More to the point, Silvergate was one of exactly two banks serving crypto companies in the US. The other, Signature Bank, is also under a lot of regulatory pressure and it has already cut off eg. Binance and Kraken.
What about recent events would suggest more institutions wanting to get a piece of this action? I'm not being snarky, I'm trying to figure out where banking is going to come from now. Cobbled together small players, is that what it looks like?
Plenty of banks want billions of dollars of business. Smaller banks jump at 100 million of deposits here and there for some niche market. The properly run crypto organizations are still banked fine, USDC - a stablecoin that isn't considered controversial - has $40bn on deposit at BNY Mellon. There are also many financial institutions under state charters and other concoctions that are or seek to operate better for the crypto industry. And crypto organizations have undergone more serious stress tests and banking isolation before.
Silvergate's stress came from holding normal super boring bonds and needing to liquidate those, it needed to liquidate because of the mismanaged crypto organizations, but its ability to liquidate came from its own portfolio choices during a coincidental macroeconomic environment and not crypto.
> And there are many more institutions open to the business now.
Is that really true? I got the impression the cryptocurrency industry was shrinking these days, with lots of companies that had previously announced involvement now exiting.
There are some pretty interesting ideas there. I had a conversation with a friend the other day and the whole blockchain then, AI now thing reminded me of a saying about shelling “Picks and Shovels during a Gold Rush”. I think it is intriguing that GPUs are the “picks and shovels” of both the Blockchain Rush and the AI Rush. One could point out conspiracies and PR, another could point out that the as GPUs become more general compute tools, new applications will emerge.
That's my beef with most of the critical takes. Yeah, it has some warts, but an hour playing with the thing, for both broader chat interaction and writing code, make the value evident, and startling.
That's not because voice recognition doesnt work. It's been working quite well for 15 years now. Just ask the Deaf community.
The issue is even if the error rate is 1 in 100 and you scale that up to a billion users supporting thousands of use cases, you then need to maintain a large army of people to manually handle those errors.
Its a huge cost to even the largest firms. Very similar to what Facebook/Twitter/Youtube end up doing to handle content moderation. The faster systems scale the faster you get swamped with bugs you don't have bandwidth to fix. The consequences begin to multiply. Your basic Jurassic Park story plays out.
I think indeed it’s not a conspiracy theory but just an observation of what might be happening that requires no collusion, just individual greed.
(I hence appreciated the quotes).
I am also not sure it’s so simple; the tools are so much more powerful than I would have believed just a couple years ago. But there’s value and then there’s perceived value; the fact that there’s so much nontechnical interest is perhaps suspect.
I mean, one of them has millions of users and is poised to revolutionize the entire digital economy (and perhaps the non-digital one as well) and the other one is electronic chuck-E-cheeze tokens older than the first iphone and still useless.
I wish I could agree with you, but there's a lot of smoke and mirrors with "AI" right now. These companies are letting people believe these services are thinking machines that are on the verge of consciousness when they are far from it.
There's some people making outsized and unreasonable claims about AI today, sure, but AI is generally useful and valuable right this minute. Crypto never really made it over that hump.
It's essentially the same crowd moving from one hustle to another. There's a new tech buzzword every few years, and it's easy to raise money from clueless investors who don't want to miss out. Remember "big data"? Or the "Uber for XYZ" phase?
They provide (provided) good quality, legal, regulated, transparent services to a market that often lacks all those things. They were a small company just trying to "get by" and they worked hard to get into a good position. Now they've been killed by regulators both under and over regulating them. They're basically collateral damage to congress refusing to do it's job...
Why - unless you're being sarcastic? Looks to me like the system is working Early warning system pushed the bank to unwind positions before hurting depositors. Regulation appears to be working well, for once.
Good context by Matt Levine a few days ago [1]. Basically Silvergate did a lot of business with crypto firms and got burned not by crypto speculation but just by holding long maturity safe assets when too many of their customers wanted to withdraw money on a short term basis. The result was falling below the line of being "well capitalised" as a bank. Bank regulation seems to be working here: there is no indication of wrongdoing or losses to depositors...
And for pretty good reason, at least it seems to me. Doing business with physical currency is not just objectively worse than digital transactions under most circumstances, it’s also increasingly untenable for more and more of life.
