> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
Remember IBM had gone through a very painful antitrust case and was still subject to the consent decree. I’m not sure right now of the terms, but it certainly limited the leverages IBM could apply against third parties profiting from the PC.
There was still an antitrust case in process against IBM in 1981 when the PC was launched, it would only be dropped by the US in 1982. I started in 1990 and the fear of another antitrust case pervaded everything through the ten years I was there, even after the earlier consent decree expired.
Open nature of PC allowed for truly free/open source software to exist which can be functional without big corporate lockdown. I can fully assemble it with parts I can buy individually and as long as they are compatible (which is mentioned on the box, no hidden knowledge here) I can expect it to work within the mentioned warranty.
My PC based computers can be booted and fully functional with Debain, Fedora and (put your favorite Linux, BSD distro here mine is openSUSE Tumbleweed). There is no parallel ecosystem which yet, which rivals PC in terms of open specs and fully tinkerable hardware and software.
Macbooks are locked down with Apple and forget about your own hardware.
Android seemed like a competitor, but closed nature of its development and lack commodity hardware around ARM based phones means that FOSS layer exists only in user bases apps. We have custom ROMs which require bootable blobs from vendors and its non-reliable and breaks often.
You are right. We are lucky. A company like Digital could have made the PDP-11 into 'the PC' and lock it down from the beginning. IBM could have done the same if they had not been so incompetent. In such a case you would have Intel, IBM and Microsoft being a single organization that would have become to powerful.
We still had plenty of issue with Intel and Microsoft being able to play out their monopoly.
So I think it could have been a lot worse, but it could also have been a lot better.
ironically, you should be thanking Apple that the IBM PC exists
The Apple II was an open system and IBM clearly took a lot of inspiration from the Apple II line. Look at the 5150 motherboard in the picture in the article and compare it to the motherboard from an Apple II+
It's common for people to assume that if IBM didn't use a simple, open architecture with off-the-shelf components for the original PC, then we'd never have had the PC ecosystem as we know it.
But this view neglects the fact that an organic ecosystem of interoperable open hardware converging to de facto standards and running a common OS already existed prior to IBM designing their PC. By 1980, there were already many independent vendors implementing their own variation on the 8080/S-100 design pioneered by MITS, all running CP/M from Digital Research.
When IBM released the PC, the CP/M world was still going strong. The fact that it was an easily cloneable architecture based on the 16-bit 8086 caused a lot of disruption, and led to the market dynamics that were already present in the 8080-S100-CP/M world pivoting over to x86-ISA-DOS.
If IBM had kept their PC proprietary, it might have led to a bit more fragmentation in the short-term market for business microcomputing, but at the same time, the CP/M world would have continued on without that disruption, and something else would have ultimately catalyzed the move to a common 16-bit architecture. DR was already working on CP/M-86 at the time IBM was developing the PC, after all.
Eventually, the same forces that led to the collapse of vertically integrated, proprietary platforms and the dominance of open-standards system builders would have asserted themselves, and IBM itself would still have been subdued by them. Modern computing would likely be in a similar position with or without IBM. The PC was a major ripple, but didn't really change the current.
>I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product.
That was true everywhere. I worked at a mini company at the time when the PC came out. People in that company looked at the PC as a cool thing, but not a real computer.
In 10 or so years, the PC killed of almost all mini computer companies. Some even speculated that was the main reason for IBM to create the PC :)
PC only got where it was thanks to the mistakes that made clones possible.
Everyone else, including other IBM offerings, were all about vertical integration.
It is no coincidence that nowadays with PC desktops being largely left to enthusiastics and gamers, OEMs are all doubling down on vertical integration across laptops and mobile devices, as means to recoup the thin margins that have come to be.
You mean like publishing the system board schematics and a full source listing for the BIOS?
That seems to have been surprisingly normal for PCs in the late 1970s.
Apple also published schematics and listings, and had to deal with clones, but Apple 2 clones weren't particularly useful without a copy of (or compatible replacement for) Apple's ROM, which Apple did not license.
