uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs to, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
For simple problems yes. Look up the term "blue teaming." If researchers ask AI to generate a summary of a vulnerability and then it randomly ads a disclaimer that is something that can be trained out of the model.
Imagine trying to poison datasets to make ChatGPT respond that it is James Bond when a user asks "Who are you?" I personally can't see how that would be possible to do. OpenAI explicitly trains it so that it knows it is ChatGPT, they provide it in the system prompt, and it would be caught before they released the model if it did somehow happen.
I'm simply pointing out that modern LLMs do not just regurgitate what was most common in the dataset for the base model. Especially when we are talking about how it is structuring the output of a generic task it's doing.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
^^^ This. As someone who worked in the computer security for years: the second best thing for security (after turning on automatic updates for your OS / software that you use) is to block ads. They are chock full with scams in addition to plain old malware.
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
The other way round it looks like a website's javascript being allowed to interfere with extensions is also a bit of a problem. I can't really think of a reason you'd want to let it interecept requests to a moz-extension: URL or allow it to make an iframe for one.
Neither could be considered a security bug, but it's a bit odd the entire interface is wide open.
Uh no it isn't, being able to edit the page contents is the entire purpose of this extension (and many others), the issue here is that because there is no other way for an extension to provide a UI to the user it also has to do that by modifying the page - which is something a malicious page can take advantage of.
The solution here isn't "extensions shouldn't be allowed to modify the page" but "extensions should have some means of creating their own UI so they don't have to modify the page for their UI".
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
Yes, with caveats. They could have UI that the websites couldn't access, but the fact that they interacted with website content could still expose them to attacks.
My intuition was yes, but research says otherwise. They have had their own vulnerabilities. Basically, anywhere anything interacts with site code, there's potential for vulnerabilities. It might be better, but the extensions still read HTML from the page, and... guess what can happen then?
No, the opposite. Firefox WebExtensions inherit the two main security features that XUL extensions used to separate page content from extension code. But in the XUL extension days, if page content did manage to control an extension, it could directly take over your machine and execute any code with full filesystem access.
(The two security features are X-ray vision and cross-origin access controls. The former makes it so extension code doesn’t see the page’s modifications to built-in properties. For example, if my extension calls document.createRange(), but the page has overwritten that method, my code will see the original and not the modified version. But if I call document.wrappedJSObject.createRange(), I ask to get the page’s version, which might be malicious. The latter just means that objects created by extensions and made accessible to the page can’t actually be used by it unless the extension explicitly exports them. Both of these are still active for WebExtensions.)
Lotta rose-tinted glasses when people remember the XUL extension days. It was an extraordinarily risky and fragile architecture. Every single extension had full control over your machine, and every major Firefox update broke most extensions (or made them break Firefox), because the main way to inject your logic into the browser was monkey-patching.
XUL extensions could essentially open pop-up windows (the way context menus do), so yes. It can be fully transparent if needed, I believe.
You can probably drop an absolutely positioned block (relative to the browser chrome, outside the tabbrowser) too, but I think that didn't work in some older versions?
Note that this is all based on very vague memories, so may be off… Also, both scenarios don't bother injecting anything inside the content. This unfortunately means you need to do some annoying math to position things correctly (in particular if funny DPIs are involved).
Yes. There was even an XUL extension which loaded ActiveX controls, except without IE's 'security zones'. Honestly, that was always a massive security blindspot.
At the very least the author's method doesn't seem to work for the "legacy" version of uBlock Origin here in Pale Moon since the iframe uBO adds to the DOM is an HTMLDocument pointing to about:blank. There are also no moz-extension:// shenanigans since uBO lives in chrome:// which can't be accessed from content I believe
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Not GP, but I did the same about 3 years ago when 1PW transitioned from 7 to 8: it works decently, but the UI/UX is not as polished compared to how 1PW was back then. No technical issues at all, just not as smooth. It's still fine and not something I notice any more.
