a hard drive too large. Making a UEFI hidden OS has not been done yet.
And the Hidden Volume option- isn't 'as' useful, and of course, your OS might make a copy and put it somewhere, you have to be careful. As a example: Any time I open a file, using the software tool Everything to search and confirm this- you can easily see Windows makes copies and temp files and whatnot in randomly named locations- that's the sort of behavior that would screw people over
We need fully image-backup capable Phones. I mean fully. Not just backing up some apps- as this refuses to backup apps you have that are no longer on app stores, or that Play Protect doesn't like, etc.
Next- Plausible deniability is a way forward- but you need multiple profiles, that are cryptographically indistinguishable, along with the phone being hardened so GreyKey /Cellebrite won't be able to exploit a way in. This needs to be built this way from the ground up ideally, eventually.
There has been research about making devices that treat all block space the same way so you can't tell if someone has 1, or 50 profiles or partitions, etc- and even stuff that overlaps. Often it needs to be fixed size partitions, but it is apparently NOT impossible to create. I am aware of Shufflecake attempting to make a solution for Linux, and yes, a Hidden OS option that is forensic- invisible.
But nothing has come out - and especially, for phones.
I hope Graphene OS or another group, eventually works on this for phones. I do wonder if it would require a Linux phone, or something built from the ground up rather than current phone architecture.
It would be nice to see the day where, if you travel to a hostile country, you can tell them you have just one profile, and if they ask, you could theoretically mention a 2nd, and then show it- but you might have 3 more - and they'd all be immune to forensic inspection if the system is built right.(Yes, there's often issues you have to be careful of ,like setting this up so you dont destroy data when in other profiles,)
This is how you solve this problem in the long run-make computing devices impossible to analyze, but standard.