Banking services basically are so successful they became a necessity for the vast majority of people who can access them—you have to have money storage, as a prerequisite to moving money you can’t or don’t wish to store. I can’t think of a reason I should pay a bank for the privilege of access to paying some of my own money to another party.
On the other hand, I think this is just as good an argument that the kind of banking I’m describing should be a public good rather than a part of the services provided by investment firms. I even think there’s fairly good precedent for that argument, albeit at a drastically larger scale and with an unfortunately storied history of fraud and abuse.
As a public good you want all money to be invested. Money that is under lock and key is dead money. So having the bank lend your money IS a societal good. That it generates cash flow is just a bonus.
Many banks do put customer funds into T-Bills, or park it with the Fed at the fed funds rate. Both of which are 0 risk and effectively instantly redeemable. And this is still highly profitable right now, if you offer customers yields below fed funds rate (~5%), the money on the spread is risk free.
Pretty much every crypto adjacent firm has decided to take excessive risk with customer deposits to skim some off the top instead
> if you offer customers yields below fed funds rate (~5%), the money on the spread is risk free.
Absolutely insane how my local bank's money market account interest rate is something like 1.4%. Their CDs only hit 3%. Like come the fuck on. Ended up moving most of my money out of there.
Some are probably upset with it because they want Silvergate's liqudiation to be caused by crypto, and not super-safe US Treasurys. Turns out Silvergate's bitcoin loans are just fine, and it was the Treasurys that fucked them up.
Others are probably upset with it because Silvergate had the option to hold cash as cash, or cash as one-month T-bills, and if they had done that, they wouldn't have had to liquidate.
But instead they locked it up in much longer dated bonds to grab a little extra yield, and got burned when interest rates increased.
Yes, despite these being "safe" they effectively took on duration risk, and their bonds were "callable" by their customers. Not safe at all despite credit-risk being low
This bank did put a ton of the money in T-Bills. The vast majority of the remainder was in boring stuff like longer-term bonds. A very small amount (relatively) was involved in bitcoin lending.
The problem is highly liquid and effectively instantly redeemable wasn't enough when the crypto world melted down and a huge percentage of their depositors needed money back right away. No bank can survive that. Wells Fargo just has customers from a wide enough crosssection that they won't all need their money back at once. But you can imagine it happening to a small local bank following a natural disaster as well.
Silvergate was solvent and has the assets to cover liabilities, just has liquidity issues.
If they could cover their liabilities with their assets then they would sell the assets to do so. Clearly the assets do not cover the liabilities. It's not a lengthy process to sell a bond on the open market
If you bought them at 2-3% yields then you lost a lot of money, which is probably the case here. If they bought below par they would get their money back at maturity, but that could be 20-30 years from now. Despite being "safe" from a credit perspective, munis are not safe from interest rate risk
Sorry, you're right that their assets are also down. I didn't mean to deny that. It just seems that it was more a liquidity crunch than a solvency crunch. But maybe they cannot pay all their debtors?
It would be impractical to keep the cash in the form of 100 dollar bills. Given that, they need to be database entries in the Fed's system, and the Fed has discouraged banks from trying to keep large balances long-term: https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/safest-bank-fed-wont-san...
Interesting. That article from 2018 speculates on the Fed's motivation, but seems upfront that nobody is certain why they gave TNB such a hard time. Has the story developed since then? Did the suit go to trial?
EDIT: In 2020 the Southern District of New York court dismissed TNB's complaint[1], finding the 18 month wait did not construe a denial (despite the application form saying a decision "may take 5-7 days"). I guess there was no appeal?
> safe, boring assets weren't safe and boring enough
No, they weren't. Duration is a measured risk [1]. Silvergate chose a flighty, risky set of clients. Their portfolio should have been optimized for liquidity, not yield. They got greedy and are paying the price.
I thought banks were able to sell those long maturity assets for cash to another bank or investor to avoid exactly that kind of situation?
And my understanding is banks must meet their regulatory requirements overnight each night, so there is a market for overnight loans/swaps/etc to make sure thats the case.
> I thought banks were able to sell those long maturity assets for cash to another bank or investor to avoid exactly that kind of situation?
Those assets dropped in value by like 20% last year. Check out the stock ticker "TLT", which tracks 20+ year treasuries to see just how bad it was, zoom out to 1-year or 2-years.