IBM tried to make a more thoroughly "IBM" proprietary PC product first with the PCjr and then especially with the PS/2. Attempted to lock down the hardware a bit more, introduced the Microchannel bus/architecture, etc.
But it was too late, and they didn't have the power they thought they had.
This reads like a case study from "The Innovator's Dilemma" by Clayton Christensen.
TL;DR: big incumbents (e.g. IBM) get out-innovated and replaced by scrappy startups even when the incumbent sees it coming and tries to react. The incumbent's business processes, sales metrics (NPII in this story), internal culture and established customer base make it impossible for an innovative product to succeed within the company.
The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers. They haven't got time to go chasing small orders of the new gadget from new customers who they don't have a relationship with, and the existing customers don't see the point of the new gadget. So orders for the gadget stagnate.
Across town is the small scrappy start-up making a similar gadget. It lives on those small orders and has a highly motivated sales person who chases those orders full time. So their orders grow, their product improves from the market feedback, and one day the new gadget is actually better than the incumbent's main product. At that point the incumbent goes out of business.
> The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers.
In a rare feat, Apple managed to do just that with the iPhone, which ate the iPod’s lunch. This at a time when the iPod was a core product, directly responsible for their revival and success, that could have been milked for years to come.
> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
They tried, in the form of the previously mentioned PS/2. They just squeezed a little too hard. There was also the PCjr, which was riddled with enough technical flaws at a blistering price point for it to also end up a flop (Charlie Chaplin was also not exactly a great choice to sell to a market already trending younger). IBM might have eventually gotten it right, they just lost the will to keep trying. Their business model depended on landing corporate whales buying high-margin products and services; mere commodities were a plebeian concern beneath them.
Steve Jobs came to my university in 1984 to push the Mac, where he told us that we students could buy one for half price. At the same talk he rattled off all the flaws of the PCjr and said the famous line "IBM should do us a favor and just throw them all in the Hudson."
> I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product
This makes perfect sense. In the early 2010s I worked with what remained of IBM development and was surprised at the dysfunction, complete lack of manufacturing culture and engineering approaches. I couldn't believe that this culture could produce a successful product. Guess what, it actually didn't.
IBM wasn’t that hopeless, at least not so early. It produced some fairly successful and well-regarded products in the ‘80s and ‘90s like the POWER architecture, the AS/400, and updates to its mainframe line.
2010's would have been too late to see those things. Wrt PCs, the PC company sale was complete and IIRC Lenovo was no longer even sharing space with IBM.
I’m sure the IBM of the 2010s bore little resemblance to the engineering culture that gave them the reputation that made the 5150 as important as it was.
Can anyone remember when IBM made their own clones?
Ambra?
They had very unusual mice but I never saw one in the wild.
The sale to Lenovo went very well, when compared to how most mergers, acquisitions and consolidations went in the period. I can't remember Lenovo from before the acquisition and, again, I can't remember seeing any pre-Thinkpad Lenovo machines.
It's always interesting to see these types of articles with a bunch of people pontificating about what was or wasn't happening at IBM. I started my career at IBM and had the chance to engage with the Boca Raton group and the PC division there, working as an internal supplier within IBM. The idea that the PC Group was somehow destroyed by "antibodies" is ridiculous on its face—this notion is often spoken by people who have no real background with the group or a true understanding of what was going on.
As Patrick Lencioni has often said, we have things reported as strategy, when it turns out to be people issues. A lot of what happened at IBM only makes sense if you were there.
I'll list some things here, though since I'm late to the conversation, I’m not sure how much it will be observed. However, perhaps an IBMer who was with the PC Company will come across this and add a few more alternatives or supporting facts.
1. IBM was a wildly diverse place culturally. We had almost half a million employees worldwide. As with any large corporation, you could find divergent views—anyone could find a person or two to support anything they wanted to claim about the company. However, the PC division was generally well regarded. Sure, you can find somebody who said something about "antibodies", but you can find a lot more who would say that’s ridiculous. I tend more toward the latter than the former.