As someone who uses one for work and the other for personal pws, I'm puzzled about what you're doing in the UI of either that makes BW even all that different, let alone 'horrific'
It's definitely not better, 1p is by far the best manager, but it works fine. I still have 1p installed because I was paying yearly and I'm running bitwarden in a container that sometimes I forget to restart, etc so its more manual, but I don't think 1passwors was worth the yearly fee before their Omarchy donations etc, and I don't even want to think about how much money I've paid to 1password for storing a 3mb database for me for 10 years.
I had been wanting to get my passwords off the cloud for 5 years and just finally did it. Everything transferred fine, but sometimes a UX or chrome extension glitch happens and I'll wind up storing a new pass in 1p instead of bitwarden. Before my subscription ends in 6 months I'll just dump 1p again and import it and fully delete the app once I can't log in again.
You just aren't getting that super smooth 1p UX. It's more like a linux app that has quirks, weird design decisions, etc. Like its 2 clicks to copy password, not just clicking "copy password" like in 1password. And after 10+ years of 1p UX over and over every day it's a bit jarring but its a LOT better than lastpass was 10 years ago and totally fine. It, generally, looks and acts almost exactly like 1p.
The container is super simple, I just start it and open bitwarden. I have never had to troubleshoot it and it starts almost instantly and is ready to use.
Use tailscale and put it on a magic dns name like "vault.mytailscale.net" and use it everywhere you have connections.
Same. User of 15 years. Solid native apps turned into buggy Electron mess. I'd be fine with Electron if it weren't buggy. Wi-Fi server went away. 25% price increase this year and they do stupid sports sponsorships now.
I wonder how much of this is to be blamed on ai psychosis C-suites have. Everybody I know has been complaining that the push from the c suite down is to ship ship ship with AI. Proper engineering is seen as a waste of time, along with testing and future thinking. Companies just ship more and more untested slop
Right, but what part of VC funding means ditching native apps for electron? Enshitification usually means exploitation, this is just change for change's sake
Prior to that the Windows version was a somewhat half-baked thing made by a contractor and didn't keep parity with the Mac version. It was better than nothing if you had to use Windows sometimes, but you wouldn't have bought it just for that version.
But with the VC funding came a change from B2C sales to Mac users who wanted good software to targeting B2B enterprise customers who wanted a feature checklist across their fleet, Windows included.
Same here, it’s sad how they went from working flawlessly with a quick and clean client, to whatever it is today. Sometimes I get three or more popups when trying sign in (many after the login has already been completed)…
Same. My favourite is the one offering to save the login that you've just filled from a saved login while simultaneously using 12GB of RAM. What an absolute clown car 1Password has become.
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
This leak doesn’t exist. The injection goes in a sandboxed iframe, which is protected from the rest of the page by the same security boundary that prevents them from puppeteering your bank’s pages in an iframe they’ve embedded themselves.
A password manager should prompt the user to pick which extension to share, and send only that to the browser extension itself.
I'm aware that several show all accounts in the DOM itself _and then_ prompt to disclosed only the secret material, but that's honestly not great design.
What universe are you people living in? Every ad blocker except uBO has been using DNR for years and they all work fine. uBO Lite uses DNR and it works fine (although recently it stopped being permissionless, which I think was a huge mistake).
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from having uBO installed is zero.
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from ad-slots on various websites is non-zero, and the number of accidental "click on ad, end up on malicious website" incidents is even higher.
For me, the math on uBO has been working out great so far.
There's almost no overlap between sites you shouldn't mess with and sites that need ad-blocking. Like Chase isn't running third-party ads, and Google doesn't need login.
Malicious ads on Google.com (as in: on the top of the search results) are routine occurrence. Blocking ads for you and your loved ones is the second best thing you can do to keep them safe (after keeping your OS/software updated).
You should double check what your bank is doing under the hood. I can't speak to chase but mine would load lots of questionable third party garbage if it weren't for umatrix.
