This is ridiculously stupid. You need to (a) have your device unlocked, (b) connected to a computer you don't know and (c) have clicked the 'Trust This Computer' button.
Of course your deep personal data is going to be exposed if you manage to get through all that.
Precise: anyone with access to the computers you have "trusted" to pair with your iPhone, can extract encrypted data from your iPhone because that's what the trusted pairing is intended to do.
There are also "backdoor" systems that Apple Store employees use to unlock your phones, which can be exploited by Law Enforcement to extract text messages, contact lists and photos.
Noting of course that Law Enforcement already has access to numbers you have called and all SMS & MMS messages you have sent by subpoena to the carrier responsible for your service.
>> Noting of course that Law Enforcement already has access to numbers you have called and all SMS & MMS messages you have sent by subpoena to the carrier responsible for your service.
That's a poor excuse. Those calls may have been made in a different country.
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[ 6.6 ms ] story [ 49.1 ms ] threadOf course your deep personal data is going to be exposed if you manage to get through all that.
No, it's not. IMHO the problem is not the exact procedure, but the lack of option for the user to properly encrypt their data.
There are also "backdoor" systems that Apple Store employees use to unlock your phones, which can be exploited by Law Enforcement to extract text messages, contact lists and photos.
Noting of course that Law Enforcement already has access to numbers you have called and all SMS & MMS messages you have sent by subpoena to the carrier responsible for your service.
That's a poor excuse. Those calls may have been made in a different country.