TLTs value went down because yields went up. This is by design, anyone who invested in TLT at zero rates should have known the yields to price function. Honestly i dont see whats to hide here in reporting ??
again, why would i put my money in bonds when the interest rates are rock bottom ?
I invest in treasuries when interests are high or gonna stay high. If i see us hitting a recession in coming year, i keep mostly cash and start piling into treasuries over each hike cycle until at least the central banks start cutting rates and keep riding the treasuries till rates keep moving down.
Many financial institutions are required by law to hold UST, some of which have suffered declines comparable to TLT. This was in part a result of regulations post-GFC.
I'm surprised there hasn't been more reporting about this. Maybe everything's fine and there's nothing to see here.
If a bank classifies their long-duration Treasurys as held-to-maturity, they don’t need to mark the fluctuating value of the bond principal to market. [0]
Also, most other banks aren’t overly concentrated in one area that could collapse and force a bunch of customer withdrawals like Silvergate was (in cryptocurrency)
If there was a problem in banking bond holdings, it likely would’ve surfaced by now with the massive interest rate changes.
What do you mean underreported? TLT losing value isn’t news. The average duration of TLT’s US Treasurys is ~20 years—if rates go up 1%, the bond principle value goes down ~15-20%. The 20y treasury yield went from ~2% in Jan22 to 4% in Mar23, and TLT went from $150->$100 in the same time period.
Anyone who knows what TLT is likely knows about duration risk.
Under-reported by who? Virtually everyone I know has been watching the Fed / FFR and the rate-hike news because it affects things like long-term treasuries very significantly.
The FFR going from 0% to 4.5% over the last year is probably the biggest, most important (and definitely well reported) piece of news... and constantly makes front-page material on most financial newspapers I've been reading.
The idea that this is somehow "underreported" is... odd... to me. The amount of commentary on rising interest rates, federal fund rates, hawks in the Fed, inverted yield curves and more suggests that the public is hyper-aware of this and the implications.
I should have phrased it differently. The potentially large unrealized capital losses on UST sitting on bank balance sheets has been under-reported. Banks are both required to hold UST and not always required to mark-to-market. This interest rate move has been massive relatively speaking, leaving some number of banks in a terrible capital position, just waiting for a disturbance (like the FTX implosion) to trigger run-like conditions.
This story sketches a problem that hopefully doesn't start to gather steam:
Matt Levine is a good example of how writing cynically about crypto matters makes you wind up correcting crypto adversaries so much that you wind up coming across as a crypto proponent, simply from being able to opine accurately on what's going on.
I’m not sure what I think about this. It’s literally the first time I hear about Silvergate, I don’t have strong feelings about its continued existence or lack thereof, and my vision of the ideal situation in cryptocurrency is rooted in, like, 2010, but I’m reading this and...
> It’s just last week that US regulators warned banks about this [...]. It’s almost like they knew this was coming. The regulators did not quite say “therefore, don’t bank crypto exchanges”; in fact, they said the opposite [...]. But you got the idea.
If you stay silent most of the time, but say “we might be on a collision course with an iceberg” an hour before said iceberg comes along, your advice is very valuable (it might not be legibly valuable if it’s the first time you spoke up, but that’s not the concern here). If you say a lot of things all the time and then warn about the iceberg thing a minute before it happens, well, your advice is still better than nothing, but it’s not exactly an example of amazing foresight. And surely appending “captains have broad discretion over the course of their ship, as permitted by law or regulation” to the warning should discount its value further, at least a bit.
> A run on the bank happens in, like, It’s a Wonderful Life, but in the real world of big US banks, that particular dynamic [...] would be strange. [...] The story today is that Silvergate’s customers are withdrawing their money because they are worried about Silvergate [...]. But that's not why they were withdrawing their money in late 2022, when the trouble started. Then, they were withdrawing their money because crypto had collapsed [...]. The customers — crypto exchanges — were the problem, not Silvergate. [...]. I suppose this counts as contagion from the crypto crash to the real financial system [...] It is a narrow sort of contagion: That bank is pretty much the Bank of Crypto [...]. But it is certainly the sort of contagion that regulators will want to discourage [...].