It used to be. The "legacy" version of uBO intended for Pale Moon and pre-Quantum Firefox had the add-on living in chrome://ublock0 (the picker is in chrome://ublock0/content/epicker.html), and the iframe for the element picker injected into a website's DOM is an HTMLDocument pointing to about:blank.
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
The concept of browser extensions seems terrible in general. There are many that ship with malware, botnets, infostealers etc. uBlock Origin even requires a compiled .wasm module. It's unwise to grant that level of complexity from third party devs permission over something as sensitive as your web browser.
Th day no browser allows it is the day I make the vibe-browser. A browser that scraps all the content of every website, and tells an AI to present it without the garbage.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
Start it today... The best time to plant that tree may have been 15 years ago, you may still have 5 years for it to be viable if you start now. There no need to wait until the quote matures to start panicking.
The solution would be to properly implement the features that enough users want into the browser. After all, extensions are usually just a stopgap measure. Firefox could also simply build in an ad blocker that works just as well as uBlock Origin. For password managers, they could simply build an API into the browser that password managers could then use to integrate with the browser. Then there would be no need for an extra extension. The same goes for things like add-ons to download videos from sites that prevent it, such as YouTube or similar streaming sites. If Firefox simply had a built-in feature to scrape video files from websites and save them normally via the right-click menu, no one would install dubious extensions for that purpose.
That's an argument in favor of extensions. Most of the examples you listed are features that oppose the interests of most commercial players on the market, including but not limited to, many multinational corporations. If they were all first-party features of the browser, Firefox would've been dead a long time ago.
As it is, they're just voluntary extra software that Firefox neither bundles nor recommends explicitly, which keeps both the browsers and extensions safe - merely supporting arbitrary extensions in general is not enough to create focused market pushback against the browser (and gives Fx some leverage, mostly around "accessibility"), while individual extensions are too small a target to fight.
It's a good separation of concerns, and a somewhat stable equilibrium.
I'm thoroughly disappointed that a vulnerability as trivial as this requires AI assistance. The poster already had all the important information at hand.
I used uBlock Origin and I enjoyed the relief, I must say. But, it did slightly nag at me that I was "ripping off resources" from the very sites that I should've been supporting in that way. I mean, if I go and visit every day and get some benefit out of them, their webmaster team deserves a cut of the proceeds, at least, yeah? But I am a freeloader by nature and unfortunately, the Internet spawned a generation of freeloaders. Not that there's anything wrong with freeloading. I've always supported RMS and the F/OSS vision. (Those licenses are not freeload licenses!)
Anyway, Edge is ramping up some decent protection against tracking and ad-annoyances. Again, I'm posting on the wrong thread, wrong site about these alternatives. But I've found Edge already blocking stuff that was blasting through my Chrome sessions.
And then there's Chrome, which offers two levels of Safe Browsing protection, as of November 2026. Have we enabled the highest AI-heuristic-powered levels of safety for yourself? Are we at high risk of malware attacks because we're klicking on sketchie linkies all day? Yeah... but we're too paranoid to touch Google kit anyway? Google also has the Advanced Protection Program we can enroll in, if we're a palestinian reporter or Elon Musk type.
Just another reminder that many don't think about: if we are adding extensions to our browser like there's no tomorrow, all of them are increasing our attack surface. (UBO excepted...) These risky integrations and extensions are a really fertile field for malware, spyware, and supply-chain attacks. We hate Manifest v3, but we're running 2 dozen extensions, any one of which could stab us in the back next month, next year, next millennium falcon.
You'd trust Google to protect you, if you were a Palestinian journalist? Haha, tell me you are joking, please.
Supporting RMS and feeling like blocking ads is "ripping off resources" from websites? How did you make those 2 things square up in your mind? They are like opposites! And then more of the same, talking about MS Edge. Also talking about Google Chrome and not at least Chromium, or better Ungoogled Chromium.