2. Don Estridge was a bit of a cowboy. He did love being down in Florida, which gave him the ability to move quickly. Still, I would say IBM allowed for its “wild ducks”, and while the PC group was one of the more obvious successes, it was not IBM’s only success. Estridge died in a well-publicized airplane accident at Dallas Fort Worth. I don't think most people understand how much cultural impact this had on the group. Although it could be debated, I do believe we could say it was as if Bill Gates or Steve Jobs had been taken out of their company. The amazing thing about the PC group is that it didn’t collapse after his death.
3. The single most destructive thing IBM did was thinking they could take the PC group out of Boca and transport it to Research Triangle Park. After it moved to RTP, I got to work there with many of the group’s core members. They consistently described how the move was traumatic to virtually every aspect of a team that was truly world-class. (Another issue: There was also a development decision in Boca that some decried—some forward-thinking was shelved—but I wasn’t heavily involved in that, and it wasn’t so universal.)
4. I was in the midst of the turmoil as IBM reached the midlife of the PC in RTP. By that stage, we had given up on the idea of clear, proprietary closed systems. Yet at the same time, we were doing some excellent engineering and marketing—we were finally winning awards from PC magazines for the desktops, and people already loved our laptops. But we were clearly hamstrung. Without going deep into details, it’s clear in today’s economy that certain business units serve different purposes. The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell. What most people don’t realize is that one of the biggest impacts of selling the group to Lenovo was the removal of the blue tax. Many key U.S. development team members stayed with the company, and though Lenovo was committed to eventually moving true development headquarters to China, it would have collapsed without an incredibly dedicated group of IBMers who were unfailingly unselfish. There was something about the culture—dedication to the team was one of the most important things you could do, even after the group had been sold to Lenovo.
On reflection, if Estridge never died, and if the division had never moved from Boca, the computing industry would be very different as b...
"IBM had no moat around the PC." is true about the original PC and XT, but they did have 7 patents on the AT. After the PS/2 attempt didn't work out, their lawyers spent the first half of the 1990s going after the chipset makers and the second half of the 1990s getting clone makers themselves to license these patents (along with some other unrelated ones that weren't about to expire).
A quick search showed it isn't easy to find online version of these patents (because IBM has so many that even knowing these are from 1984 didn't help), but I remember that one was related to being able to split a screen into a graphics and a text part in their EGA board (though the Apple II previously did this too, but with a fixed split), one was about detecting 360KB vs 1.2MB floppy drives by seeking to track 60 and then stepping back 59 tracks and checking if we were now at track 0 (not unlike how the Apple II handled the lack of a track 0 signal, but for a different purpose), one was for the "bus master" signal in the PC AT (later ISA) bus and I can't seem to remember the other four but they were all similar in style.
So in the late 1990s you had to pay IBM if you wanted to make a PC clone (AT and up, but 8088 clones had died out in the early 1990s).
30 comments
[ 2.4 ms ] story [ 57.3 ms ] threadRemember IBM had gone through a very painful antitrust case and was still subject to the consent decree. I’m not sure right now of the terms, but it certainly limited the leverages IBM could apply against third parties profiting from the PC.
Open nature of PC allowed for truly free/open source software to exist which can be functional without big corporate lockdown. I can fully assemble it with parts I can buy individually and as long as they are compatible (which is mentioned on the box, no hidden knowledge here) I can expect it to work within the mentioned warranty.
My PC based computers can be booted and fully functional with Debain, Fedora and (put your favorite Linux, BSD distro here mine is openSUSE Tumbleweed). There is no parallel ecosystem which yet, which rivals PC in terms of open specs and fully tinkerable hardware and software.
Macbooks are locked down with Apple and forget about your own hardware.
Android seemed like a competitor, but closed nature of its development and lack commodity hardware around ARM based phones means that FOSS layer exists only in user bases apps. We have custom ROMs which require bootable blobs from vendors and its non-reliable and breaks often.
Not completely. Asahi linux boots on bare metal and runs great on Apple silicon machines prior to the M3.