Are the crypto exchanges the problem, though? This doesn’t read like a “cryptocurrency bad” story, it reads like a “being the Bank of Thing is bad” story. Cryptocurrency exchanges are a particularly bad value of Thing here, sure, but generally speaking, if you are the Bank of Thing and an overwhelming majority of your depositors are in the Thing business, then aren’t you essentially betting that Thing will not experience short-term volatility? Most of the time, the most relevant Thing is retail deposits, and as the article mentions, there’s a whole bunch of stuff instituted to smooth that out, but doesn’t this still apply for other, deposit-insurance-disadvantaged Things just as well?
In that view, it seems like, first, there should be indeed some opinions that, if you a running a bank, being an undiversified Bank of Thing on the depositor side is not a good idea, but also, second, that if you are a bank regulator and you regulate a Thing to a point where most but not all banks will refuse Thing businesses, you are very much accepting that those few remaining banks will be vulnerable.
You don't know enough then. If I were to use Wise I would be getting half salary due to my country "regulations", not even mentioning that I wouldn't be getting dollars or the fact that it would be nearly impossible due to bureaucracy.
Edit: forgot to mention that around a month ago Wise decided to no longer support my local currency, so there's also that.
I've just went onto Wise and they support Argentina Pesos and lots more, seems to be working all good, you realise that Wise isn't the only company that works in Argentina?
Payoneer also works in Argentina and other countries and pays employees / contractors internationally.
You really don't need crypto at all, since international payments is pretty a solved problem already and Wise, Payoneer etc is much safer to use.
Rather than the immensely risky, speculative, dangerous and volatile crypto sector which doesn't solve anything new at all.
I'm well aware of most payment options, I even have the Payoneer card. As I mentioned in other comments, I suggest that you look up how those services actually work for Argentinians and why they are not enough.
Crypto is the best solution to get paid, and I know it for a fact since I depend on my job to live.
While governments in Argentina and other countries might be poorly run and have unstable currencies, that doesn't mean that one should use an even worse system that loses people's savings together.
The fees on crypto is much higher and is slower than any of the solutions I mentioned when you account for exchange fees, volatility, transfer fees, buy/sell fees, etc.
Yes, my two examples exist but are not enough, but combined with other payments systems is used more than those using unsafe, unregulated, volatile crypto tokens that fits an extremely tiny and miniscule niche that only less than 2,000 people like yourself are unfortunately forced to use.
When Transfers 3.0 hits critical mass in Argentina and links up with Pix, UPI and other real time payment systems, there wouldn't be a need at all for crypto.
> Silvergate’s ability to find a white knight bidder to “salvage” the bank ended when gutsy U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), John Kennedy (R-LA), and Roger Marshall (R-KS) released a letter on January 30 to the bank’s CEO, Alan Lane.
> Another way that Silvergate apparently met the run on the bank was to obtain $4.3 billion in advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco – a program meant to support housing for the poor.
Indeed. For those unaware: while the mainstream media were busy castin SBF, frontpage, as an altruistic white knight, Marc Cohodes was out there telling everyone that SBF was a "no name" (his words) fraudster running a ponzi scam.
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[ 3.1 ms ] story [ 152 ms ] threadhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silvergate_Bank
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/08/silvergate-shutting-down-ope...
Silvergate's stress came from holding normal super boring bonds and needing to liquidate those, it needed to liquidate because of the mismanaged crypto organizations, but its ability to liquidate came from its own portfolio choices during a coincidental macroeconomic environment and not crypto.
Is that really true? I got the impression the cryptocurrency industry was shrinking these days, with lots of companies that had previously announced involvement now exiting.
https://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2023/02/place-y...
(Which I don't buy)
While I agree there is a hype bubble forming, I disagree with the premise that it only produces garbage.
Right now I can basically ask my home assistant "what's the time/weather" and "play some music". Anything else returns "i don't understand".
I can see ChatGPT has huge potential here to give at least somewhat sane voice assistant responses.
The issue is even if the error rate is 1 in 100 and you scale that up to a billion users supporting thousands of use cases, you then need to maintain a large army of people to manually handle those errors.
Its a huge cost to even the largest firms. Very similar to what Facebook/Twitter/Youtube end up doing to handle content moderation. The faster systems scale the faster you get swamped with bugs you don't have bandwidth to fix. The consequences begin to multiply. Your basic Jurassic Park story plays out.
"Who played bond in that film Goldensomething?"
"I don't understand."
ChatGPT on the other hand returns "you're thinking of Goldeneye, where Bond was played by Pierce Brosnan"
(I hence appreciated the quotes).