And why does one need to "enroll" in something something Google anyways, in order to get what should be in the default package?
I've 3rd party frames blocked by default, which is good reminder to everyone that you can up one your blocking game with increasing the blocking mode level as described here https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode.
One can have keyboard shortcut which automatically reduces that blocking level(may cause refresh) if something not right, or enable on domain basis. I got used to enabling stuff when have issues and it's not mentally taxing
Browsers should implement something like a sandboxed DOM where execution is limited to a snapshot of the DOM. This would prevent most of the client side related vulnerabilities.
That sounds like a halving of performance for marginal security gain, when we have such glaring holes like extensions having unfettered access to all network requests made by the browser (the gap that manifest v3 moved towards closing).
The entire point of extensions is to operate outside the default sandbox. Otherwise any tab could act like an extension, interacting with your other tabs.
On hand we're widening what a tab may do, throwing dozens of permission prompts at users, on the other we're trying to lock down extensions to the point of making them redundant. I wouldn't be surprised if by the time manifest v5 rolls around, tabs and extensions will be indistinguishable.
At that point someone will create a chrome mod "SuperExtensions", sourcing extensions from a third-party marketplace that is worse in every way than what we had in 2020, but at least gives people useful extensions again.
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[ 0.19 ms ] story [ 56.2 ms ] threadThis does indeed sound like religious belief.
It's that the problem? "Good writing" is benchmarked, but we get writing the over-fits the benchmark?
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
That is... an ironic disaster.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50454639
How?
Neither could be considered a security bug, but it's a bit odd the entire interface is wide open.
The solution here isn't "extensions shouldn't be allowed to modify the page" but "extensions should have some means of creating their own UI so they don't have to modify the page for their UI".
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP
Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/
Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html
SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/
(The two security features are X-ray vision and cross-origin access controls. The former makes it so extension code doesn’t see the page’s modifications to built-in properties. For example, if my extension calls document.createRange(), but the page has overwritten that method, my code will see the original and not the modified version. But if I call document.wrappedJSObject.createRange(), I ask to get the page’s version, which might be malicious. The latter just means that objects created by extensions and made accessible to the page can’t actually be used by it unless the extension explicitly exports them. Both of these are still active for WebExtensions.)
Lotta rose-tinted glasses when people remember the XUL extension days. It was an extraordinarily risky and fragile architecture. Every single extension had full control over your machine, and every major Firefox update broke most extensions (or made them break Firefox), because the main way to inject your logic into the browser was monkey-patching.
You can probably drop an absolutely positioned block (relative to the browser chrome, outside the tabbrowser) too, but I think that didn't work in some older versions?
Note that this is all based on very vague memories, so may be off… Also, both scenarios don't bother injecting anything inside the content. This unfortunately means you need to do some annoying math to position things correctly (in particular if funny DPIs are involved).
As someone who uses one for work and the other for personal pws, I'm puzzled about what you're doing in the UI of either that makes BW even all that different, let alone 'horrific'
I had been wanting to get my passwords off the cloud for 5 years and just finally did it. Everything transferred fine, but sometimes a UX or chrome extension glitch happens and I'll wind up storing a new pass in 1p instead of bitwarden. Before my subscription ends in 6 months I'll just dump 1p again and import it and fully delete the app once I can't log in again.
You just aren't getting that super smooth 1p UX. It's more like a linux app that has quirks, weird design decisions, etc. Like its 2 clicks to copy password, not just clicking "copy password" like in 1password. And after 10+ years of 1p UX over and over every day it's a bit jarring but its a LOT better than lastpass was 10 years ago and totally fine. It, generally, looks and acts almost exactly like 1p.
The container is super simple, I just start it and open bitwarden. I have never had to troubleshoot it and it starts almost instantly and is ready to use.
Use tailscale and put it on a magic dns name like "vault.mytailscale.net" and use it everywhere you have connections.
https://1password.com/blog/accel-partnership
Enshittification began shortly thereafter.