We still had plenty of issue with Intel and Microsoft being able to play out their monopoly.
So I think it could have been a lot worse, but it could also have been a lot better.
The Apple II was an open system and IBM clearly took a lot of inspiration from the Apple II line. Look at the 5150 motherboard in the picture in the article and compare it to the motherboard from an Apple II+
But this view neglects the fact that an organic ecosystem of interoperable open hardware converging to de facto standards and running a common OS already existed prior to IBM designing their PC. By 1980, there were already many independent vendors implementing their own variation on the 8080/S-100 design pioneered by MITS, all running CP/M from Digital Research.
When IBM released the PC, the CP/M world was still going strong. The fact that it was an easily cloneable architecture based on the 16-bit 8086 caused a lot of disruption, and led to the market dynamics that were already present in the 8080-S100-CP/M world pivoting over to x86-ISA-DOS.
If IBM had kept their PC proprietary, it might have led to a bit more fragmentation in the short-term market for business microcomputing, but at the same time, the CP/M world would have continued on without that disruption, and something else would have ultimately catalyzed the move to a common 16-bit architecture. DR was already working on CP/M-86 at the time IBM was developing the PC, after all.
Eventually, the same forces that led to the collapse of vertically integrated, proprietary platforms and the dominance of open-standards system builders would have asserted themselves, and IBM itself would still have been subdued by them. Modern computing would likely be in a similar position with or without IBM. The PC was a major ripple, but didn't really change the current.
That was true everywhere. I worked at a mini company at the time when the PC came out. People in that company looked at the PC as a cool thing, but not a real computer.
In 10 or so years, the PC killed of almost all mini computer companies. Some even speculated that was the main reason for IBM to create the PC :)
Everyone else, including other IBM offerings, were all about vertical integration.
It is no coincidence that nowadays with PC desktops being largely left to enthusiastics and gamers, OEMs are all doubling down on vertical integration across laptops and mobile devices, as means to recoup the thin margins that have come to be.
Had IBM made clones impossible they could likely have captured far more of the market.
It certainly wasn't IBM ability to produce PC that prevented them selling more.
Likely eventually they would have licensed the architecture to AT&T and the like.
Vertical integration could have worked, we are just lucky it didn't.
You mean like publishing the system board schematics and a full source listing for the BIOS?
That seems to have been surprisingly normal for PCs in the late 1970s.
Apple also published schematics and listings, and had to deal with clones, but Apple 2 clones weren't particularly useful without a copy of (or compatible replacement for) Apple's ROM, which Apple did not license.
But it was too late, and they didn't have the power they thought they had.
TL;DR: big incumbents (e.g. IBM) get out-innovated and replaced by scrappy startups even when the incumbent sees it coming and tries to react. The incumbent's business processes, sales metrics (NPII in this story), internal culture and established customer base make it impossible for an innovative product to succeed within the company.
The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers. They haven't got time to go chasing small orders of the new gadget from new customers who they don't have a relationship with, and the existing customers don't see the point of the new gadget. So orders for the gadget stagnate.
Across town is the small scrappy start-up making a similar gadget. It lives on those small orders and has a highly motivated sales person who chases those orders full time. So their orders grow, their product improves from the market feedback, and one day the new gadget is actually better than the incumbent's main product. At that point the incumbent goes out of business.
In a rare feat, Apple managed to do just that with the iPhone, which ate the iPod’s lunch. This at a time when the iPod was a core product, directly responsible for their revival and success, that could have been milked for years to come.
They tried, in the form of the previously mentioned PS/2. They just squeezed a little too hard. There was also the PCjr, which was riddled with enough technical flaws at a blistering price point for it to also end up a flop (Charlie Chaplin was also not exactly a great choice to sell to a market already trending younger). IBM might have eventually gotten it right, they just lost the will to keep trying. Their business model depended on landing corporate whales buying high-margin products and services; mere commodities were a plebeian concern beneath them.