I am also not sure it’s so simple; the tools are so much more powerful than I would have believed just a couple years ago. But there’s value and then there’s perceived value; the fact that there’s so much nontechnical interest is perhaps suspect.
FFR futures are expecting a +0.50% increase for the March 22nd meeting.
Crypto bros and LLM bros both monetize via tokens
[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-02/silver...
Their safe, boring assets weren't safe and boring enough. Why can't there be a bank like this that just keeps your cash as cash?
Banking services basically are so successful they became a necessity for the vast majority of people who can access them—you have to have money storage, as a prerequisite to moving money you can’t or don’t wish to store. I can’t think of a reason I should pay a bank for the privilege of access to paying some of my own money to another party.
On the other hand, I think this is just as good an argument that the kind of banking I’m describing should be a public good rather than a part of the services provided by investment firms. I even think there’s fairly good precedent for that argument, albeit at a drastically larger scale and with an unfortunately storied history of fraud and abuse.
Many banks do put customer funds into T-Bills, or park it with the Fed at the fed funds rate. Both of which are 0 risk and effectively instantly redeemable. And this is still highly profitable right now, if you offer customers yields below fed funds rate (~5%), the money on the spread is risk free.
Pretty much every crypto adjacent firm has decided to take excessive risk with customer deposits to skim some off the top instead
Absolutely insane how my local bank's money market account interest rate is something like 1.4%. Their CDs only hit 3%. Like come the fuck on. Ended up moving most of my money out of there.
Others are probably upset with it because Silvergate had the option to hold cash as cash, or cash as one-month T-bills, and if they had done that, they wouldn't have had to liquidate.
But instead they locked it up in much longer dated bonds to grab a little extra yield, and got burned when interest rates increased.
The problem is highly liquid and effectively instantly redeemable wasn't enough when the crypto world melted down and a huge percentage of their depositors needed money back right away. No bank can survive that. Wells Fargo just has customers from a wide enough crosssection that they won't all need their money back at once. But you can imagine it happening to a small local bank following a natural disaster as well.
Silvergate was solvent and has the assets to cover liabilities, just has liquidity issues.
Obviously some assets they hold (mortgage backed securities) have declined in value.
If you bought them at 2-3% yields then you lost a lot of money, which is probably the case here. If they bought below par they would get their money back at maturity, but that could be 20-30 years from now. Despite being "safe" from a credit perspective, munis are not safe from interest rate risk
EDIT: In 2020 the Southern District of New York court dismissed TNB's complaint[1], finding the 18 month wait did not construe a denial (despite the application form saying a decision "may take 5-7 days"). I guess there was no appeal?
[1] https://justmoney.org/the-narrow-bank/
No, they weren't. Duration is a measured risk [1]. Silvergate chose a flighty, risky set of clients. Their portfolio should have been optimized for liquidity, not yield. They got greedy and are paying the price.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_duration
I thought banks were able to sell those long maturity assets for cash to another bank or investor to avoid exactly that kind of situation?
And my understanding is banks must meet their regulatory requirements overnight each night, so there is a market for overnight loans/swaps/etc to make sure thats the case.
Those assets dropped in value by like 20% last year. Check out the stock ticker "TLT", which tracks 20+ year treasuries to see just how bad it was, zoom out to 1-year or 2-years.
Can you explain what am i missing here ?
I invest in treasuries when interests are high or gonna stay high. If i see us hitting a recession in coming year, i keep mostly cash and start piling into treasuries over each hike cycle until at least the central banks start cutting rates and keep riding the treasuries till rates keep moving down.
Or in other words, dont fight the fed
I'm surprised there hasn't been more reporting about this. Maybe everything's fine and there's nothing to see here.
Also, most other banks aren’t overly concentrated in one area that could collapse and force a bunch of customer withdrawals like Silvergate was (in cryptocurrency)
If there was a problem in banking bond holdings, it likely would’ve surfaced by now with the massive interest rate changes.
[0] https://viewpoint.pwc.com/dt/us/en/pwc/accounting_guides/loa...
Anyone who knows what TLT is likely knows about duration risk.
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products...
The FFR going from 0% to 4.5% over the last year is probably the biggest, most important (and definitely well reported) piece of news... and constantly makes front-page material on most financial newspapers I've been reading.