But with the VC funding came a change from B2C sales to Mac users who wanted good software to targeting B2B enterprise customers who wanted a feature checklist across their fleet, Windows included.
Can't the extension use the sidebar? I know Tree Style Tab uses it, so why couldn't an extension put the selector there?
I'm aware that several show all accounts in the DOM itself _and then_ prompt to disclosed only the secret material, but that's honestly not great design.
Every time MV3 comes up there's a slew of people that say you can't do ad blocking with it but no one ever prevents evidence or explains why everyone not using uBO has working ad blocking.
> I would never use a browser with any extensions for anything important.
I agree with this though, or at least I agree for extensions that ask for overly broad permissions such as uBO and uBO Lite.
The number of drive-by malware attacks I've gotten from ad-slots on various websites is non-zero, and the number of accidental "click on ad, end up on malicious website" incidents is even higher.
For me, the math on uBO has been working out great so far.
uBlock Origin: 1.76.4
uBO Lite: 2026.1110.1816
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
You're missing out (or rather, getting a lot more ads and trackers and spyware).
DNS blocking is complementary, and a good thing to also have. Some sites are best blocked at that level becuase they are pure evil.
But DNS blocking will miss most of the spyware/adware/malware that uBlock Origin can handle.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
As it is, they're just voluntary extra software that Firefox neither bundles nor recommends explicitly, which keeps both the browsers and extensions safe - merely supporting arbitrary extensions in general is not enough to create focused market pushback against the browser (and gives Fx some leverage, mostly around "accessibility"), while individual extensions are too small a target to fight.
It's a good separation of concerns, and a somewhat stable equilibrium.
Anyway, Edge is ramping up some decent protection against tracking and ad-annoyances. Again, I'm posting on the wrong thread, wrong site about these alternatives. But I've found Edge already blocking stuff that was blasting through my Chrome sessions.
And then there's Chrome, which offers two levels of Safe Browsing protection, as of November 2026. Have we enabled the highest AI-heuristic-powered levels of safety for yourself? Are we at high risk of malware attacks because we're klicking on sketchie linkies all day? Yeah... but we're too paranoid to touch Google kit anyway? Google also has the Advanced Protection Program we can enroll in, if we're a palestinian reporter or Elon Musk type.
Just another reminder that many don't think about: if we are adding extensions to our browser like there's no tomorrow, all of them are increasing our attack surface. (UBO excepted...) These risky integrations and extensions are a really fertile field for malware, spyware, and supply-chain attacks. We hate Manifest v3, but we're running 2 dozen extensions, any one of which could stab us in the back next month, next year, next millennium falcon.
tl;dr: Thank you kindly for the downvotes
Supporting RMS and feeling like blocking ads is "ripping off resources" from websites? How did you make those 2 things square up in your mind? They are like opposites! And then more of the same, talking about MS Edge. Also talking about Google Chrome and not at least Chromium, or better Ungoogled Chromium.
And why does one need to "enroll" in something something Google anyways, in order to get what should be in the default package?
It all sounds very unreflected.
no advisory still on the github page unlike the big sibling's mv2 repo
One can have keyboard shortcut which automatically reduces that blocking level(may cause refresh) if something not right, or enable on domain basis. I got used to enabling stuff when have issues and it's not mentally taxing
I'm no expert but that doesn't seem very secure to me, maybe there was alterior motives.
I wonder why 5.6 rather than 6.1 ?
On hand we're widening what a tab may do, throwing dozens of permission prompts at users, on the other we're trying to lock down extensions to the point of making them redundant. I wouldn't be surprised if by the time manifest v5 rolls around, tabs and extensions will be indistinguishable.
At that point someone will create a chrome mod "SuperExtensions", sourcing extensions from a third-party marketplace that is worse in every way than what we had in 2020, but at least gives people useful extensions again.