This makes perfect sense. In the early 2010s I worked with what remained of IBM development and was surprised at the dysfunction, complete lack of manufacturing culture and engineering approaches. I couldn't believe that this culture could produce a successful product. Guess what, it actually didn't.
The blog on Don Estridge covers IBM's place in PC history in fascinating and extensive detail.
Mr. Edwards also reminded me what a debt Linux users owe to Rod Canion for making the gang of 9 and open hardware a reality.
Ambra?
They had very unusual mice but I never saw one in the wild.
The sale to Lenovo went very well, when compared to how most mergers, acquisitions and consolidations went in the period. I can't remember Lenovo from before the acquisition and, again, I can't remember seeing any pre-Thinkpad Lenovo machines.
As Patrick Lencioni has often said, we have things reported as strategy, when it turns out to be people issues. A lot of what happened at IBM only makes sense if you were there.
I'll list some things here, though since I'm late to the conversation, I’m not sure how much it will be observed. However, perhaps an IBMer who was with the PC Company will come across this and add a few more alternatives or supporting facts.
1. IBM was a wildly diverse place culturally. We had almost half a million employees worldwide. As with any large corporation, you could find divergent views—anyone could find a person or two to support anything they wanted to claim about the company. However, the PC division was generally well regarded. Sure, you can find somebody who said something about "antibodies", but you can find a lot more who would say that’s ridiculous. I tend more toward the latter than the former.
2. Don Estridge was a bit of a cowboy. He did love being down in Florida, which gave him the ability to move quickly. Still, I would say IBM allowed for its “wild ducks”, and while the PC group was one of the more obvious successes, it was not IBM’s only success. Estridge died in a well-publicized airplane accident at Dallas Fort Worth. I don't think most people understand how much cultural impact this had on the group. Although it could be debated, I do believe we could say it was as if Bill Gates or Steve Jobs had been taken out of their company. The amazing thing about the PC group is that it didn’t collapse after his death.
3. The single most destructive thing IBM did was thinking they could take the PC group out of Boca and transport it to Research Triangle Park. After it moved to RTP, I got to work there with many of the group’s core members. They consistently described how the move was traumatic to virtually every aspect of a team that was truly world-class. (Another issue: There was also a development decision in Boca that some decried—some forward-thinking was shelved—but I wasn’t heavily involved in that, and it wasn’t so universal.)
4. I was in the midst of the turmoil as IBM reached the midlife of the PC in RTP. By that stage, we had given up on the idea of clear, proprietary closed systems. Yet at the same time, we were doing some excellent engineering and marketing—we were finally winning awards from PC magazines for the desktops, and people already loved our laptops. But we were clearly hamstrung. Without going deep into details, it’s clear in today’s economy that certain business units serve different purposes. The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell. What most people don’t realize is that one of the biggest impacts of selling the group to Lenovo was the removal of the blue tax. Many key U.S. development team members stayed with the company, and though Lenovo was committed to eventually moving true development headquarters to China, it would have collapsed without an incredibly dedicated group of IBMers who were unfailingly unselfish. There was something about the culture—dedication to the team was one of the most important things you could do, even after the group had been sold to Lenovo.
On reflection, if Estridge never died, and if the division had never moved from Boca, the computing industry would be very different as b...
Someone might also have read the BIOS source code listing that IBM provided:
https://archive.org/details/IBMPCIBM5150TechnicalReference63...
A quick search showed it isn't easy to find online version of these patents (because IBM has so many that even knowing these are from 1984 didn't help), but I remember that one was related to being able to split a screen into a graphics and a text part in their EGA board (though the Apple II previously did this too, but with a fixed split), one was about detecting 360KB vs 1.2MB floppy drives by seeking to track 60 and then stepping back 59 tracks and checking if we were now at track 0 (not unlike how the Apple II handled the lack of a track 0 signal, but for a different purpose), one was for the "bus master" signal in the PC AT (later ISA) bus and I can't seem to remember the other four but they were all similar in style.
So in the late 1990s you had to pay IBM if you wanted to make a PC clone (AT and up, but 8088 clones had died out in the early 1990s).