The idea that this is somehow "underreported" is... odd... to me. The amount of commentary on rising interest rates, federal fund rates, hawks in the Fed, inverted yield curves and more suggests that the public is hyper-aware of this and the implications.
This story sketches a problem that hopefully doesn't start to gather steam:
https://www.axios.com/2023/03/04/why-some-banks-are-heading-...
> It’s just last week that US regulators warned banks about this [...]. It’s almost like they knew this was coming. The regulators did not quite say “therefore, don’t bank crypto exchanges”; in fact, they said the opposite [...]. But you got the idea.
If you stay silent most of the time, but say “we might be on a collision course with an iceberg” an hour before said iceberg comes along, your advice is very valuable (it might not be legibly valuable if it’s the first time you spoke up, but that’s not the concern here). If you say a lot of things all the time and then warn about the iceberg thing a minute before it happens, well, your advice is still better than nothing, but it’s not exactly an example of amazing foresight. And surely appending “captains have broad discretion over the course of their ship, as permitted by law or regulation” to the warning should discount its value further, at least a bit.
> A run on the bank happens in, like, It’s a Wonderful Life, but in the real world of big US banks, that particular dynamic [...] would be strange. [...] The story today is that Silvergate’s customers are withdrawing their money because they are worried about Silvergate [...]. But that's not why they were withdrawing their money in late 2022, when the trouble started. Then, they were withdrawing their money because crypto had collapsed [...]. The customers — crypto exchanges — were the problem, not Silvergate. [...]. I suppose this counts as contagion from the crypto crash to the real financial system [...] It is a narrow sort of contagion: That bank is pretty much the Bank of Crypto [...]. But it is certainly the sort of contagion that regulators will want to discourage [...].
Are the crypto exchanges the problem, though? This doesn’t read like a “cryptocurrency bad” story, it reads like a “being the Bank of Thing is bad” story. Cryptocurrency exchanges are a particularly bad value of Thing here, sure, but generally speaking, if you are the Bank of Thing and an overwhelming majority of your depositors are in the Thing business, then aren’t you essentially betting that Thing will not experience short-term volatility? Most of the time, the most relevant Thing is retail deposits, and as the article mentions, there’s a whole bunch of stuff instituted to smooth that out, but doesn’t this still apply for other, deposit-insurance-disadvantaged Things just as well?
In that view, it seems like, first, there should be indeed some opinions that, if you a running a bank, being an undiversified Bank of Thing on the depositor side is not a good idea, but also, second, that if you are a bank regulator and you regulate a Thing to a point where most but not all banks will refuse Thing businesses, you are very much accepting that those few remaining banks will be vulnerable.
Maybe you should dig a bit deeper before making such comments
I know lots of software engineers and companies that use Wise to get paid / pay employees and contractors internationally with no issues there at all.
So crypto is still not needed here at all.
Edit: forgot to mention that around a month ago Wise decided to no longer support my local currency, so there's also that.
Payoneer also works in Argentina and other countries and pays employees / contractors internationally.
You really don't need crypto at all, since international payments is pretty a solved problem already and Wise, Payoneer etc is much safer to use.
Rather than the immensely risky, speculative, dangerous and volatile crypto sector which doesn't solve anything new at all.
Crypto is the best solution to get paid, and I know it for a fact since I depend on my job to live.
The fees on crypto is much higher and is slower than any of the solutions I mentioned when you account for exchange fees, volatility, transfer fees, buy/sell fees, etc.
Yes, my two examples exist but are not enough, but combined with other payments systems is used more than those using unsafe, unregulated, volatile crypto tokens that fits an extremely tiny and miniscule niche that only less than 2,000 people like yourself are unfortunately forced to use.
When Transfers 3.0 hits critical mass in Argentina and links up with Pix, UPI and other real time payment systems, there wouldn't be a need at all for crypto.
https://wallstreetonparade.com/2023/03/fdic-investigators-ar...
> Silvergate’s ability to find a white knight bidder to “salvage” the bank ended when gutsy U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), John Kennedy (R-LA), and Roger Marshall (R-KS) released a letter on January 30 to the bank’s CEO, Alan Lane.
https://wallstreetonparade.com/2023/03/silvergate-a-federall...
> Another way that Silvergate apparently met the run on the bank was to obtain $4.3 billion in advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco – a program meant to support housing for the poor.